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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation used critical race theory as a basis to probe legal and 
regulatory transitions in the area of minority ownership and their implications for 
marketplace diversity and public interest. Through the examination of judicial 
decisions involving minority broadcast ownership this dissertation analyzed the 
expressed or implied assumptions of the judiciary in reaching those decisions, 
provided a critical analysis of those assumptions, discussed the implications and 
results of those assumptions on minority broadcast ownership, and suggested 
approaches to promote diversity and minority ownership in a deregulated media 
environment. 
Both primary and secondary authorities were integral to this research. 
Overall, analysis took place in three parts. First, there was a collection of United 
States district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court cases in the area of 
minority ownership and minority ownership policies promoted by the FCC. 
Second, analysis of cases consisted of reviewing majority and dissenting 
opinions. Placing majority and dissenting opinions in the framework of critical 
race theory, the study continued with determining the judicial rationales and 
arguments. 
The FCC expressed concern that historically, minority groups have been 
underrepresented. While moderately helpful, minority broadcast ownership 
policies (such as distress sales and tax certificates) were superseded by major 
court decisions and the deregulatory movement towards the "economic" 
marketplace of ideas. Not surprisingly, the period since the Telecommunications 
vi 
Act of 1996 has seen a decline in minority ownership and arguably in 
marketplace diversity. 
Deregulation has left the decisions of service and programming to the 
economic forces operating within the broadcast industry. With the increasing 
relaxation of government regulations, broadcasters have discretion in how they 
serve the public's interests. From the early 1990s until the present, the FCC 
minority preferences have been challenged and severely restricted. The trend 
towards deregulating the broadcast industry has coincided with the increased 
hostility toward and lack of support for minority ownership preferences. 
Legally and socially, the concept of race was initially defined in terms of 
group rights, as seen in TV 9 and Garrett decisions. With the remnants of 
segregation embedded in society, race was seen as a label. However, as 
economic and social changes took place, there was a backlash. Minority 
ownership policies were perceived as forms of "reverse discrimination" against 
the white majority. Discrimination against groups began to be attributed to 
individual actions in isolated, specific contexts. The courts shifted in their 
interpretation of FCC rationales for minority ownership policies and deferred to 
administrative agencies (FCC) and congressional action, as they recognized 
Congress' power to promote the interest of society. 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
began to change its approach to minority ownership polices. In National Black 
Media Coalition, the courts allowed the industry's focus on technological 
advancements to prevail over citizen concerns. With the coming of new 
vii 
technologies such as personal communication services (PCS), high-definition 
television (HDTV), and direct broadcast satellite (DBS), the FCC was looking to 
advance pro-industry, deregulatory policies. Congress soon followed the FCC's 
stance as comparative hearings were replaced with competitive bidding. The 
courts, without questioning what impact these changes may have on minorities, 
upheld the deregulation of the industry. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The marketplace of ideas language coined by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr., in World War I sedition cases continued to cast a shadow over 
thought and language into the latter years of the 20th century and beyond. The 
marketplace of ideas is a commonly held expression, which has been found in 
policy statements by the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] as a 
manifestation of a desire to promote diversity in broadcast ownership and 
programming. The FCC expressed concern that historically, minority groups have 
been underrepresented. Recognizing this as an issue, the FCC instituted a series 
of minority preferences in the 1960s/1970s. While moderately helpful, these 
policies were superseded by major court decisions and the deregulatory 
movement towards the "economic" marketplace of ideas, a belief that unbridled 
competition would mean good results for society. Not surprisingly, the period 
since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has seen a decline in minority 
ownership and arguably in marketplace diversity. 
While some argue that the marketplace of ideas and the economic 
marketplace are one and the same, 1 the ability of these concepts to work 
together is questionable. 2 
1 Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. R. 207 
(1982) Fowler and Brenner assert that the free market (removed of regulation) would allow the rights of the 
viewers to be heard and attended to. 
2 Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority Advocacy before the FCC: Using Marketplace Rhetoric to Urge 
Policy Change, 41 FED. COM. L.J. 133, (1989) [Hereinafter Minority Advocacy). The author stated that 
deregulation has limited the citizens ability to be heard noting the removal of the fairness doctrine, 
ascertainment requirements, and the limited appeals through public participation (license challenges, etc.); 
See also Wilfrid Rumble, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide Diverse Viewpoints on Issues 
of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to Receive Critical Information, 28 SAN FRANCISCO 
1 
Former FCC chairman Newton Minow declared, "I reject this ideological 
view that the marketplace will regulate itself and that the television marketplace 
will give us perfection." 3 Deregulation has left the decisions of service and 
programming to the economic forces operating within the broadcast industry. 4 
With the increasing relaxation of government regulations, broadcasters have 
discretion in how they serve the public's interests. 5 
Quoting former governor of Florida and past president of the National 
Association of Broadcasters, LeRoy Collins, Minow said public interest in 
broadcasting, 
" ... must have a soul and a conscience, a burning desire to 
excel, as well as to sell; the urge to build the character, 
citizenship and intellectual stature of people ... "6 
However, there remains great ambiguity about what exactly constitutes 
"public interest." Rather than trying to clarify the concept, broadcaster- friendly 
regulators resolved to let industry forces and economic bottom-line 
considerations define what the public interest should be. It is arguable that by 
removing FCC and government restrictions, broadcasters will be inclined to 
pursue those ideas. But as Don R. LeDuc has argued, broadcasters often 
sacrifice freedom of expression in order to secure economic concessions or 
LAw REVIEW 793 (1994); Vincent Mosco, The Mythology of Telecommunications Deregulation, 40 JOURNAL 
OF COMMUNICATIONS 36 (1990). 
3 Newton Minow, How Vast The Wasteland Now? Thirtieth Anniversary of "The Vast Wasteland" 12 
!Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991). 
Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpreting 
the Public Interest Standard, 60 NORTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW 1057 at 1104 (1982). 
5 Jon T. Powell and Wally Gair, Public Interest and the Business of Broadcasting 39 (1988). 
6 Supra note 3 at 23. 
2 
advantages. 7 For example, many stations opt to forego investing monies into 
news and public affairs programming, which are traditionally considered the heart 
of public interest obligations. 8 
Previous judicial and government involvement promoted minority 
preferences and viewpoints in the media. From the mid-1960s until 1989, the 
FCC and Congress have enacted various policies to help minorities gain a 
foothold in the industry.9 While these policies have helped minorities make small 
strides in ownership, they failed to substantially increase the number of minority 
owners and have not been without their critics. From the early 1990s until the 
present, the FCC minority preferences have been challenged and severely 
restricted. 10 The trend towards deregulating the broadcast industry has coincided 
with the increased hostility toward and lack of support for minority ownership 
preferences. 
7 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. & Don R. LeDuc, Law of Mass Communications 453 (8th ed. 1995). 
8 See, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, FCC Mimeograph No. 81575, March 1946. 
The 'Blue Book' is a 1946 document that outlined the public service responsibilities of broadcast licensees. 
Though never officially enforced by the FCC, the Blue Book provided a thorough and well-reasoned 
guideline. In order for broadcasters to fully serve the public's interest, four major issues were deemed 
important: 1) elimination of excessive advertising, 2) carriage of programs devoted to public service, such as 
news, 3) coverage of live, local programming, and 4) carriage of sustaining programming, which meant 
programs that were paid for by the station as opposed to sponsorships. See also, Michael McKean and 
Vernon Stone, Deregulation and Competition: Explaining the Absence of Local Broadcast News Operation, 
69 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 713 (1992); Benjamin Bates and L. Todd Chambers, The Economic Value of 
Radio News: Testing Assumptions of Deregulation, Paper presented at 43rd Annual ICA conference, 
Washington, D.C. May 1993. 
9 Distress sale, minority tax certificates and incubator programs. See, In Office of Communications v. FCC, 
123 U.S. APP. D.C. 328 (1966) (citizens had standing to dispute a station's programming in regards to 
minorities). Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 873 F.2d 347 
(1989). Rehearing En Banc denied June 21, 1989) (minority enhancements in license hearings were 
upheld); Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (held the FCC's 
~olicies of minority preferences in license hearings and the distress sale were constitutionally valid). 
0 Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the FCC's extension of minority enhancements to women 
was unconstitutional.) In 1995, Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (the FCC's sex-preference 
policy violated the Fifth Amendment.) In 1995, the minority tax certificate program was abolished. 
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PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to explore the concept of race in minority 
ownership policies through the analysis of court decisions. This dissertation uses 
critical race theory as a basis to probe legal and regulatory transitions in the area 
of minority ownership and their implications for marketplace diversity and public 
interest. Through the examination of judicial decisions involving minority 
broadcast ownership this dissertation: 1) analyzed the expressed or implied 
assumptions of the judiciary in reaching those decisions, 2) provided a critical 
analysis of those assumptions, 3) discussed the implications and results of those 
assumptions on minority broadcast ownership, and 4) suggested approaches to 
promote diversity and minority ownership in a deregulated media environment. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Critical legal studies are characterized by a central message that laws 
exist to legitimate the current maldistribution of wealth and power. 11 Initially, 
critical legal studies attracted minority legal scholars because of its fundamental 
belief that change is needed to create a just society. 12 Critical legal studies (CLS) 
challenged dominant legal discourse but did not acknowledge the minority voice, 
which led many to believe CLS' analysis of the law was incomplete. 13 
11 Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations in Critical Race Theory: Key 
Writings that Formed The Movement 64 (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall 
Thomas, eds., 1995). 
12 Id. At 64-65. 
13 Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-
discrimination Law in Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that Formed The Movement 107-108 (Kimberle 
Creshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds., 1995) [Hereinafter Race and reform]. 
4 
Inspired by the failures of CLS to include the minority voice, critical race 
theory emerged in 1980 with its first official conference held in 1989.14 Critical 
race theorists seek to identify values and norms that are hidden in the law 
through the combination of various philosophies (e.g., Marxism and Black 
Nationalism), disciplines (e.g. sociology, feminist studies) and techniques (e.g. 
narratives). 
Critical race theory is eclectic, as it draws from various sources of 
doctrines, methods, and styles.15 However there are some basic tenets most 
critical race theorists hold to be true.16 First, racism is normal in our society and is 
in fact part of our history and laws. Second, because race is so firmly entrenched 
in our society it is difficult to believe that our legal system is "color blind." Third, 
laws ought to be understood and interpreted with an eye on the history and 
context in which they were initially created. Fourth, the experiences of people of 
color make them effective in analyzing the law, especially the areas on non-
discrimination. 17 
Critical race theory contends that since there is no singular voice within 
the law, cultural and racial uniqueness should be reflected. 18 There is no clear, 
dominant interpretation of the law because such thinking leaves out marginalized 
14 Richard Delgado, Introduction in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) 
\Hereinafter Introduction]. 
5 John 0. Galmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual 
Life in a Multicultural World in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed The Movement 315-328 
~Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
6 Introduction, supra note 14 at xiv- xv. 
17 Id. 
18 Robert J. Arajuo, Race Relations and Conflict in the United States: Critical Race Theory: Contributions to 
and Problems for Race Relations, 32 GoNz. L. REV. 537 (1996/1997). 
5 
perspectives. Race is not a fixed term; it is fluid and complex. 19 Race neutrality, 
within the legal system, creates an illusion that race (and racism) is no longer a 
major contributor to the condition of the black underclass. 20 
Mainstream legal discourse is generally without perspective because it is 
exclusive of conflicting views, values and experiences. 21 This exclusion hinders 
the progress of minority groups since majority opinions are viewed as 
impediments to racial equality.22 Opponents feel critical race theorists over-
analyze the differences between races and dismiss the similarities. 23 Yet critical 
race theorists conclude that to truly achieve equality, whites, people of color, 
courts, etc. need to acknowledge that our society and our laws are race 
conscious. 24 
Additionally, critical race theorists advocate pluralism and promote 
multiculturalism over a unified knowledge and cultural tradition. By advancing 
pluralism, critical race theory discards a singular, assumption-driven meaning of 
law.25 Critical race theorists support the removal of the "color-blindness" ideology 
that permeates current policy, and decision-making processes that govern 
American law.26 They contend that affirmative action, as a social policy tool and a 
19 Galmore, supra note 15 at 318. 
20 Race and reform, supra note 13 at 112. 
21 Galmore, supra note 15 at 325. 
22 Carlos Nan, Adding Salt to the Wound: Affirmative Action and CRT, 12 LAw& INEQ. J. 553 (1994). 
23 See generally, Race and reform, supra note 13. 
24 Id. See also, Galmore. supra note 15. 
25 See, Robert L. Hayman, Race and Reason: The Assault on Critical Race Theory and the Troth About 
Inequality, 16 NAT'L BLACK L. J. 1 (1998/1999); Nancy Levit, Critical Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and 
Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795 (1999). 
26 Id. 
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matter of law, is slow to bring about progress and is relatively ineffective. 27 
Critical race theorists argue that advances made through affirmative action have 
been cyclical, with small steps forward and disproportionately large leaps 
backwards. 
This cyclical movement may be what legal scholar Derrick Bell refers to as 
the "interest-convergence" theory.28 Bell's theory advances the idea that when 
the interest of blacks (and presumably other minorities as well) in achieving racial 
equity "converges" with the interest and comfort level of the white majority, is 
when progress is made. If there is no convergence, racial equity becomes 
stagnant or possibly reversed.29 
For example, while the initial goals and beliefs behind affirmative action 
programs had some effects, by the late 1970s, those who were privileged (i.e., 
white majority) began to see a tightening job market. 30 As employment 
opportunities began to dwindle, resentment grew toward polices that seemed to 
provide an "unfair advantage" to others.31 The white majority insisted that 
affirmative action achieved its goals and was no longer needed to correct any 
injustices. Affirmative-action policies were attacked as a form of "reverse 
discrimination". 32 
27 Nan, supra note 22. 
28 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. R. 
518 (1980). 
29 Id. 
30 Nan, supra note 22 at 556. 
31 Id. at 556. 
32 Id. 
7 
The resentment towards affirmative action policies continues. A 1990 
California poll taken by the San Francisco Chronicle and KRON-TV revealed fifty-
five percent of white males were in support of ending affirmative action, while 
thirty-one percent of women were in favor of keeping the policy.33 In addition, 
sixty-one percent of white males stated affirmative action had gone too far. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in a report from the Commission on African-
American Affairs, located in the state of Washington. 34 The report examined 
affirmative action policies that governed hiring within state government. Findings 
of the report include statistics on the percentage and number of hires under 
affirmative action policies. In 1994, sixty-two minority women, thirty-seven white 
women, and thirty-five veterans were noted as new employees that would not 
have been interviewed for their jobs had it not been for affirmative action.35 That 
year, the state of Washington hired over three thousand new workers. 
Similarly in 1993, one hundred and sixty-seven whites and one hundred 
and fifty-three minorities were hired as a direct result of affirmative action 
programs. That year, the state hired close to thirty-five hundred new workers. 36 A 
study conducted in 2000 by the University of Michigan found racial prejudice as 
the main factor as to why whites continue to oppose affirmative action.37 The 
study, which interviewed over one thousand adults in the Detroit area, concluded 
33 Yumi Wilson, Perceptions: Minority Women's Views Opposite of White Men's, THE SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, June 10, 1995 at AB. 
34 Kerry Murakami, Affirmative Action Helps Whites Too, Says Report-Policy Doesn't Affect Most State 
Workers, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 1995 at 81. 
3s Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Jeannie Baumann, U. Michigan Study: Prejudice Fuels Opinion, U-Wire, February 16, 2000. 
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whites that opposed affirmative action also showed little empathy or high regard 
for blacks. In addition, whites that identified with racist statements (such as 
blacks have gotten more than they deserve) were also more likely to oppose 
affirmative action. 38 
Despite some evidence that might dispel the myth of reverse 
discrimination and the efforts of critical race theorists to include minority 
viewpoints in matters of social and legal discussion, critics of critical race theory 
call it oppositional scholarship because it challenges whiteness, white 
dominance, and white experiences.39 Other critics say the use of narratives 
breed "subjectivity" and encourage irrational decisions.4° For some, narratives 
have no place in law, especially in constitutional issues.41 They contend that 
case law does not turn on personal stories of tragedy because those are private 
issues, whereas the law is a public issue.42 
The notion of race-neutral laws creates what Crenshaw called "an illusion 
that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the position of the 
black underclass." 43 Race-neutral laws and 'color-blind' interpretations justify a 
social, economic, and political system of law that is advantageous to whites.44 
Gotanda noted how current Supreme Court decisions have formalized race by 
38 Id. 
39 Galmore, supra note 15 at 318. 
40 Hayman, supra note 25; Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 503 (1997). 
41 Litowitz, supra note 40. 
42 Id. 
43 Race and reform, supra, note 13 at 117. 
44 Neil Gotanda, A Critique Of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind' in Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that 
Formed The Movement 261-262 (Kimberle Creshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds., 
1995) [Hereinafter Colorblind). 
9 
constructing categories of identity.45 Race becomes an individual attribute (as 
opposed to a group attribute) and is unrelated to any cultural or societal context. 
Race becomes unconnected to present or past realities of oppression. 46 
Consequently, racial discrimination is seen as an isolated phenomenon. This 
impedes the nation's ability to address correlations between minority groups and 
racism because race-neutral laws view social problems as independent. 47 
What makes the survival of race-based programs such as affirmative 
action more difficult is the judiciary's use of the standard of strict scrutiny. 48 On 
matters related to constitutional law, strict scrutiny is applied to suspect 
classifications, such as race, in the analysis of equal protection and to 
fundamental rights such as due process.49 Creation of statutes or polices based 
on suspect classifications must establish a compelling interest that justifies the 
need for law. This standard of review makes it more difficult to defend the 
creation of minority ownership policies, especially in a deregulated marketplace. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This raises a fundamental research question: How has the legal and social 
concept of race factored into minority broadcast ownership policies and 
decisions? In order to fully address this question, it is useful to subdivide it into 
the following specific research questions: 
45 Id. at 264. 
46 Id. at 265. 
47 Id. at 260. 
48 Id. at 266-267. 
49 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 1996). 
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1) In what ways have the courts viewed the issue of race and diversity in 
broadcast ownership? 
2) Is there a difference in the rationales used among the various courts 
(e.g., Supreme Court versus Courts of Appeal) in deciding minority ownership 
cases? 
As questions continue to arise about the role and value of marketplace 
diversity and the validity of the deregulatory movement, this study can advance 
future debate on minority ownership issues. 
OUTLINE OF STUDY 
Chapter I, "Introduction," provides a general introduction to the research 
topic. In addition, this chapter outlines the foundation for the entire dissertation. 
The major problems-- minority broadcast ownership, race, and deregulation-- are 
presented. 
Chapter I explains how these problems are closely related to the 
marketplace of ideas concept and how judicial interpretations have come to 
shape the current status of minority ownership. The purpose of this research, 
along with the research questions is presented. 
Chapter II, "Literature Review," lays a historical and theoretical foundation 
for the study. It begins by discussing the assumptions underlying the marketplace 
of ideas philosophy. The chapter then traces communication and legal 
scholarship in the areas of minority ownership, employment, and racial 
preferences. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is discussed, as well as its 
11 
effects on media consolidation and minority ownership. In-depth review of 
communications scholarship focuses on stereotypes, media portrayals, 
programming, and ownership issues. The theoretical framework is explained in 
detail. 
Chapter 111, "Methods," delineates the research design and methodology. 
Delimitations of the dissertation also are clarified. 
Chapter IV," Legislative Histories," summarizes congressional and 
administrative agency discussions on minority ownership and broadcast race 
preference policies. Particular attention is given to the broadcast comparative 
hearing policy and minority tax certificate policy. 
Chapter V, "Federal Court Cases," discusses minority ownership cases 
from the district courts, court of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
Chapter VI, "Analysis and Assumptions," provides a full investigation of 
the judicial assumptions in each decision. More importantly, placed within the 
framework of critical race theory, the analysis seeks to answer the major 
research question: how have the legal and social concepts of race factored into 
minority ownership policies? The other research questions are answered 
through this chapter's exploration of judicial decisions. 
Chapter VII, "Conclusion," summarizes the results. In addition, there are 
suggestions for the future development of minority ownership policies and ideas 
for future research. 
12 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Freedom of speech, and presumably the freedom to receive speech, is the 
backbone of modern mass mediated communications. The concept of freedom of 
speech initially grew out of classical liberalism and libertarian principles. As it was 
argued in the Four Theories of the Press, libertarian principles have helped to 
shape the social and political structures that currently exist within mass media. 50 
Under liberalism, the function of society is to advance the interest of 
individual members. The state (government) exists as a means of providing 
people with various ways to realize their own potential as members of society. 
Individuals are considered seekers of truth. In order to gain knowledge and truth, 
people must be able to communicate in an open market.51 That means all people 
must be allowed to speak. Within this concept of liberalism, the mass media 
function to inform, entertain and assist society with the discovery of truth. This 
discovery of truth comes through the media's ability to present all viewpoints. 
Liberalism developed during the Enlightenment Period of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. 52 The eighteenth century saw the "transfer of the press 
from authoritarian to libertarian principles."53 Libertarian principles flourished 
through the writings of philosophers such as John Milton, John Locke, and John 
5° Fred S. Siebert, et. al, Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, 
and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do 39 ( 1963). Applied mainly to print 
media, the "marketplace of ideas" has been stretched over the years to include broadcast media. Any 
communications system that is free of control is said to promote the exchange of information in a democratic 
society. It would follow that broadcasting is to adhere to the spirit of the marketplace of ideas; it should 
expose people to a variety of messages. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 43. 
53 Id. at 44. 
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Stuart Mill. Born in 1608, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, 54 in1644. Areopagitica 
was Milton' s argument against the licensing of books, viewing such action as a 
form of censorship. Claiming that mankind was inherently good at heart, Milton 
believed liberty, freedom, and open debate permitted society to know truth. 
Milton also believed that in order for truth to be known and discovered man would 
have to ultimately encounter untruths. The often-quoted sentence, "Let her 
falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to worse in a free and open 
encounter?" is a testament to Milton's support of free speech. 55 His "self-righting" 
principle stated that when truth and falsehood collided, truth would always 
emerge. Since truth (as a concept) is very strong, it will prevail with or without 
government involvement. 
John Locke, born in 1632, is known as the father of empiricism, which is 
the heart of scientific method. Locke stated knowledge was gained from the 
inside and was the result of individual efforts. And while Locke stated everyone 
has a property interest in his or her own person,56 when society sought to 
establish government individuals divested themselves of their right to their own 
personage. The right of property no longer lay with individuals, but with the 
government. 
54 Sir R.C. Jebb, Milton-Areopagitica (1969). 
55 Id. at 58. 
56 John Locke's Two Treatises of Government: New Interpretations 182-183 (Edward J. Harpham, ed. 1992). 
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Born in 1806, John Stuart Mill is often called the founding father of 
liberalism. 57 His essay, On Liberty, 58 drew a sharp focus to the threat of individual 
freedom by society. 59 Mill thought that humankind should be free to follow any 
pleasures that brought happiness, but such pursuits should not interfere with the 
freedom of others. While Mill said the greatest threat to freedom was society and 
public opinion, he declared that all views ought to be presented for free 
expression to work properly. Suppression of any kind worked against mankind.60 
In fact, Mill asserted that silencing of expression robbed the human race.61 
Diversity of opinions, according to Milton, was advantageous and would always 
be so until mankind entered a stage of "intellectual advancement." 62 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in a dissenting opinion in Abrams vs. 
U.S.,63 borrowed from the writings of Milton and Mill to articulate his vision of free 
speech and the First Amendment. The marketplace of ideas, according to 
Holmes, should be free of government regulation. However, there were times 
when Justice Holmes advocated government restraint of speech. In Schenk v. 
US, 64 Justice Holmes wrote free speech and press were protected so long as 
what was said did not constitute a "clear and present danger. "65 
57 J. Herbert Altschull, From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism 161-162 (1990). 
58 John S. Mill, On Liberty (1869). 
59 Altschull, supra note 57 at 168. 
60 Id. 
61 The Classics: John Stuart Mill's On Liberty 20-21 (John Gary, ed. 1991). 
62 Id. at 51. 
63 Abrams vs. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
64 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
65 Altschull, supra note 57 at 121. 
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However Fred Siebert, a former dean of Communications at Michigan 
State University, observed that Alexander Meiklejohn was critical of Holmes' 
viewpoint. 66 Meiklejohn, a twentieth-century philosopher and educator, was 
particularly suspicious of Holmes' clear and present danger test because the test 
was inconsistent with libertarian principles.67 Discussion by the public, in 
Meiklejohn's view, should be free from government intervention at all times, just 
as discussion by members of the legislature are free from government 
intervention. 68 
While Locke certainly held true to his assertion that man was able to self-
govern and control his property (meaning control his or her self without 
interference), he did note that when governments were created people traded 
those rights away. Milton and Mill both argued against state intrusion on social 
debates (although liberalism does acknowledge that government involvement 
exists from time to time). Holmes also declared that a functioning marketplace 
allowed diverse ideas to compete with each other, with the best ideas winning 
out. This "marketplace theory" has been a motivation for deregulating the 
communications industry.69 
MARKETPLACE DIVERSITY ASSUMPTIONS 
The marketplace of ideas theory is based on assumptions about society, 
some of which can be described as incomplete or faulty. Marketplace of ideas 
66 Siebert, supra note 50 at 59. 
67 Id. 
6B Id. 
69 Robert B. Horowitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform 260 (1989). 
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theory and its liberal philosophical tenets consider people to be rational in 
thought and continual seekers of truth. However, it cannot be expected that 
reason will be exclusively used to comprehend reality. People create and 
discover reality; thus, it is always changing. Many things can influence an 
individual's perceptions of reality, from drugs to religious values. People are not 
always rational, often using emotion or illogical information to make decisions. 
Advertising is one example of how emotional and illogical appeals to human 
senses can help guide people towards a perceived understanding or truth. In 
other instances, people believe they are receiving the truth in its entirety and are 
less inclined to seek additional sources of information. 70 
It is also assumed the marketplace allows everyone a chance to be heard. 
However, in reality not everyone has access. Average citizens do not own a 
broadcast outlet. Becoming a broadcast owner takes a huge investment of time 
and capital. As a result, not every individual will have the opportunity to become 
a radio or television owner. However, individual citizens have tried to access the 
media marketplace in other ways. Advocacy groups, interest groups and 
community groups have tried to access broadcast stations on issues including 
politics, religion, and minority representation. For example, in the late 1960s, 
70 John Wright 111, Deregulation and Public Perceptions of TV: Longtudinal Study, 41 COMMUNICATION 
STUDIES, 266 (1990). Focused on public perception of news and programming before and after deregulation. 
Surveys conducted over 4 year period showed people believed news and quality were sufficient and did not 
feel as though they were less informed since deregulation. 
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citizen groups began to enter into agreements with stations about employment 
and programming issues.71 
These agreements between citizen groups and broadcast stations 
continued well into the 1970s, but started to decline by the 1980s. Krasnow 
offered several reasons for the decline in agreements, such as fewer petitions, 
denial of petitions that were presented, better negotiation between citizens and 
broadcasters, and reduced financial support from the private sector, which left 
those groups with fewer resources to challenge stations. 72 
Access to media ownership is occasionally granted through appeals to the 
station owners or the FCC. However, the ability for citizens to appeal has been 
curtailed by recent rulings.73 There are fewer chances for renewal hearings as 
the Telecommunications Act of 199674 eliminated the comparative process for 
license renewals and replaced it with a new two-step renewal procedure. This 
new process calls for automatic license renewal unless the license holder fails to 
meet any of the following requirements: 1) service in the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity, 2) no serious violations by the licensee of this Act or 
Commission rules and regulations, and 3) no violations that would suggest an 
ongoing pattern of abuse. 
71 Erwin G. Krasnow, et. al, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation 56 (1982). Authors noted examples in 
Texas and Los Angeles where citizen groups withdrew petitions to deny station license in return for 
apreements that changed employment policies or programming. 
7 Id. at 56- 57. 
73 Minority Advocacy, supra note 2. See also lthiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 130- 131 (1983). 
74 47 U.S.C. § 307 (c). 
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THE NEED FOR MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP 
For minority groups, portrayals are very important in how they view 
themselves and their place in society. 75 TV news media often illustrate minority 
groups, black Americans in particular, as poor and on welfare. The media images 
associated with black Americans tend to reinforce such beliefs. 76 Whites, whom 
often lack close contact and exposure to minority groups, depend on media and 
cultural images for understanding such groups.77 
Media develop stereotypes as a shorthand method to communicate with 
society about a variety of issues. While some stereotypes may be positive, in 
many instances they are negative. Research indicates stereotypical images in 
the media reinforce racist attitudes.78 Stereotyping associates certain values, 
characteristics, or expected behaviors with particular communities. As Kennedy 
stated, the media and the images they present about race are often the source 
from which others learn about people of color.79 
75 See, C Taylor, J.Y. Lee, 8.8. Stern, 1995. Portrayals of African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans in 
Magazine Advertising, 38 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 608 (1995); Jannette Dates & Edward Pease, 
Warping The World: Media's Mangled Image of Race, 8 MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL 88 (1995); Paula Matabane 
& Bishette Merritt, African Americans on Television: Twenty-five Years after Kerner, 7 HOWARD JOURNAL OF 
COMMUNICATION 329 (1996); Gloria Abnernathy-Lear, African-Americans' Criticisms Concerning African 
American Representation on Daytime Serials, 71 JOURNALISM OuARTERLY 830 (1994). 
76 Robert M. Entman & Andrew Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America 8-9 
(2000). 
' 1 Id. at 43. 
78 Neil Vidmar & Milton Rokeach, Archie Bunker's Bigotry: A Study in Selective Perception and Exposure, 
JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 36 (1974). The authors studied the effects of "All in The Family," a 1971 TV 
comedy. The high prejudice viewers admired Archie over Mike, feeling that at the end of each episode 
Archie won. Since there was no relationship between frequency of television watched and degree of 
prejudice, the authors concluded that high prejudice persons watched "All in The Family" more than low 
~rejudiced persons. 
9 Deseriee Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of Advertising on Race," 32 ARIZ Sr. 
L.J. 622 (1999). 
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Some communications scholars contend that broadcasters, in order to 
enhance profits, are willing to relinquish their duty in promoting free speech and 
public interest. 80 Since deregulation, none of the industry's actions reveals a 
commitment to providing or upholding public interest or free speech values.81 
And since free speech and diversity of voices were never explicitly a main policy 
goal, they may never truly materialize within the deregulated environment. 
In the current deregulated environment, the marketplace of ideas has 
been redefined in terms of economic incentives. 82 Reliance on economic 
incentives to bring about marketplace diversity favors those who already have 
access, which is based on one's ability to compete on an economic, business 
level. Minority groups are struggling to gain media ownership opportunities within 
the increasingly economically oriented industry. 83 
EARLY MINORITY INVOLVEMENT IN BROADCASTING 
Minority ownership of broadcast properties is a relatively uncommon 
phenomenon. However, minority involvement in the broadcast industry can be 
traced back to early 1920s. Throughout that period and until World War II, jazz 
music and its culture was idolized on radio. Barlow traced the history of black 
contributions to the broadcast industry and stated that while blacks and their 
80 Teeter, supra note 7. 
81 Id. 
82 Rumble, supra note 2; Kathryn Schmeltzer, Clearing The Air: Deregulation of the Broadcast Industry, 29 
FB NEWS & JOURNAL 398 (1982) [hereinafter Schmeltzer). 
83 Kofi A. Ofori, When Being No. 1 Is Not Enough: The Impact of Advertising Practices On Minority-Owned & 
Minority-Formatted Broadcast Stations (January 13, 1999) 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/lnformal/ad-study/#tableofcontents> [hereinafter Civil Rights 
Forum). 
20 
music were desired and imitated-- they were not allowed to perform on radio or at 
public venues. 84 This exclusion transferred over into radio programming with 
shows such as "Amos n' Andy." Public outcry against the show's stereotypical 
portrayals of blacks mounted in 1931. Despite 740,000 signatures on a 
nationwide petition and National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People [NAACP] criticism, the Federal Radio Commission (the early predecessor 
to the FCC) could not cancel the show.85 Although a call to end the show 
garnered support within the black community, 86 the Federal Radio Act forbid the 
FRC from interfering with communications or signals transmitted over broadcast 
airwaves. 87 
Blatant discrimination against black actors and actresses in radio 
continued well into the 1940s. Even with a few black-hosted radio programs, 
most of the programming failed. Many of the shows were created by whites for 
the general white audience and usually were stereotypical. 88 Ownership of Negro 
radio was usually by whites. The percentage of ownership by blacks was small 
because many prospective minority owners could not find the money to finance a 
purchase of a station or find experienced broadcasters to work at the stations. 
Furthermore, major companies (mostly white-owned) would not advertise on 
minority-owned or formatted stations for fear of alienating their white 
84 William Barlow, Voice Over: The Making of Black Radio 13-35 (1999). 
es Id. 
86 While support for ending the show grew largely from the middle-class blacks, not all blacks endorsed the 
removal of the show. See generally, Melvin Patrick Ely, The Adventures of Amos 'n' Andy: A Social History 
of an American Phenomenon (1991 ); Thomas Cripps, Amos 'n' Andy and the Debate over American Racial 
Integration in American History, American Television (1983). 
87 § 47 u.s.c. 326. 
88 Barlow, supra note 84 at 26-28 (1999). 
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customers. 89 For many white advertisers believed equating their product and/or 
image with minority groups, particularly blacks would have negative economic 
consequences. 90 
In addition, some southern communities pressured radio networks not to 
carry black-hosted programs, as they felt uncomfortable with the idea of a 
"Negro" on the air. 91 Stole examined the attempts of network television to 
address the problem of representation, specifically looking at the actions of 
National Broadcasting Company [NBC] and the Nat King Cole Show. NBC 
sought to 'stay in touch' with the minority community and hosted several round 
table discussions on ways to improve the status of minorities. They were careful 
never to push integration, so as not to alienate sponsors. According to Stole, 
NBC had gone through great lengths at the time to cultivate a "good public 
relations campaign" with the black community. Afraid to lose its competitive edge, 
NBC swept Nat King Cole away from Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] and 
gave him his own show. 
However, NBC did very little to ensure the success of the "Nat King Cole 
Show." Low production budgets, sparse pay for the workers, and no advertising 
contributed to the show's ultimate failure. Sponsorships for the show were low, 
89 Id. at 183. 
90 Kennedy, supra note 81 at 648. 
91 Id. See also Richard S. Kahlenberg, Negro Radio, 26 THEE NEGRO HISTORY BULLETIN 127 (1966) [hereinafter 
Negro Radio]. The author indicated that mixed management was common, such as Negro stations being 
white owned and black operated or white owned and white operated with mixed announcing staffs; Niger L. 
Stole, Nat King Cole and the Politics of Race and Broadcasting in the 1950's, 1 THE COMMUN/CATION RFEVIFEW 
349 (1996). Stole examined minority TV employment in the 1950's and highlighted the attempts of network 
television to address the problem of racial representation, specifically looking at the actions of National 
Broadcasting Company [NBC] and the Nat King Cole Show. 
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even after NBC drastically reduced its advertising rates. Co-ops were obtained, 
but only in the Northern states.92 The fear of the Southern audience withdrawing 
from a particular sponsor was enough to keep many from advertising on the 
show. Minority involvement in the broadcast industry was obviously limited during 
this time. Blacks either played very small, stereotypical roles or they were simply 
excluded from the industry altogether. 
Even though minorities had purchased broadcast radio properties as early 
as 1949, black broadcast ownership would not become widespread until the 
1960s. 93 Yet the idea of programming stations with a black music format began 
much sooner. Between the period of 1949 and 1956, four hundred stations 
nationwide carried some form of black-oriented programming or were completely 
black formatted. 94 By 1970, there were sixteen black owned and black formatted 
stations. That number grew to over two hundred stations nationwide by 1986.95 
The future growth of minority ownership was expected to be hampered by 
potential problems, including lack of available licenses and more importantly, 
difficulties in obtaining financing. 96 Financiers considered minority broadcast 
ownership to be "high-risk" ventures. 97 Although the problems of ownership may 
92 Co-ops, shorthand for cooperative advertising, are joint efforts between a retailer and a 
manufacturer/supplier to share the cost of advertisements. In the case of broadcasting, co-ops allow 
manufacturers to share the cost of making a commercial ad with a radio or television station. See, Ed 
Shane, Selling Electronic Media (1999). 
93 Barlow, supra note 84 at 246-247. 
94 Id. at 245-257. 
95 Negro Radio, supra note 93. 
96 Bernard Rubin, "See Us, Hear Us, Know Me," in Small Voices and Great Triumphs: Minorities and the 
Media 3-46 (Bernard Rubin, ed., 1980). 
97 Id. Many of the owners did not have a great deal of broadcasting experience. Moreover, for those who 
did, financiers considered investing in broadcast properties to be risky, as such properties were licensed and 
controlled by government authorities. 
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be acute for minorities, broadcast media in general is considered to be a risky 
investment venture. 98 Corn-Revere noted the poor economic performance of the 
broadcast industry in the early 1990s, as more than half of the radio stations on 
the air had lost money. Yet a 1978 FCC task force report declared the lack of 
minority participation would result in society being "deprived and unaware of 
minority viewpoints and concerns." 99 At the time of the task force, minorities 
owned less than one percent of the 8,500 commercial broadcast outlets. While 
the figures improved slightly, minority ownership is still low. As of 1998, minorities 
owned less than eight percent of the over 12,000 commercial AM and FM radio 
stations in the United States.100 Table 1 presents minority broadcast ownership 
from 1993 until 1998. 
MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP POLICIES 
Noting the paucity of minority owners, several programs were designed to 
promote ownership. The distress sale policy allowed broadcasters in danger of 
losing their license to sell their station(s) to minorities for up to 75% of the fair 
market value. 101 In spite of such a seemingly profitable and easy to use policy, it 
has been relatively ineffective. Because of the lack of FCC commitment, there 
were few opportunities to use the policy. The small number of renewal hearings 
held by the FCC, in conjunction with the eight-year license term periods adopted 
98 See, Alison Alexander, James Owers, & Rob Craveth, Media Economics: Theory and Practice 74 (1993). 
99 Federal Communications Commission's Minority Ownership Task Force, Minority Ownership Report (May 
17, 1978) [Hereinafter 1978 report]. 
100 National Telecommunication and Information Administration, Minority Broadcast Ownership in the United 
States, (October 27, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98/> 
101 Alan Stavitsky, The Rise and Fall of the Distress Sale, 36 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING ANO ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA 249 (1992). 
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Table 1: Ownership of Minority vs. Non-Minority Broadcast Stations* 
1993 1994 1995 1996- 1998 1999-
1997 2000 
AM RADIO 
INDUSTRY 4,590 4,929 4,906 4,814 4,724 **11,865 
BLACK 120 111 109 101 100 **211 
HISPANIC 63 76 72 80 84 **187 
ASIAN 0 1 2 1 4 **23 
NATIVES 2 2 2 2 1 **5 
FM RADIO 
INDUSTRY 4,920 5,044 5,285 5,468 5,591 
BLACK 80 80 86 64 68 
HISPANIC 23 35 34 31 46 
ASIAN 2 3 3 2 1 
NATIVES 3 3 4 3 1 
TELEVISION 
INDUSTRY 1,151 1,155 1,221 1,193 1,209 1,265 
BLACK 20 22 28 28 26 20 
HISPANIC 8 9 9 9 6 2 
ASIAN 1 1 1 1 0 1 
NATIVES 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Figures from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration reportsMinority 
Broadcast Ownership in the United States (1998); Changes, Challenges and Charting New Courses: 
Minority Broadcast Ownership in the United States (2000). 
**These are aggregate numbers, representing both AM and FM ownership as ownership of 
broadcast radio by frequency band and race was not pro'tded. 
25 
in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, meant the chance for a station coming up 
for revocation is slim. 
Starting in 1965, enhancement credit in comparative hearings was a 
method used to provide ownership opportunities. "Integration of ownership and 
management" focused on broadcast station owners and their day-to-day 
involvement with the operation and management of their stations. Minority and 
gender preferences were both seen as aspects of "integration of ownership and 
management." During competitive licensing hearings, "integration of ownership 
and management" was given quantitative credit and weighed along with the other 
licensing criteria. 102 This was very important because comparative hearings 
decided who would construct a new station in cases where more than one 
person or firm wanted to do so. However, in 1993 the United States Court of 
Appeals (DC) prohibited the FCC from using integration credit in comparative 
hearings .103 
Probably the most well noted and most controversial of all the minority 
preference programs was the minority tax certificate. Created in 1978, the 
minority tax certificate encouraged sales of broadcast properties to minorities. 
The policy originated from a section of the Internal Revenue Service tax code-
section 1071. The tax certificate provided favorable tax treatment to sellers by 
deferring taxable gain from the sale of their station(s), provided the buyer was a 
102 Kenneth C. Creech, The Licensing Process in Electronic Media Law and Regulation 100- 111 (2nd ed. 
1996). The other criteria used in this licensing process were diversification of control, proposed 
programming, full-time participation by owner(s), past broadcast record, efficient use of frequency, 
character, and other issues presented by applicants. 
103 Bechtel V. FCC, 10 F.3D 875 (1993). 
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minority. 104 There were several approaches to the tax certificate policy as well as 
some revisions over its 17-year history.105 But by 1995, minorities owned three 
hundred and sixty stations. Many of those purchases used the tax certificate to 
attract initial investors. 106 Three hundred and thirty tax certificates had been 
issued with two hundred and sixty of those for radio transactions, forty for 
television transactions, and thirty for cable television transactions. 107 In general, 
the tax certificate policy had granted 507 certificates prior to its repeal in 1995.108 
The proposed sale of Viacom's cable systems to a minority-led 
communications group in 1995 through a tax certificate would have allowed 
Viacom to defer $600 million dollars in taxes. That prompted Congress to 
eliminate the tax certificate policy.109 Many believed the repeal of the policy was 
racially motivated because Viacom utilized other tax-free provisions to sell its 
properties to a non-minority entity.110 And while this exchange of cable stations 
between Viacom and a minority owned company was blocked, in November 
104 Kofi Ofori & Mark Llyod, The Value of the Tax Certificate, 51 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 693, 
702- 703 [Ofori and Llyod). 
105 Id. The tax certificate could be used in three distinct ways: 1) the seller did not have to pay tax on any 
gains from the sale provided the proceeds were used to purchase replacement property, 2) the gains from 
the sale could be used to reduce the seller's basis in other depreciable property, or 3) use half of the gains 
towards purchase of new property and the other half towards the reduction in depreciable property. In 1982, 
the policy was amended to grant investors deferment on gains from sale of purchased stock in a minority 
owned broadcast property/ company. 
106 Erwin Krasnow, A Case for Minority Tax Certificates, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, December 15, 1997 at 
80. 
101 Id. 
108 95-319 SPR, CRS Report for Congress, The Viacom Transaction and Beyond (March 2, 1995). 
109 Id. 
11° Krasnow, supra note 106; See also Erwin Krasnow and Lisa M. Fowlkes, FCC Minority Tax Certificate 
Program: A Proposal for Life After Death, 51 FEDERAL COMMUNICATION L.J. 665 at 673 (1999). 
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2000, Viacom purchased the largest black-owned cable channel- Black 
Entertainment Television. 111 
However, the minority tax certificate idea has begun to resurface. As 
recently as 1998, Congress looked toward re-instating the program. 112 Mandatory 
holding periods, limiting the number of times a certificate could be used, 
screening of participants, and caps on the amounts deferrable are all new ways 
in which the policy is being adjusted. 113 Although various mechanisms to prevent 
abuses were explored in 2000, former FCC Chairman William Kennard, while 
FCC General Counsel, offered many of the same suggestions in 1995. In 
testimony before the United States Senate, Kennard presented alternative 
methods of tightening the policy.114 Specifically, Kennard discussed extending 
holding periods for licensees, limiting the number of certificates that could be 
used, and limiting the dollar amount of the deferral. However, the suggestion 
made did not include specific numbers or figures as the FCC was still blocked 
from making any changes to existing broadcast policy under the appropriation 
riders. 
BROADCAST EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Prior to the creation of specific minority ownership policies, employment 
was viewed as a way to include minorities in the broadcast industry. In July 1969, 
111 Geraldine Fabrikant, BET Holdings to be bought by Viacom for $2.34 billion, (November 7, 2000), 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/business/04viac.html> 
112 Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, Minority Initiatives Advance, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, August 2, 1999 
at 7. 
113 Erwin Krasnow, Tax Certificate: New and Improved, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, June 28, 1999 at 14. 
114 FCC's Tax Certificate Program, hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 104th Congress (1995). 
(Testimony of William Kennard, FCC General Counsel at 9-10). 
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the FCC adopted rules that prohibited discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, or origin. Those rules also required that equal opportunity in employment 
be given to all qualified persons. License holders had to develop a program of 
specific practices that would assure equal opportunity. 115 
The FCC began requiring licensees to file annual reports, including written 
equal employment policies and data, to insure minorities were given full 
consideration. 116 The FCC eventually created a model EEO program. The policy 
said, "An affirmative action plan is a set of specific and result-oriented 
procedures which broadcasters must follow to assure that minorities and women 
are given equal and full protection."117 Today, all formalized EEO requirements in 
broadcasting have been removed, as they were ruled invalid in Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod v. FCC. 118 
The FCC argued that two church-related stations in Missouri were not 
vigorous in their minority recruitment efforts. Those stations were fined as they 
failed to comply with the FCC's EEO rules and regulations. Although the FCC 
used a rational basis test when they applied their EEO guidelines, 119 the Court of 
Appeals (DC) disagreed, stating that after the decision in Adarand v. Pena, 120 the 
115 Federal Communications Commission, Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership of Broadcast 
Facilities, 68 FCC 2D 979 [hereinafter Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership). 
11s Id. 
117 Non-Discrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 54 FCC2d 358 
p975). 
18 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (1998). 
119 Black's, supra, note 49. In constitutional law, when a court uses a rational basis test it will uphold a law 
valid under the equal protection clause only if it has a conceivable relationship to a legitimate government 
o~ective. 
12 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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FCC should have been using a standard of strict scrutiny. 121 The Supreme Court 
ruled that affirmative action efforts that used racial classifications in awarding 
contracts were to abide by strict scrutiny standards. The ruling affected all 
federal, state, and local government agencies. 
After weighing the policy under "strict scrutiny" guidelines established in 
Adarand, the D.C. Court of Appeals decided the Commission's EEO policy had 
no compelling interest. According to the court, the FCC failed to produce 
evidence that non-programming positions that employed minorities affected the 
outcome of overall programming diversity. 
The FCC had asked the Court of Appeals not to pass any ruling on the 
Missouri-Synod case. 122 Nevertheless, the case went forward. The National 
Association of Black Journalists argued the removal of the EEO policies "raised 
questions about access to the airwaves by African-Americans and other peoples 
of color. "123 The EEO policy did help bolster minority employment in the industry 
from 9% to almost 20% over a 25-year period.124 Insiders speculated whether the 
removal of the EEO policies meant the end of the industry's ability to enforce 
affirmative action policies in general.125 
121 FCC diversity plan loses on appeal, ABA JOURNAL, July 1998 at 36. 
122 Chris McConnell, FCC asks court to stay out of EEO case, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, March 9, 1998 at 
12.The FCC informed that court they would send the case back to the FCC, the Commission planned to 
reverse its earlier finding in the case and remove the reporting of employment portions of the policy. 
123 Kelvin Childs, Black Journalists Blast Ruling, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, April 25, 1998 at 35. 
124 Alicia Mundy, An unappealing decision, MEDIAWEEK, June 1, 1998 at 18. 
12s Id. 
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DEREGULATING THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 
The Reagan (and later Bush) presidencies marked what many believed 
were the beginnings of widespread deregulation across many industries, 
including communications. 126 In particular, President Reagan supported the 
relaxation of restrictions in many private sectors in order to boost the economic 
health of society and private industry.127 Reagan's administration's rhetoric 
invoked a desire to cut taxes, remove government from people's lives, balance 
the budget, and increase military spending. 128 While President Reagan 
drastically removed or limited spending for social programs such as food stamps, 
and subsidized housing, 129 spending for the military increased. The cutting of 
social programs coupled with the increase of military spending, according to 
University of Nebraska Professor Ann Mari May, was detrimental to women and 
minorities. 130 Women tended to be less supportive of President Reagan's 
initiatives, as they favored less spending on military issues and more on social 
services. 131 
Besides the shifts in spending, President Reagan vowed to remove 
government control of businesses. This was achieved through the removal or 
relaxation of government regulations that supervised the conduct of 
126 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 244-247. 
127 Id. at 209 
128 Lauren Tarshis, The Legacy of Reaganomics, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, March 6, 1992 at 10. 
129 Id. 
130 Ann Mari May, Women, economics, and the concept of the market: A second look at Reaganomics, 27 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 471 (1993). 
1a1 Id. 
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businesses. 132 However, the plan to de-regulate many industries had mixed 
results. 133 The airline industry began to experience massive buyouts, which 
resulted in less competition and inflated prices passed on to consumers. 134 The 
savings and loan disaster in the mid 1980s was another example of how less 
government control harmed society.135 
Horowitz wrote that during the mid 1980s, the broadcasting industry 
adopted the economic marketplace theory and used it as the basis for 
deregulation. 136 According to William Ray, former chief of the FCC's Complaints 
and Compliances division, under the leadership of FCC Chairman Mark Fowler 
and later Chairman Dennis Patrick, the FCC" ... sought to nullify the entire 
concept of the broadcaster as a public trustee." 137 Ray wrote that those 
chairmen began to deregulate the industry from policies and issues they believed 
hampered the broadcasters, such as the anti-trafficking rule (which made way for 
the early attempts at mergers and consolidations). 138 It was said by Chairman 
Fowler that competition would correct any deficiencies in programming. 
132 Tarshis, supra note 128. 
133 Id. at 14. 
134 Id. at 14-15. 
135 Tarshis, supra note 128. The industry was wrought with mismanagement, fraud, and corruption. Many 
taxpayers lost their life savings as those institutions that were members of the savings and loan industry 
went under. The author stated that Congress estimated taxpayers would have to spend over $550 million 
dollars to fix the problem. 
136 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 244-246; Pool, supra note 73. 
137 William B. Ray, FCC: The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regulation 163 (1990). 
138 This FCC policy forbade station owners from selling their license within a three-year period of purchase. 
Ray, supra note 137 argues that once this policy was abolished, stations were bought and sold at rapid 
pace, often times with no regard for the employees' an/or programming of various stations. 
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When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed, it further relaxed 
nationwide and local ownership limits.139 For radio, old FCC rules did not permit 
ownership of more than 20 FM or 20 AM stations nationwide. As of the 1996 Act, 
there is no limit on radio ownership nationwide. Yet, there are local market 
limitations. In markets with 45 or more commercial radio stations, an entity can 
own up to 8 stations. In markets with 30-44 commercial radio stations, ownership 
is capped at 7 stations. Markets with 15-29 commercial stations, ownership is 
held to 6 stations. Lastly, in markets with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations, 
an entity can own up to 5 stations, however one entity may not own, operate, or 
control more than 50% of the stations in the market. All of these changes 
prompted many companies to purchase radio and television stations at a rapid 
pace. Large media outfits began merging with and buying out other 
broadcasters. 140 
As suggested by McChesney, radio station ownership had undergone 
major transformations that resulted in four large companies controlling one-third 
of all the industry's revenues.141 Mergers and acquisitions generated huge 
amounts of cash flow, which was used to finance future purchases. For minority 
owners, the ability to convince banks, venture capitalists, or potential investors to 
139 Under the former FCC rules, a single entity could not own more than 12 television stations nationwide or 
television stations reaching more than 25% of the nation's television households. The 1996 Act eliminated 
the 12-station limit and increased the maximum permissible audience reach to 35% nationwide. 
140 Paul Farhl, For Radio Stations, Does Big Mean Bland? THE WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 1996, at F5. 
Author notes that between May and July of 1996, companies such as Evergreen and CBS/Westinghouse 
made aggressive moves to purchase radio properties that not only gave those companies sizable control of 
local markets, but also built their nationwide assets. 
141 Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communications Politics in Dubious Times 18 
(1999) [Hereinafter Rich Media, Poor Democracy]. 
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provide more cash for expansion became harder. 142 Current stations had to be 
used as collateral for financing deals. Any attempt to buy more stations came at 
the risk of potentially losing the currently owned stations through hostile 
takeovers. 143 
On the other hand, the inability to compete for advertising against large 
group owned stations could also squeeze a minority owner out of the 
broadcasting business. In 1997, a Birmingham-based minority broadcast 
company sold its radio properties to industry giant Cox Radio.144 (According to 
Columbia Journalism Review's website, Cox Radio owned stations in the 
following places: Los Angeles (4), Atlanta (4), Tampa (4), Miami (2), Orlando (7), 
San Antonio (8), Louisville (3), Birmingham (7), Dayton (5), Tulsa (5), Syracuse 
(5), and Bridgeport (1).)145 The Birmingham minority radio group cited 
competition from several local stations that were black formatted but white 
owned. The competing stations were part of larger media conglomerates. That 
allowed those stations to offer better advertising rates through combination sales 
across stations. 
Radio and television have seen increased concentration of ownership that 
has resulted in less competition. 146 The total number of television group owners 
142 See, Geraldine Fabrikant, Slow Gains by Minority Broadcasters, NEW YORK TIMES, May 31, 1994 at D1; 
Bill McConnell, Few and Far Between, BROADCASTING AND CABLE, October 5, 1998 at 28 [hereinafter Few 
and Far). 
143 Few and Far, supra, note 142 at 30. 
144 Paula M. White, Black-Owned Radio Stations Tuning Out, BLACK ENTERPRISE, September 1997 at 20. 
145 http://www.cjr.org/owners/index.asp, accessed June 26,2000. 
146 See, Farhl, supra note 147; Neil Hickey, So Big: The Telecommunications Act at One Year, 35 COLUMBIA 
JOURNALISM REVIEW 26 (1997); Ofori and Llyod, supra note 106. 
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decreased between 1995 and 1997. 147 The mergers between broadcasting 
groups, usually smaller ones being acquired by larger ones, seemed to be the 
major cause of overall group ownership decline. 148 These consolidations and 
mergers are believed to have been detrimental to listener choices in 
programming. 149 Since there are fewer owners, the ability of those owners to 
dictate advertising rates has negatively impacted other competitors. 
Effects of Media Consolidation 
There are also social effects and impacts of consolidation. The media 
appear more interested in pleasing corporate owners and advertisers than 
informing and providing a voice for the public. Citing the Telecommunications Act 
and the resulting trend towards consolidation, McChesney referred to examples 
such as the Disney and 20/20 fiasco 150 as inevitable outcomes. In 1998, ABC's 
news program "20/20" refused to air an investigative report on Disney theme 
parks and employment practices, which include inadequate screening for 
pedophiles. Disney owns ABC. 
Aptly put by McChesney, "the media ... exists as it does because powerful 
interests have constructed it so that citizens will not be involved in the key policy 
decisions .... "151 This certainly raises the issues of how a media system controlled 
by private ownership can work to promote public interest and divergent views. 
147 Herbert H. Howard, The 1996 Telecommunications Act and TV Station Ownership: One Year Later, 11 
THE JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS 26 (1998). 
1 ◄a Id. 
149 Bruce E. Drushel, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Radio Market Structure, 11 THE JOURNAL OF 
MEDIA ECONOMICS 16 (1998). 
150 Id. 
151 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 15. 
35 
Furthermore, it is noted that the content of the press is often related to those who 
finance the press. 152 And relationships, such as that between the tobacco 
industry and the media, point to a longstanding, systemic influence on media 
content. 153 Media scholar Ben Bagdikian also noted the potential danger of 
corporate influences and interlocking directorates when he said, 
"It is dangerous enough that in a democracy fifty corporate 
chiefs have so much power over the national 
consciousness and that this power can be exercised in 
ways that serve other interests. "154 
McChesney acknowledged that an oligopolistic structure exists in the 
media industry. 155 Oligopolies are characterized by market conditions in which 
there are few sellers and the action of any single seller can affect price and have 
a sizeable impact on other competitors. Many media companies are also 
worldwide and have become what are known as transnational companies. These 
companies are interwoven as many hold stocks in each other's businesses. 156 
Their boards of directors have what McChesney called 'direct links'- two or 
more people serving on different executive boards of media firms and Fortune 
1000 companies. 157 Similar to Bagdikian's concept of interlocking directorates, 
McChesney's 'direct links' are not only interwoven with one another, but with the 
larger corporate community. 
152 Pamela J. Shoemaker & Stephen D. Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on Mass 
Media Content 162 (1991). 
153 Id. 
154 Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly 20 (1983). 
155 Robert Mcchesney, Big Media Game Has Fewer and Fewer Players, THE PROGRESSIVE, November 1, 
1999 at 20 [hereinafter Big media]. 
156 Robert Mcchesney, It's a Small World of Big Conglomerates, THE NATION, November 29, 1999 at 11 
~hereinafter Small world]. 
57 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 29. 
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Media giants also tend to participate in "equity joint ventures." 158 In these 
ventures, two or more companies assume ownership of certain media projects. 
The financial risk is spread around, so no one company takes an unusually hard 
hit. The advertising revenue is also shared, thereby reducing competition among 
the companies for advertising dollars.159 This tendency to share what 
McChesney called "interlocking relationships" is dangerous because most 
corporations support a very conservative, mainstream agenda. Shoemaker and 
Reese suggested that financial institutions could end up controlling the basic 
decisions in media corporations or large media institutions may become 
dependent on the resources controlled by financial institutions. 160 
There is general concern that the blitz of mergers and consolidations 
poses a threat to diversity of voices. When huge media companies own multiple 
stations in a market, the ability for smaller, minority owned stations to obtain 
necessary revenue is greatly diminished. More minority owners may sell their 
properties as their capacity to buy more stations and attract advertising dollars 
has decreased. 161 It is argued that consolidation, particularly in radio, allows an 
owner to focus on one type of musical format and buy up the competition, 
effectively dominating huge chunks of the broadcast markets' offerings. 162 That is 
not to say that all owners will follow that course of action. However, consolidation 
has the potential to leave listeners with fewer musical choices. 
158 /d. at 28 
1se /d. 
160 Shoemaker, supra note 152 at 175. 
161 Few and Far, supra, note 147 at 30. 
162 Eric Boehlert, Radio Land Rush, ROLLING STONE, October 17, 1996 at 40. 
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Impacts on Minority Ownership 
Advertising Discrimination 
For years, minority owners have complained of discriminatory practices in 
broadcast sales and advertising. These practices, usually seen in agencies, tend 
to view minority consumers as unimportant. 163 As such, the agencies do not push 
"advertising buys" on minority-owned stations. And while in some markets 
minority owned media are the leaders, their revenue streams do not match their 
rankings. 164 Across radio formats (such as black, urban, Spanish, ethnic, and 
general) in the top 200 markets, white-owned stations earned more revenue than 
minority-owned stations. 165 On average the revenue stream for white- owned 
radio stations is approximately $3.5 million dollars per year, while black- owned 
stations take in $2.6 million dollars per year regardless of format. 166 
Stations that are minority programmed are often unable to earn revenue 
comparable to "general" formatted stations. This can be attributed to many 
factors including media consolidation, group ownership, non-urban dictates and 
minority discounts, along with subtle race discrimination. In a study conducted by 
Kofi Ofori (director of research at the Civil Rights Forum on Communications 
Policy) and commissioned by the FCC, non-urban dictates were identified as the 
practice of barring the placement of advertising on Spanish or urban formatted 
163 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83 at 23. 
164 Mira Schwirtz, Ratings Racism: When NO. 1 is Not, MEDIA WEEK, June 22, 1998 at 14. 
165 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83. 
166 /d. 
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radio stations. 167 Minority discounts is the system of buying time on urban and 
Spanish formatted stations at rates far less than would be paid to general 
formatted stations of a comparable size in a comparable market. 168 Non-urban 
dictates and discounts usually take place at the advertising agency level, 
although individual businesses often discriminate and refuse to place ads on 
Spanish and urban formatted stations as well. Because of these reduced rates 
and/or outright refusal of ad placements, minority owned stations tend to earn 
less advertising revenue than non-minority broadcasters. 169 
Financial Barriers 
Several published reports from the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) concluded that deregulation, consolidation, 
and discrimination were contributors to the declining number of minority owned 
media. 170 Elevated prices for stations and lack of advertising dollars were just a 
few of the effects. Some have predicted broadcast station prices at 20x cash 
flow. 171 For example, it can cost as much as $20 million dollars to enter the FM 
side of radio in any of the larger broadcast markets. 172 Ragan Henry, founder of 
the black owned US Radio Inc., sold his stations to Clear Channel 
Communications for $140 million dollars.173 He said that his financial investors 
167 Id. at 25. 
168 Id. at 26. 
1s9 Id. 
170 See, supra note 87; National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Minority Broadcast 
Ownership in the United States, (October 27, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98/>. 
171 Ofori and Llyod, supra note 106. 
172 Boehlert, supra note 162. 
173 Andrea Adelson, Minority Voice Fading For Broadcast Owners, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at D9. 
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were reluctant to provide him with more money to buy expensive stations. 
Without the tax certificate and the lack of available equity financing, Mr. Henry 
encountered hurdles he felt he could not overcome. (Clear Channel, the 
company that bought out Mr. Henry came under fire in 1999 when on-air 
personalities at one of their Ohio market stations, made racially offensive 
statements. 174 As a result, the station apologized and instituted proposals to 
bring about racial diversity in hopes of reaching out to the community.) 
Financial and technical barriers exist in markets and among competitors, 
regardless of race. In the case of broadcast markets, there are few available 
frequencies left to apply for. 175 In order for a broadcaster to gain entrance, an 
existing station must be acquired. As previously discussed, prices for radio 
stations have dramatically increased.176 Notwithstanding the daily financial 
expenditures in broadcast operations, such as payroll and programming, new 
entrants must also worry about the effects of rapid consolidation. 
McChesney observed that about eight conglomerates control much of the 
world's media. 177 And locally, it is typical for three to four media companies to 
control almost all of a market's radio stations. Robert Johnson, former owner and 
president of Black Entertainment Television (a cable channel that programs to 
Combined they owned 35 stations. Ragan Henry indicated that he would have preferred to hold on to those 
stations. The deregulating of the industry has sent station prices soaring and as Henry noted stations are 
now being valued at 15x cash flow, as compared to the figure of Bx cash flow just a few years ago. 
174 Toledo Radio Stations Pledge to be More Sensitive to Minority Issues, Associated Press Newswire, 
March 24, 2000. 
175 Alan B. Albarran, Radio Industry, in Media Economics: Understanding Markets, Industries, and Concepts 
(1st ed. 1996). 
t1e Id. 
177 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141. McChesney referred to the eight major conglomerates 
that have a heavy hand in media and broadcast communications worldwide: Disney, Time Warner (which 
merged in 2000 with AOL), Viacom, Seagram, Bertelsmann, General Electric, and AT & T. 
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African-Americans) perceived large conglomerates would eventually control 
broadcast media, effectively pushing out the smaller voices. 178 Johnson also 
stated that media consolidation blocks out agendas and concerns that are not 
important to those in control.179 Media consolidation is a threat to minority 
broadcast ownership and a contributor to the elimination of local programming. 180 
Various black-owned broadcasting groups have sold their properties to bigger 
companies. 181 However, it is a general belief that large media operations have 
more resources to effectively compete in the media market, thus race may not 
always be considered the sole factor. Nevertheless, other minority broadcast 
owners are expected to follow suit as their ability to survive has dwindled. 182 If 
minority owners cannot acquire other stations, obtain strong advertising revenue, 
and manage the daily finances of a station, then their chances of survival are 
slim. 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Anti-discrimination law and its legislative foundation can be found in Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 183 This provision of the 1964 Act prohibits 
discrimination based on sex, color, gender, or national origin. This provision also 
178 Robert Johnson, The First Amendment Speech You've Never Heard Before, BROADCASTING & CABLE, 
May 19, 1997, at 22-23. However, Robert Johnson recently sold BET to multi-media giant, Viacom, for $2.34 
million dollars. See, Geraldine Fabrikant, BET Holdings to Be Bought by Viacom for $2.34 Billion, New York 
Times on the Web, November 4, 2000 <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11 /04/business/04VIAC.html>. 
179 Id. 
180 Adelson, supra note 173. 
181 Id. (US Radio sold its 25 station in 1996 for $140 million to Clear Channel Communications). See also, 
White, supra note 151. 
182 Adelson, supra, note 173. 
183 Pub. L. 88-352 (1964) amended several sections of Title VII. 
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created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], which is 
charged with upholding the law proscribed through Title VII. 
According to Carter Wilson, a University of Toledo professor, during its 
initial years the EEOC was ineffective because it suffered from limited resources, 
limited statutory authority, and operated under a politically conservative 
framework. 184 This meant the Commission operated on a case-by-case basis, 
viewing discrimination as an individual problem as opposed to a systemic 
problem. 185 Of the 100,000 employment discrimination complaints received at 
the EEOC during its first seven years in existence, only 41,000 were investigated 
and only 2,460 were successfully resolved. A key factor in the seemingly weak 
enforcement of Title VII complaints was that the EEOC lacked the power to bring 
lawsuits against firms. The EEOC had to turn many cases over to the Justice 
Department for further investigation and/or prosecution. 
In the 1970s, anti-discrimination policies became more effective. Wilson 
described how the EEOC and the courts began to view anti-discrimination 
policies in a more expansive framework. Institutional forms of discrimination were 
being recognized. 186 The EEOC moved to implement an industry-wide approach 
in dealing with discrimination, no longer using a case-by-case approach. 187 
Affirmative action plans had begun to be used to remedy discrimination. Most 
184 Carter A. Wilson, Racism: From Slavery to Advanced Capitalism 190 (1996). 
1es Id. 
186 Id. at 191. 
187 Id. at 192. 
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importantly, the EEOC had the newfound power to initiate lawsuits against firms 
that discriminated. 
Equal opportunity is crucial for all people, but especially for those who 
have been historically denied privileges. Congressional Digest described equal 
opportunity in several ways.188 Affirmative action, as defined by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, includes any measure adopted to correct or 
compensate for past/present discrimination or prevention of future recurring 
discrimination. Affirmative action has two elements: a voluntary and a mandated 
effort to ensure minorities and women are given equal opportunity in education, 
employment and other areas.189 Equality of opportunity is the idea that all people 
should be able to equally compete, perform and succeed on their merits without 
being discriminated against because of their race, sex or other characteristics. 
As a goal of affirmative action, equality of results is not as simple. Those 
who oppose affirmative action say a system seeking equal results is designed to 
give people an advantage based on their membership in a protected group. 
Supporters argue that the lack of minority participation is indicative of the lack of 
opportunity. Members of marginalized or minority groups do not start at the same 
level as society at large, so trying to root out discrimination case by case is 
ineffective. 
Affirmative action programs use a classification structure and are 
designed to correct a tangible, evident problem. In order to classify groups for 
188 Affirmative Action, Retribution or Equal Opportunity?, 75 CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST 162- 164 (1996). 
18s /d. 
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special treatment, the goals of affirmative action programs should be narrowly 
defined and target a government interest. Providing protection for a class of 
people (defined by race) is a violation of the Constitution, unless it can be proven 
that such classification identifies and corrects past injustice. In the case of 
broadcast minority preferences, distress policies and tax certificates were seen 
as ways to overcome prior discrimination. 
These policies did not use specific, past instances of discrimination as 
their explicit purpose. As a result, many of the legal arguments against these 
minority ownership policies have cited equal protection clause violations. The 
equal protection clause regulates the government's ability to classify people for 
obtaining benefits or administering punishments. The equal protection clause 
provides for similar treatment of all people in like circumstances. Nevertheless, 
minority ownership preferences and policies were created to foster the concepts 
of diversity and to increase the presence of minority groups in broadcast media. 
While minority preferences initially passed judicial muster as serving a 
substantial government interest, 190 opponents have continued to argue that such 
policies infringed on the constitutional rights of others and failed to present a 
logical connection to programming.191 Schement & Singleton studied the 
relationship between minority ownership and minority programming and 
concluded Spanish-owned stations fared no better or worse than white owned 
190 As seen through Congress's actions in the 1980s to stop FCC revocation of minority preferences. 
191 Howard Kleiman, Content Diversity and the FCC's Minority And Gender Licensing Policies, 35 JOURNAL 
OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 411 at 421 (1991 ). 
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stations in terms of minority programming. 192 A subsequent study found no 
significant relationship between race, ownership and quantity of programming. 193 
Other studies reinforced this tenuous connection between race, programming, 194 
and ownership. 195 Even without a clear empirical connection between minority 
ownership and programming, inclusion of minorities in media ownership was said 
to promote a more open, accepting and reflective society. 196 
Besides the belief that minority ownership would help in the promotion of a 
more reflective society, Gauger's analysis concluded that race based 
preferences did not unnecessarily abridge the rights of adversely affected 
parties. 197 Other scholarship indicated "tangible" benefits to minority ownership, 
such as better programming. 198 In 1988, the Congressional Research Service 
found some correlation between minority ownership and programming. 199 Of the 
stations that were not owned by minorities, only twenty percent provided 
192 Jorge Reina Schement and Loy A. Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership: FCC Policy and Spanish-
Language Radio, 31, JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 78- 83 (1981). 
193 Loy A. Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-Entertainment Programming in Black-Oriented 
Radio Stations, 25 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING, 195-201 (1981). (Black owners did not provide significantly 
more or less programming than non-black owners). 
194 Stuart Surlin, Black Oriented Radio: Programming to a Perceived Audience, 16 JOURNAL OF 
BROADCASTING, 288- 298 (1972) (Black oriented radio devoted less time to news and public affairs 
wogramming). 
95 James Jeeter, A Comparative Analysis of Black-owned Black-oriented radio stations and White-owned 
Black-oriented radio stations (1981) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison). Study found no 
significant difference in public affairs programming and content between black-owned, black oriented 
stations and white-owned, black oriented stations. However, results showed there were significant 
differences in playlists and musical selection between the two types of ownership. 
196 1978 report, supra note 99. 
197 Timothy Gauger, The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast 
Licenses, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 665 (1989). 
198 Paul M. Gold, The Federal Communications Commission's Minority Ownership Policy: Public Interest 
Assumptions as it is Applied to Nonentertainment Program Content of Black-Oriented Commercial Radio 
Stations on the U.S. Mainland (1983) (Thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) (study concluded 
that a greater percentage of black owned stations expended over 4% of their total news times to locally 
oriented news.) 
199 Kleiman, supra note 191 at 424. 
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programming for minorities. However, of the minority owned stations, sixty-five 
percent provided programming for minorities.200 
The need for minority ownership also was reflected in studies that linked 
minority ownership to better employment opportunities for minorities. 201 
Nevertheless, Stone found minorities working in broadcast news were not 
employed in positions that led to managerial opportunities. 202 This was especially 
true for minority males, as they were concentrated in low paying jobs such as 
cameramen and photographers. Women, however, were seen more often in 
reporting and anchoring positions.203 Profiles of television and radio news 
directors found women (mostly white women) were making rapid advancements 
in news management, although minority advancement was minimal, a one 
percent increase over a four-year period.204 In addition, a ten-year study showed 
the total broadcast industry workforce had increased by thirty five percent but 
minority employment had decreased, particularly for black males. 205 
200 Id. 
201 David Honig, Proceedings from the 10th annual telecommunications Policy Research Conference: 
Relationships between EEO, Program Service and Minority Ownership (1982). (Stations with black oriented 
programming hired twice as many blacks as did the control group stations -those not black formatted. In 
addition, black owners generally hired blacks at higher rates.) See also Gold, supra note 198. (Results from 
the study showed a significantly greater percentage of black owned stations hired black general managers 
and reported that over 75% of the stations staff was black.) 
202 Vernon A. Stone, Pipelines and Dead Ends: Jobs Held by Minorities and Women in Broadcast News, 15 
MASS COMM REVIEW 10(1988). 
203 Id. 
204 Vernon A. Stone, Changing Profiles of News Directors of Radio and Television Stations, 1972-1986. 64 
JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 745 (1987). 
205 Vernon A. Stone, Trends in the Status of Minorities and Women in Broadcast News, 65 JOURNALISM 
QUARTERLY 288 (1988). 
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OWNERSHIP POLICIES AND THE FCC 
Perhaps the lack of minority involvement in broadcast ownership and the 
ineffectiveness of minority broadcast policies was due to weak enforcement of 
FCC policies. 206 For example, the Commission initiated an ascertainment 
requirement policy in 1960. Broadcasters were required to go into the community 
and speak with various leaders and groups to determine the type of people who 
lived there, the kinds of concerns and interests those people had, and how they 
[broadcasters] could meet those concerns. The FCC designated certain 
institutions that broadcasters should seek out and interview about community 
concerns. 207 When the ascertainment requirements were undermined and 
eventually eliminated in 1981, it became more difficult for citizen groups to 
question station efforts to serve underrepresented members of the community. 208 
Challenging station licenses was another way in which citizen groups sought to 
voice their concerns. Hundreds of citizen complaints were lodged over an eight-
year period, yet the FCC failed to hold any hearings, 209 and over a ten-year 
period, the FCC had one hundred and twenty renewal challenges but only 
granted three hearings.210 
206 The history of FCC involvement in minority broadcast policy decisions has contrasted with court 
interpretation of such policies. However, much of the conversation in this area is now moot. Much of the 
le9aI foundation for race-based policies was overturned in 1995 with Adarand v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
20 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 248-249. See generally, Orville Walker, Jr. and William Rudelius, Ascertaining 
Programming Needs of "voiceless" Community Groups, 20 Journal of Broadcasting Media 89 (1976). 
208 Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 FCC 2d 650 (1971 ); 
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 FCC 2d 418 (1976). See also David 
Honig, The FCC and its Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 27 
HOWARD LAW JOURNAL 859 (1984). 
209 Id. 
210 G.G. Leatherman, Employment Discrimination in Television Broadcasting: A Study of FCC and EEOC 
47 
Additional research suggested a history of racism at the FCC in its early 
years might have affected minority ownership and participation in the industry. 
The WLBT-TV 211 case is the often referenced as evidence of FCC denial of 
community groups' grievances in relation to programming. 212 Citizens and 
advocacy groups in Jackson, Mississippi, petitioned the FCC to deny WLBT's 
license renewal application. The formal petition stated, among other things, that 
WLBT failed to serve the black population of Jackson, the programming was 
unfair and discriminatory against blacks, and their treatment of racial and 
integrationist issues was unfair and inadequate. Although the petitioners had 
gathered evidence to support their case, the FCC granted a one-year conditional 
renewal to the station, provided WLBT improved its programming. Instead of fully 
investigating the claims of the petitioners, the FCC declared the petitioners did 
not have standing. 213 Petitioners appealed the case to the D.C. Court in 1966. 
The Court remanded the case back to the FCC for further consideration. The 
Commission held formal hearings on the renewal of WLBT's license and 
subsequently renewed the license. Upon a second appeal to the D.C. Court in 
1969, WLBT's license was removed. 214 As then judge-- and later Chief Justice 
Warren Burger-- stated in the opinion it was imperative that, 
Concurrent Jurisdictions, 2 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 125 (1979/1980). 
211 Office Of Communication Of The United Church Of Christ, v. Federal Communications Commission, 359 
F.2d 994 (1966). 
212 Steven Douglass Classen, Standing on Unstable Ground: A Reexamination of the WLBT-TV Case, 11 
CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS 73 (1994); Mary Tabor, Encouraging "Those Who Would Speak 
Out With a Fresh Voice" Through the FCC's Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 612 (1991). 
213 Id.; See also, Steven Douglass Classen, Broadcast Law and Segregation: A Social History of the WLBT-
TV case (1993) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison). 
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"the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the 
needs of the audience without which the broadcaster could 
not now exist."215 
Some have argued that the failure of minority preferences in broadcasting 
rested with FCC construction of minority ownership policies, 216 while others 
concluded preference policies were subjects of great support or opposition as 
they hinged upon court interpretation of constitutional law.217 According to 
Anastos, other explanations for failure of minority ownership policies claimed 
people who were not in need of the policies used loopholes to take advantage.218 
And while loopholes are bound to exist with any policy, Hart stated the policies 
themselves were of extreme value and importance. 219 
BROADCAST REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
Deregulation has had a profound impact on minority participation in the 
broadcast industry. Deregulation was predicted as being potentially contrary to 
minority interests, as it would allow the commercial market to determine 
allocation of media properties.220 As such, the highest bidder would be able to 
215 Supra note 211 at 1002. 
216 Milan Meeske, Black Ownership of Broadcast Stations: An FCC Licensing Problem, 20 JOURNAL OF 
BROADCASTING, 261-271 (1973). Meeske indicated that the concept of "weight" in comparative hearings was 
problematic and lacked true definition. Furthermore, the exact roles of minorities that would enable them to 
receive the "weight" were a fuzzy concept. Lastly, Meeske wondered if minority preferences should even 
exist at all. If they were so problematic was that not an indication that perhaps they were not working. 
217 Kleiman, supra, note 191. 
218 Arthur J. Anastos, The Fallacy of a Single Minority Broadcast Voice: The Legacy of Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 15 COMMUNICATIONSANDTHE LAw3 (1993). 
219 Thomas A Hart, Jr., The Case for Minority Ownership, 2 GANNETT CENTER JOURNAL 54 (1988). The author 
suggested a case-by-case approach with regards to minority ownership, thus solving the problems of 
'shams' and 'fronts'. 
22° Kurt Wimmer, An Interdisciplinary Look at Minorities and the Media: Implications for Deregulation. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, 
Memphis, TN (1985, August); Kurt Wimmer, Deregulation and the Market Failure in Minority Programming: 
The Socioeconomic Dimensions of Broadcast Reform, 8 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 329- 480 (1985/1986). 
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purchase broadcast properties. Socioeconomic factors would preclude the 
existence of minority advocacy and a market failure would exist for minority 
programming. 221 Economic changes influenced shifts in political power. Those 
changes contributed to high concentrations of wealth in the upper class. 222 As 
conservative forces grew strong, civil rights forces weakened. This shift in power 
allowed the corporate sector to become more politically active,223 as McChesney 
stated companies such as Time Warner and Disney "have their own lobbying 
machines. "224 
Private ownership of capital sources (such as those in the broadcasting 
and communications industry) indicates that investments and policies tend to 
profit and help accumulate wealth, not to satisfy human (listeners or viewers) 
needs.225 A deregulated broadcast environment, according to Schmeltzer, would 
provide little incentive for broadcasters to serve minorities,226 would reduce 
competition and diversity,227 and would only serve advertisers and profit 
appeals. 228 Yet broadcasters are licensed to serve in the "public interest, 
convenience, and necessity" as evidenced by that phrase's inclusion in the 1996 
221 Broadcast Reform, supra note 220, at 333, 340, 353. 
222 Wilson, supra note 184 at 241. 
223 Id. 
224 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 64. 
225 Wilson, supra note 184 at 212. 
226 Kathryn Schmeltzer, supra note 82. 
227 Jill Howard, Congress Effs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps: More Monopolies, Less 
Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of Equal Protection, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269 (1997). 
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Telecommunications Act.229 As guardians of the public airwaves, that implies a 
certain responsibility to the public regarding programming. 
The FCC historically used several rationales for regulating in the public 
interest. One was the "scarcity" argument. 230 There was limited channel 
availability, so not every citizen would be able to broadcast. Licensing was 
created as a way to ensure that diverse ideas were being introduced into society. 
However, "scarcity" in the technical sense no longer has the same meaning as it 
once held, especially with the emergence of additional programming sources like 
cable, independent stations, digital broadcast satellites, etc. 
Some studies have theorized that as the number of channels increase, 
more minority and diverse programming will be provided.231 Although there are 
multitudes of programming outlets, some have noted minority access or 
participation is still relatively low.232 According to Minow, enlarged choice may 
not be enough to satisfy the public interest, as some viewers will be excluded. 233 
Choices, such as cable television, come with a huge price that many people will 
229 Section 307(c) (47 U.S.C. 307(c)) was amended to read as follows: Upon application therefore, a renewal 
of such license may be granted from time to time for a term of not to exceed 8 years from the date of 
expiration of the preceding license, if the Commission finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity 
would be served thereby. Consistent with the foregoing provisions of this subsection, the Commission may 
by rule prescribe the period or periods for which licenses shall be granted and renewed for particular classes 
of stations, but the Commission may not adopt or follow any rule which would preclude it, in any case 
involving a station of a particular class, from granting or renewing a license for a shorter period than that 
prescribed for stations of such class if, in its judgment, the public interest, convenience, or necessity would 
be served by such action 
230 See generally, Horowitz, supra note 69; Pool, supra note 73. 
231 Steven S. Wildman and Theomary Karamanis, The Economics of Minority Programming, The Aspen 
Institute (June 11, 2000) <http://www.aspeninst.org/c&s/diversity_papers96_wildman.asp>. The authors 
referred back to Peter Steiner's 1952 model, which studied the programming decisions of an ad-supported 
broadcasting industry with relatively few channels. Steiner was the first to state that programming provided 
by advertiser-supported broadcasters is likely to be biased toward the types of programs preferred by the 
majority of viewers and away from those that would appeal to viewers with non-mainstream tastes. 
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be unable to afford. 234 And despite the growth of pay-per-view services in the last 
twenty years, television still has the most significance for addressing minority 
programming as approximately one-third of television homes in the United States 
rely on commercial television as their sole means of broadcast programming. 235 
Another rationale used for regulating in the public interest was diversity of 
programming and information. Long standing as a basic tenet of broadcast 
regulation law, diversity of programming has its root in a 1943 Supreme Court 
case. 236 The FCC's decision to provide for minority representation was designed 
to foster "unrestricted flow of ideas and equal opportunities for all."237 To that 
end, the FCC implemented rules that offered equal opportunities in all licensees 
and permittees. 238 
Overall, the value of encouraging a wide range of voices and opinions has 
been asserted as a fundamental principle of the First Amendment and has been 
used by regulators and courts to sustain broadcasting polices. Yet, broadcasters 
have not presented a wider range of programming nor diversity within 
programming. A 1981 study indicated blacks were shown less frequently than in 
previous years, black females were invisible, but whites of both sexes had 
increased their representation in major roles.239 A 1989 survey conducted by the 
234 Id. 
235 Wildman, supra note 231. 
236 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
237 1978 Report, supra, note 99. 
238 Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, supra note 115. 
239 John F. Seggar, Jeffrey K. Hafen, & Helena Hannonen-Gladden, Television Portrayals of Minorities and 
Women in Drama and Comedy Drama 1971- 1980, 25 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 277 (1981). Authors 
conducted content analysis of television dramas and comedy programs. And although specific shows were 
examined at the exclusion of other show types, the authors contend their results were in agreement with 
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Center for Media and Public Affairs showed that minorities were rarely seen as 
anchors and reporters on network evening newscasts. 240 The survey found no 
blacks, no Asians, and only two Latinos-- Juan Vasquez on CBS and John 
Quinones on ABC. Ziegler and White's study, which investigated network news 
and the role of sex and race on newscasts, found most correspondents were 
white and male and the representation of women and minorities changed very 
little on television, even though the number of minorities in the population 
continued to increase. 241 
Other studies have examined the effects of programming formats on 
portrayals of minority groups. For reality based shows such as "Cops," research 
showed white characters were likely to be depicted as law enforcement, while 
perpetrators and criminal suspects were overwhelming black and Hispanic 
characters. 242 As part of President William Clinton's initiative on race dialogue, a 
1998 study conducted by communications scholar Robert Entman investigated 
the issue of race and stereotypes.243 The study found high visibility of blacks, but 
in stereotypical roles. Additionally, the study noted the invisibility of other 
minorities who are not black. Other research has studied portrayals of other 
prior research studies. Their results in this study contrasted sharply with the researchers early findings in 
1977. That study showed an increase in portrayals for whites and blacks and other groups (whom were 
defined as Orientals, Mexicans, Natives, etc.) and females. See John F. Seggar, Television's Portrayals of 
Minorities and Women, 1971-1975, 21 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING435 (1977). 
240 Dissecting Network News: Study Finds Men Dominate, With More Women Anchors Than Reporters and 
Few Minorities, BROADCASTING, February 26, 1990 at 40. 
241 Dhyana Ziegler and Alisa White, Women and Minorities on Network Television News: An Examination of 
Correspondents and Newsmakers, 34 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 215-223 (1990). 
242 Mary Beth Oliver, Portrayals of Crime, Race, and Aggression in "Reality-basedn Police Shows: A Content 
Analysis, 38 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 179 (1994). 
243 Mass Media and Reconciliation (September 1, 2000) <http://raceand media.com/chp.asp>. The study 
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minority groups, such as Asian Americans, finding evidence of over-
representation of such portrayals as compared to actual population figures. 244 
Overwhelmingly, black portrayals were seen more on black programs 
while white characters were seen more on white programs.245 Black characters 
on black programs were more stereotypical, exhibited more personal problems, 
and had lower social status. In contrast, black characters on integrated shows 
displayed greater social values, exhibited community problems, and had higher 
social status. 246 Interviews with writers, producers, and talent agents in Los 
Angeles revealed that what the average person thought someone in a particular 
role should look like was an important factor in making casting decisions. 247 A 
producer stated: 
"By a damn sight, you would be far more likely to accept a 
white or Chicano policeman in Beverly Hills than a black 
policeman ... Why should I start arguments in a living room 
or a den between husband and wife? I mean, why make a 
point out of something that's not a point?"248 
When blacks did appear in programming, their roles were usually 
unrealistic compared to the actual world.249 The 'televised' labor market did not 
244 Charles R. Taylor and Barbara B. Stem, Asian Americans: TV Advertising and the "Model-minority" 
Stereotype, 26 JOURNAL OF ADVERTISING 47 (1997). 
245 Pamela T. Reid, Racial Stereotyping on Television: A Comparison of the Behavior of Both Black and 
White Television Characters, 64 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 465 (1979). 
246 Cherry A. McGee-Banks, A Content Analysis of the Treatment of Black Americans on Television, SOCIAL 
EDUCATION 336 (1977). 
247 Joseph Turow, Casting for Television Parts: The Anatomy of Social Typing, JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 
18 (1978). 
248 Id. For example carpenters were usually male and telephone operators were usually female. Although it 
can be disputed that either sex can actually be in either one of these professions, the casters emphasized 
most people had certain expectations in terms of occupational roles. Ironically, most casters admitted they 
had no idea what most people thought. Others stated that whatever they believed would be good enough for 
the masses. 
249 John F. Seggar & Penny Wheeler, World of Work on TV: Ethnic and Sex Representation in Television 
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resemble the actual labor market except for farm workers and managerial 
depictions. 250 Portrayals of various racial and ethnic groups were not comparable 
with their numbers in the population. In some cases, there seemed to be over-
representation of minorities in the televised "labor market." Most occupational 
portrayals of blacks were as law enforcement officers or entertainers, with under-
representation of less prestigious occupations. 251 
Programming affects how minorities view themselves. There is a strong 
relationship between race and perceptions of black television characters. Blacks 
tend to relate to black characters on television. 252 In addition, programming can 
connect people to positive and negative images about themselves and members 
of other groups. For example, "All in The Family" had high enjoyment from both 
high and low prejudice viewers. However, high prejudice persons watched "All in 
The Family" more than low prejudiced persons. These viewers admired Archie 
(antagonist) over Mike (protagonist) and believed Archie made better sense.253 
The public's ability to be informed on a variety of issues, through 
programming or other ways, has continued to be a strong goal of regulators. 
However, the way to accomplish this task is no longer through the accountability 
of broadcasters to the public. Deregulation centers broadcaster accountability in 
Drama, 17JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 201 (1973). 
250 Id. See also, J.R. Dominick, The Portrayal of Women in Prime Time: 1953-1977, 5 SEXROLES4O5 
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the marketplace. In spite of that, evidence shows that minority groups are less 
able to afford access to new media (such as cable, satellite, etc.) and continue to 
view traditional media as their way to receive information and programming. 254 
As the market is left to dictate programming choices, the industry's ability to 
serve minority interests and tastes dwindles. 255 Wimmer's discussion of minority 
issues in broadcasting noted that in 1983, the large networks devoted less than 
30 seconds per day to minority programming interests.256 
The NAACP president, Kweisi Mfume, criticized the broadcast networks 
for lack of diversity within their programs.257 While newer networks such as 
Warner Brothers' WB Network and Rupert Murdoch's Fox Network have 
attempted to provide some minority programming, the traditional three networks 
(ABC, CBS, and NBC) are still far behind. None of the twenty-six shows 
scheduled for the fall 1999-television season had a minority person in a 
prominent role.258 Another contributing factor is that only fifty-five of the eight 
hundred and thirty-nine writers who work on television dramas and comedies are 
black. The majority of those black writers work for the WB or United Paramount's 
network-- UPN.259 
USA Today had the same opinion of the fall 1999 TV season. In a 
featured cover story, the fall line-up of shows was described as being unreflective 
254 Broadcast Reform, supra, note 220 at 339. 
255 Broadcast Reform, supra note 220 at 353. 
256 See Id. at note 50. 
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of American society. 260 Not only were the story lines and accompanying casts 
focused on young, urban, and beautiful characters, but those characters and the 
storylines were white-oriented. 261 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
Critical race theory is composed of many theoretical strands, some of 
which are connected to the dissertation topic. The "constitution is color blind" and 
the interest-convergence theory are theoretical strands that can help explain the 
failure of minority ownership polices. They can help show why the policies have 
been unsuccessful to this point. In addition, these legal theories provide insight 
into what can be done to craft and implement minority ownership policies in a 
more effective manner. 
The Constitution is Color-Blind 
Kimberle Crenshaw, a well-known critical race theorist, remarked that the 
Reagan administration symbolized the emergence of hostility towards civil rights 
and affirmative action policies.262 The Reagan and Bush administrations sought 
to restore a conservative standard in civil rights laws.263 There was an active 
campaign against affirmative action, as both administrations promoted race-
neutral policies that insisted upon proof of discrimination. Furthermore, President 
Reagan's administration saw the EEOC returning to a case-by-case approach 
260 Robert Bianco, According to TV, Everyone is White, Sex-crazed, Beautiful, and Young-- Just Like in 
Reality? Right?, USA TODAY, Friday, August 6, 1999. Section E, 1-2. 
251 Id. 
262 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
263 Wilson, supra note 184 at 197. 
57 
that was indicative of the Commission's conservative approach prior to the 
1970s. 264 This new hostility towards affirmative action was transformed into a 
formalistic, "color blind" view of civil rights, although the move towards 
deregulation began prior to the Reagan and Bush presidencies. However, this 
"color blind" view of civil rights and the Constitution called for the removal of 
affirmative action and other preference based policies. Color-blind rhetoric was 
transformed in the broadcasting industry through broadcast deregulation. The 
removal of broadcast policies such as ascertainment, anti-trafficking, and license 
challenges were ways to relax industry and remove the voice of marginalized 
persons. 
While the Supreme Court has held racial subordination of any group as an 
isolated phenomenon, Gotanda contended this viewpoint hinders society's ability 
to address the connection between minorities and racism.265 The "color blind" 
theory limited available remedies only to "actual victims" of discrimination; 
meaning only those people who could prove a visible injury of some kind.266 
Freeman argued that anti-discrimination law was embedded in the 
"perpetrator" viewpoint.267 In this viewpoint, racial discrimination is viewed as a 
series of actions inflicted upon a victim by a specific perpetrator. Racial 
discrimination is simply the misguided actions of a few individuals, not a social 
264 Id. 
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266 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
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phenomenon. Remedies become case specific as their objective is neutralizing 
the inappropriate conduct of the perpetrator.268 The overall focus is on the 
specific action rather than the overall existence of the victim and the racial 
subordination. 269 
Affirmative action, as an equalizer, looks to redistribute power, resources, 
and wealth. 270 Harris argued that affirmative action, "dismantles the actual and 
expected privilege that has attended white skin.".271 The origin of inherent 
property rights in whiteness is deeply rooted in race discrimination and slavery. 272 
White identity and being white were sources of protection from being enslaved. 
Blacks were imported into the United States as tools of labor and were labeled as 
property. 273 This resulted in the legalization of slavery which allowed blacks to be 
sold, used as collateral, transferred, or used sources of currency- all 
characteristics of property.274 This institutional system was codified in the United 
States Constitution through the Representation Clause where blacks were 
classified as 3/5 of all other persons.275 Race was critical as being white was 
equated with freedom. 276 
Historical and social contexts, such as slavery and the original intent of the 
Constitution's framers, are a part of the "victim" perspective of affirmative action. 
268 Id. at 36-37. 
269 Id. 
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Movement289 (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds., 1995). 
271 Id. at 288. 
2721d. at 277. 
273 Id. at 279. 
21◄ Id. 
275 Id. at 278. 
276 Id. at 279. 
59 
From this perspective, racial discrimination consists of existing social conditions 
(e.g. housing, money, employment), as well as the mental state associated with 
those conditions. Freeman argued that when race discrimination is viewed 
holistically and when the steps to remove the discrimination are systematic, only 
then can racial balance and equity be achieved. 277 Similar to this perspective is 
what Crenshaw called the expansive view of anti-discrimination law.278 The 
expansive view characterizes equality as a result and it tries to identify real 
consequences for racial groups. 
Minority ownership and preferences share concepts akin to the "victim" 
viewpoint. Reflecting on barriers such as lack of capital, lack of viable properties, 
and bias in advertising, supporters refer to the systematic nature in which 
minorities have been excluded from ownership. 
To counter, opponents claimed such policies served to "stereotype" 
minorities with a single voice.279 While not all minorities think the same way, 
critical race theorist Patricia Williams contended equating minority ownership 
policies and preferences with a stereotype of the single voice is inaccurate. 280 
There exist culturally and historically shared experiences within each minority 
group and society as a whole. What minority ownership policies seek to 
277 Freeman, supra note 269. 
278 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
279 Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times in Critical Race 
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accomplish is a more reflective media, accommodating other interpretations, 
images, and views- not typecasting all minorities with one, monolithic voice. 
The Interest-Convergence Theory 
Discrimination can be described as a collection of behaviors, beliefs, and 
customs embedded in our society. According to legal scholar and critical race 
theorist Derrick Bell, it is the inability of whites to recognize and accept the fact 
that discrimination still exists that hinders overall efforts to achieve racial 
balance. 281 Whites are not willing to accept accountability for the problems that 
exist nor do they deem any level of personal sacrifice necessary to right 
systematic or societal wrongs. The evidence that whites are still unable to accept 
the deep-rooted effects of racism is evident in the continued debate over 
affirmative action and preferential programs.282 
Bell contends that racial equality will only happen when that equality 
merges and is in alignment with the interest of the white majority. 283 The need to 
remain superior hinders whites from understanding the need to allow racial 
minorities to exert their social and political muscle. This convergence of interest 
undermines the efforts to eradicate discrimination by focusing the spotlight on 
preserving the socio-economic status of upper class whites. The theory asserts 
that whites will only allow social and economic progress of racial minorities 
insofar as it does not encroach on what whites feel they are naturally entitled. 




What motivates the resistance to racial equality is the perception (belief) by 
whites that any gains by minority groups will threaten the white majority's sense 
of entitlement to preferential treatment and superiority over minority groups. 284 
To wonder why whites would feel the need to hinder the removal of racial 
barriers is difficult. However, one cannot dismiss various efforts by the white 
majority to limit progress of racial minorities, under the guise of public interest, 
race-neutrality, and other concerns. The repeal of the minority tax certificate was 
placed in such a context. In order to provide a health care provision for small 
business owners, the tax certificate needed to be removed. The program was 
removed based on a deal to a minority led cable group and the wish to supply a 
health care policy for small business owners. Interests that were very different 
and an instance where a policy aimed at rectifying inequalities in ownership were 
dismissed for a "greater societal good." 
While the federal courts now assess 14th Amendment violations under the 
strict scrutiny standard of review, Bell argued there may be more to this blanket 
approach to equal protection and constitutional guarantees. 285 Remedies that are 
achieved under strict scrutiny review may be an external expression of 
subconscious judicial need to protect the status of upper and middle class 
whites. 286 As such, the meaning of the policy and its subsequent remedy (which 
should be justice for the disadvantaged and racial balance) is never achieved. 
284 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Property Rights in Whiteness- Their Legacy, Their Economic Costs in Critical Race 
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Even if one disagrees with the idea of a judicial subconscious playing a 
role in remedying discrimination, viewing racial discrimination and discriminatory 
actions under a standard of strict review might pose as a legal obstruction to 
achieving racial balance. Discriminatory actions must now be linked to intentional 
conflict of some kind and remedies are targeted at punishing specific entities. 287 
It is often difficult to distinguish from intentional and unintentional acts. 
Furthermore, a requirement of intentional conflict can diminish the importance of 
social and historical factors that contributes to racial inequality- factors that 
cannot be easily identified, but are embedded in our society. 
For broadcast ownership, minorities have faced the same challenges for 
years. Many of those challenges are direct results of overt and subtle bias, such 
as advertising discrimination. The minority ownership policies were cognizant of 
the long social and even industry discrimination towards minority participation. 
However, the acceptance of the colorblind theory by the courts has diminished 
the importance of understanding such information. 
Race does matter because it reveals something about the person and 
links to a larger, cultural identity. It is a filter through which all people see the 
world and themselves. Many whites think minorities are obsessed with race and 
fail to understand why race is so important. However, communications 
scholarship has found race to be important to self-awareness, self-esteem and 
socialization. 
287 Colorblind, supra note 44 at 262-266. 
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CHAPTER Ill: METHODS 
According to Wren and Wren, researching the law is often necessary to 
learn the consequences of a specific set of facts. 288 For this reason, legal 
research was selected as the method of investigation. While an understanding of 
the set of facts that underlie a case or statute is important, legal research can 
help make clear the roles that social and political processes play in shaping our 
laws. Legal research can serve largely adversarial goals. However, Gillmor & 
Dennis 289 stated that legal research could also accomplish several things: 
Clarifying the law through the examination of case precedents or 
procedures. 
Advocating reformation of old laws and creation of new ones. 
Giving clear understanding of how the law operates for people and 
within society. 
Gillmor and Dennis described a variety of ways to conduct legal 
research. 290 Traditional legal research focuses on the exhaustive analysis of 
legal materials related to a specific area of law, for example, analysis aimed at 
finding rules of law from statutes, administrative agency decisions, executive 
orders or court decisions. Empirical legal research and behavioral legal research 
use methodologies found in social sciences as they recognize the complexities 
288 Christopher G. Wren and Jill Robinson Wren, The Legal Research Manual 29 (2 ed. 1986). 
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and circumstances of the law. Context, as a tool of legal research, calls for the 
understanding of legal issues that may have origins in areas unrelated to the 
phenomenon being studied. It remains important to know that legal research is 
often done to support a particular position. Only a small percentage of legal 
research is conducted just for the sake of knowing. 
Several factors distinguish legal research from traditional scientific 
research. Social scientific research seeks to emphasize general aspects of a 
phenomenon. While social science research looks for connection between 
various phenomenon, empirically based testing is customarily used to make 
those connections. Legal research is concerned with the uniqueness of a case 
and often uses reasoning by analogy- case B is like case A. Stare decisis refers 
to the principle of precedent. This principle requires the adherence to rulings in 
similarly patterned cases by following the principles that prior courts and judges 
have established. 291 Although precedents may be distinguished (saying case Bis 
really not like case A) or overruled, courts are reluctant to do so unless it is 
apparent that the former rule would be clearly unjust in present circumstances. 
Legal research also differs from social scientific research because it does 
not deal with probabilities or uncertainties, and is heavily oriented towards the 
past. In social scientific research, theory is composed of related, abstract 
statements that are empirically linked and explain a human behavior or condition. 
The concept of theory has a different purpose when used in legal research. 
291 Christina Kuntz et al, Legal Research 137 (4th ed. 1996). 
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Theory in law focuses on explaining the rationale or explaining the specifics on 
which an action is claimed to exist or not exist. 
Despite the differences among social scientific forms of communications 
research, legal research is one of the oldest areas of communication research. 
Legal research lends itself to a variety of other fields of study, including history, 
economics and philosophy. 292 Legal research has begun to incorporate elements 
of social science research. Although this kind of application is relatively new, 
what exists proves to be potentially useful to making sense of the law. 293 Gillmor 
and Dennis note that scholars are moving away from the dogmatic, intrinsic 
aspects of law. Many are exploring the extrinsic factors that can influence the 
courts and the law, such as politics, elections, 294 and in the case of this 
dissertation, race. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Legal research methods were used to conduct this study. Overall, legal 
analysis took place in three parts. First, there was identification of a collection of 
United States district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court cases in the area 
of minority ownership and minority ownership policies promoted by the FCC. 
Second, analysis of cases consisted of reviewing majority and dissenting 
opinions. Third, placing majority and dissenting opinions in the framework of 
292 Id. at 333. 
293 Id. at 345. 
294 Id. at 346. 
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critical race theory, the study continued with determining the judicial rationale and 
arguments. 
Legal research relies heavily on existing documents and materials, which 
also adds a historical dimension to the study as well. The materials used in legal 
research are generally differentiated in terms of primary and secondary authority. 
Primary authority is described as anything that constitutes the law.295 Local, 
state and federal legislation, judicial case law, administrative regulations and 
decisions, legislative histories, as well as rules of procedure are all sources of 
primary authority. 296 Using primary authority provides not only a firm legal basis 
for any argument, but also shows where such arguments have taken place in the 
law. 
Secondary authority is information and resources that are created by 
individuals and non-governmental bodies to attempt to interpret or explain 
primary authority. 297 Secondary authority includes treatises, restatements, 
periodicals, journals (academic and law), newspapers, encyclopedias, 
pamphlets, Internet, microforms, and other such materials. 298 Usage of 
secondary authority is important for many reasons. First, such sources can lead 
to the discovery of primary authority. Next, secondary authority provides 
specialized analysis or a distinct viewpoint of a specific argument. 299 
295 Id. at 4. 
296 Id. at 5. 
297 Id. at 6. 
298 Id. at 6. 
299 Id. at 44. 
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Both primary and secondary authorities were integral to this research. 
Primary authority was located through Lexis-Nexis Universe and West Law 
databases. The key research phrases used in the databases searches were: 1) 
ownership, 2) broadcast ownership, 3) radio, 4) television, 5) broadcast policies, 
6) broadcast preferences, 7) communications policies, 8) minorities, 9) black, 10) 
Afro-American, 11) distress sales, 12) comparative hearings, 13) racial 
preferences, and 14) minority tax certificates. These research phrases were used 
in together in a variety of search patterns. 
To locate secondary authority materials, Lexis-Nexis Universe and 
Lega/Trac were used to find law review articles. Academic and industry sources 
were identified using ProQuest, CommAbstracts, Dissertation Abstracts, Dow 
Jones Interactive and Uncover databases. 
The citation style used for this dissertation is, A Uniform System of 
Citation: The BlueBook, sixteenth edition. This citation is the standard form used 
in legal research and writing. 
DELIMITATIONS 
While this dissertation covers an expansive period of judicial decisions 
and government regulations, there are some acknowledged limitations of this 
study. The author has delimited the types of persons involved, the types of cases 
used for analysis, and the subject matter of the cases, in order to focus on a 
narrower issue. 
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Race versus Gender Issues 
According to the FCC, a minority individual is defined as an American 
Indian, Black (not of Hispanic origin), American Eskimo, Hispanic, Aleut, or 
Asiatic American. 300 Although the courts or the government have rarely 
recognized such a connection, women disadvantaged by workforce 
discrimination might very well fit the description of a minority.301 Socially, a 
minority person can be defined as anyone that is not of the majority. In the United 
States, the majority culture is described as being white and Eurocentric. 
While it is conceivable to examine all cases involving these designated 
minorities, the 2000 Census reported that of the 281 million people in the United 
States, African Americans constituted 34 million or 12% of the population. 
American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut populations stood at 2.4 million, Asian 
population stood at 10 million, and Pacific Islanders were estimated to be close 
to 400,000 people. Lastly, Hispanic population estimates were 35 million 
people. 302 
Even though Hispanics are now considered the largest minority, there are 
several reasons why this study focuses on African-Americans as the population 
group for analysis. First, population estimates and figures identify African-
Americans as a very large group of people, trailing Hispanics only slightly. 
Second, the analysis of cases involving other minority groups would have yielded 
300 1978 Report, supra note 99; Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, supra note 115. 
301 Supra note 8. 
302 See, Census 2000 Brief Series, OveNiew of Race and Hispanic Origin (March 12, 2001) 
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html. 
69 
relatively few cases for analysis. As ownership figures revealed in Chapter II, 
African-Americans tend to comprise the bulk of minority owners. Also, many of 
the FCC policies regarding minority ownership grew from concerns voiced by 
African-American individuals and groups. As a result, this study concentrated on 
cases involving African-Americans. 
There is an acknowledgment that some cases may involve African-
American women as well. That is an inherent outcome when deciding to narrow 
cases by racial identification as opposed to gender identification. For purposes of 
this study, black (African American) individuals and groups were the only minority 
group used for analysis. 
Judicial versus Administrative Cases 
Statutes passed by Congress create federal administrative agencies. The 
Federal Communications Commission is an example of what is called an 
independent federal agency, meaning it was positioned by Congress to sit 
outside the three branches of federal government. This "independence" is 
guaranteed to some extent by the statute requiring no more than three of the five 
FCC commissioners can be from the same political party. This independence, 
however, is illusory because as is commonly observed, there often does not 
seem to be major doctrinal differences between the two major political parties. 
For example, in the late 1990s, FCC Chairman William Kennard wanted to draw 
back from some of the deregulatory efforts within the industry, specifically 
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ownership concentration, Congress (through pressure from the NAB) announced 
it might hold hearings to investigate the role of the FCC. 303 
Since its inception in 1934, the FCC has been more of an advocate for 
broadcast licensees than a regulator. McChesney argued that the "FCC notion of 
regulation owes more to its support of the commercial interest than to its being 
the public watchdog." 304 The power to remove broadcast licenses was rarely 
exercised and then usually for technical reasons (such as bad engineering or 
straying from the assigned frequency). Even though it has been widely held that 
licenses were renewed as a basic formality, former FCC Chairman Minow 
remarked that there was nothing inherently permanent about a broadcast 
license. 305 Broadcasters are now seen as "de facto owners,"306 as any challenges 
to license holders because of inadequate service to the public are very difficult to 
prove. McChesney noted that in 1998, the FCC failed to remove a license from a 
Denver television station, despite evidence that showed no local public affairs 
coverage and excessive coverage of violence in the news. 307 
Nevertheless, the legal function remains-- independent agencies such as 
the FCC are supposed to be insulated from political shifts or influences. 
Regardless of whether the FCC is sufficiently independent to insure that 
broadcasters live up to their obligations to serve the "public interest, 
303 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 69. 
304 Id. at 69. 
305 Minow, supra note 3 at 28. 
306 Id. 
307 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 69. 
71 
convenience, or necessity," the FCC creates regulations, which are rules that 
govern the areas they enforce. 
Federal agency decisions constitute administrative law. Administrative 
law, on a federal level, has the force of law. Rules, regulations, and decisions 
from the FCC govern telecommunications throughout the country. However, 
decisions from federal agencies are subject to review from the federal court 
system. In the case of the FCC, any administrative decisions made can be 
appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 
Several reasons preclude the use of FCC administrative decisions in this 
study. First, the author seeks to understand the assumptions and arguments 
used in judicial proceedings. Second, the judiciary makes what is called 
"common law"- law that applies throughout the United States. More importantly, it 
is such law that can overturn an administrative decision or rule an administrative 
decision as unconstitutional. So while examining FCC decisions may have 
added another dimension to this research, it is not necessary to the primary 
focus of this study. 
Ownership versus Employment Issues 
Employment of minorities may be an entrance into minority ownership. 
Nevertheless, most of the FCC employment rules and policies are based on the 
EEOC guidelines and standards. The procedures and issues that are involved in 
employment cases are different from procedures and issues in ownership cases. 
Employment cases might involve such issues as sex, age, or religious 
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discrimination. In order to keep the scope of the study narrowly focused on 
minority ownership policies and regulations, employment cases were excluded 
from analysis. 
There were several limitations to this study that may have impacted the 
outcome of this research. First, the texts for analysis were limited to federal court 
cases, specifically district court and Supreme Court cases. While a search of 
district court cases yielded no usable results, an inclusion of FCC decisions may 
have provided an added dimension to this research. The addition of FCC rulings 
and adjudications on the issues of minority ownership policies could show other 
arguments that the agency considered which may have impacted the policies. In 
addition, the rationales of the FCC's minority ownership policies could have been 
weighed against their actions in other agency decisions. However, the focus of 
this study was on judicial decisions and rationales used in their decision making 
processes. 
Another limitation of this policy was the focus on minority ownership 
policies. While the study's topic was the reason why the cases were selected, 
focusing on three distinct policies limited the number of potential cases. By 
including perennial issues such as "sham" organizations, multiple ownership 
rules, equal employment opportunities, and comparative license renewal 
hearings, the impacts of other industry policies on minority participation could 
have been examined. 
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CHAPTER IV: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 
In January of 1978, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) submitted a petition to the FCC calling for an official policy 
statement on minority broadcast ownership. 308 Established in 1978 by 
Reorganization Plan Number 1 (1977) and implemented with Executive order 
12046, 309 the NTIA was created by President Jimmy Carter to shift 
telecommunications policy and advisory functions away from the White House for 
fear of undue Presidential influence.310 The Executive Order made the Secretary 
of Commerce the President's principal adviser on telecommunications policy. The 
NTIA became the research unit for the United States government, formulating 
policies to support the growth of telecommunications. 311 The NTIA wanted the 
FCC to create a general policy in support of minority ownership and specific 
polices that would: 1) create minority oriented changes to the comparative 
hearing process, 2) create minority oriented changes in license assignment 
policies, and 3) change standards of financial qualifications for new facilities 
applicants. 312 
While the NTIA had proposed specific items for implementation, the FCC 
was already working on several of its own. By May of the same year, the FCC 
formed the policies of granting tax certificates and distress sales to minority 
308 Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice oflnquiry, 69 F.C.C. 2d 1591 (1978). 
309 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/history.html 
31° Krasnow, et. al, supra note 71. 
311 T. Barton Carter, Marc A. Franklin, & Jay B. Wright, The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate: 
Regulation of Electronic Mass Media (4th ed., 1996). 
312 Id. 
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applicants. The rationale for the newly created policies was to increase 
ownership by minorities and to "enhance the diversity of control of a limited 
resource." Diversification was seen as a public interest goal, one that the FCC 
wanted to promote. And while they noted that these two policies alone were not a 
total solution to the problem, the FCC believed these policies would be a start. 
Minority tax certificates, distress sales, and later on comparative hearings 
would remain the primary ways that the FCC fostered minority ownership. What 
follows is a discussion of how those policies have legislatively evolved over time. 
MINORITY TAX CERTIFICATES 
The FCC had been granting minority tax certificates since 1978. The 
policy was effective in promoting minority ownership, thus it went relatively 
unchanged for several years. These certificates provided a reduction in capital 
gains taxes to owners of broadcast stations who sold their stations to minority-
owned firms. In 1982, the FCC issued a policy statement that reflected some 
modifications to the policy.313 The FCC limited the usage of tax certificates to 
situations that would only fulfill new or current FCC policy. That translated to the 
barring of sales that involved detailed inquiry or required heightened evaluation 
of the merits of the sales. 
In 1986, the FCC chose to review the minority tax certificate policy along 
with other minority-preference policies.314 However, Congress attached an 
313 Policy Statement on Issuance of Tax Certificates, 92 F.C.C. 2d. 170 (1982). 
314 Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies 
Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986). 
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appropriation rider to the FCC's fiscal budget which prohibited the spending of 
monies to repeal, change, examine, or continue any examination of policies or 
procedures that dealt with comparative licensing, distress sales, or tax 
certificates. 315 
The minority tax certificate policy would again come under scrutiny in 
1995. Viacom Inc., one of the world's largest entertainment and media 
companies, 316 announced that it was selling its cable systems to a minority-
owned company on January 20, 1995. A minority tax certificate was being used 
to complete the deal. There were many estimates on how much money Viacom 
would defer from the sale. A Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress placed the figures anywhere from $440 million to $640 million 
dollars. 317 
It is important to note that linked together with the discussion of the 
minority tax certificate was the government's plan to restore and codify a tax 
deduction for self-employed people who paid certain portions of their health 
premiums. In order to pay for the reinstatement of the tax deduction (revenue 
reducer), the government had to find ways to fund it (revenue raisers). 318 One of 
the ways to raise the revenue was the repeal of the tax certificate policy. It had 
been estimated that by repealing the policy, federal revenue would increase by 
315 Pub. L. No. 100-202 (1987). 
316 See http://www.viacom.com/merger/ 
317 Angele A. Gilroy, The Viacom Transaction and Beyond: the Federal Communications Commission Tax 
Certificate Program, 95-319 SPR. 
318 95-1895032. Congressional Research Service. Jack Taylor, Aril 18, 1995. 
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$1.3 million over a five-year period.319 While other measures were discussed, 320 
the tax certificate was intensely focused on. 
A bill that originated in the House of Representatives in February 1995, 
H.R. 831, called for the end of the tax certificate. The bill was also applied 
retroactively to January 17, 1995.321 That had serious implications for the Viacom 
deal. In a Senate hearing, Viacom's Vice Executive President and General 
Counsel Phillippe Dauman said: 
"If I were unable to go through with this transaction we will 
have to explore other possibilities. We had wished to re-
configure our assets ... That was the reason we explored 
the sale of our cable system to Mr. Washington. But we will 
not be able to go through with this sale if the Section 1071 
program is retroactively repealed."322 
Both the House323 and Senate324 held public hearings on the minority tax 
certificate program. Debate continued over the following months with the House 
and Senate agreeing to the bill's passage. On April 11, 1995, House Bill 831, 
which repealed the minority tax certificate and permanently extended the tax 
deduction for health insurance costs of the self-employed, was signed into public 
law.325 
319 /d. at 3. 
320 Modification of involuntary conversion rules and restrictions on earned income tax credits for low-income 
workers. 
321 H.R. 831. 
322 FCC'S Tax Certificate Program, hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance, 104th Cong. 69 
(1995). 
:\23 /d. 
324 FCC Minority Tax Certificate, hearing before the Subcom. on Oversight of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, 104th Cong. (1995). 
325 Pub. L. No. 104-7 (April 11, 1995). 
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BROADCAST DISTRESS SALES 
When the broadcast distress sale policy was adopted in 1978, the policy 
sought to increase minority ownership. Station owners who were in danger of 
losing a license could transfer the license at a "distressed" price (usually no more 
than 75% of fair market value) to a minority owner. The minority ownership 
interest in the property had to be more than fifty-percent or compose a controlling 
interest. 
Only forty broadcast licenses had been transferred using the broadcast 
distress sale policy from 1978 until 1995.326 So ttie FCC posted a notice of 
inquiry to examine ways to expand the policy.327 Specifically, the FCC wanted to 
adopt two changes to the policy that would: 1) limit the distress price of the 
station to no more than 50% of the fair market value, and 2) allow distress sales 
prior to the beginning of revocation or renewal hearings. 328 
However, the ruling in Shurberg v. FCC ended the Commission's attempts 
to expand the policy.329 In Shurberg, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled the policy 
unconstitutional because it deprived Shurberg of his equal protection rights. 
Furthermore, the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past 
discrimination and the policy was not designed to promote programming 
diversity. 330 A rehearing en bane was denied. Consequently, the FCC 
326 FCC Minority Tax Certificate, supra note 336 at 51 (Testimony of William Kennard). 
327 Distress Sale Policy for Broadcast Licensees, 50 F.R. 42047 (1985). 
320 Id. 




terminated the original notice of inquiry begun in 1985 and the policy was 
subsequently terminated. 331 
COMPARATIVE LICENSE HEARINGS 
The FCC has used comparative hearings for the awarding of radio and 
television licenses for many years. However in 1965, the Commission announced 
a set of guidelines and preferences to be followed in future comparative 
hearings. 332 In a comparative hearing, each applicant presents evidence and 
reasons as to why it should be awarded the license being sought by multiple 
applicants. However, the comparative hearing process did not initially have 
provisions that specifically focused on race. The main goals of the comparative 
policy were: 1) to provide the best service to the public and 2) to provide a 
maximum diffusion of control of mass media. According to the Commission, good 
service originated from a broadcaster's ability to serve his or her primary 
audience needs and be aware of other specialized needs or interests. 
Diversification of control was needed in a free society, especially in a system 
where the government must limit access to, and control of, broadcast licenses. 
However, diversification of control in the 1965 policy statement did not 
speak of granting preferences based on racial orientation. In fact, most of the 
issues under the diversification criterion dealt with manageme~t. The 
Commission favored full-time owners, as it believed hands-on participation would 
lead to greater knowledge of the community. Experience within the industry, local 
331 Distress Sale Policy of Broadcast Licensees, 5 F.C.C.R. 397 (1990). 
332 Policy Statement On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d 393 (1965). 
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residence, participation in community activities, and types of signal coverage 
were other types of factors under the diversification criterion. 
Granting Minority Preference in Comparative Hearings 
The granting of racial and gender preferences were born out of the 
decisions in two D.C. Circuit cases. In TV 9, 333 several applicants filed for the 
license of a Florida TV station. The station was awarded to a company called 
Mid-Florida. Appellants contested the FCC's award of the station to Mid-Florida. 
Specifically, a minority owned company called Comint claimed no credit was 
given in the proceedings to its ownership structure. Two of the principals in 
Comint Corporation were African-American. In addition, one of the African-
American principals was designated a vice president and was to spend at least 
two days a week at the TV station. Both African-American principals had lived in 
the community for more than 20 years, and had been involved in various 
community activities. 
The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that the level of participation by the 
two African-American principals would be high. However, the FCC did not grant 
credit to Comint. The FCC ruled that the Communications Act was color-blind 
and unless Com int could show that the participation of the two minority principals 
would provide a level of superior service than Mid-South, Comint could not 
succeed on minority ownership merit. Black ownership could not be an 
333 TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (1973). 
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independent comparative factor. Instead, black ownership must be shown to 
produce a public interest benefit. 
The D.C. Circuit Court found the FCC's decision to be inadequate. While 
the Commission granted some credit to Comint for management participation, 
the court stated that was not the same kind of credit that could have been 
attributed to the broader community representation of the two principals. The 
credit being sought by Comint was consistent with the comparative hearings 
criterion of "diversification of ownership of mass media." Moreover, the court 
argued that the FCC wavered on its own standards of qualifications, as the FCC 
sought an assurance of superior community service from Comint, but did not 
seek such assurance on the issues of local residence, participation or integration 
of management with ownership. 
In Garrett v. FCC,334 the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC did not 
provide credit for black ownership and operation of a radio station in Alabama. In 
addition, the Court contended that the FCC did not remain faithful to prior 
precedents it had set with other cases with similar circumstances. The proposals 
of Garrett and the other applicant were combined into a comparative hearing at 
the request of an administrative law judge, since the targeted changes of both 
stations would have impacted service to the Huntsville, Alabama area. The 
appellant, Leroy Garrett, had filed an application with the FCC seeking to 
construct additional facilities that would change his station's (WEUP) status from 
334 Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (1975). 
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daytime-only to unlimited broadcasting. The Commission denied his application 
because Garrett was unable to comply with rules regarding minimum city 
coverage. The competing applicant also fell short on coverage requirements, but 
the application was granted. The FCC and an administrative law judge believed 
that the competing applicant's lack of coverage was better justified. 
The competing applicant's proposed changes would have encompassed 
92.4% of the population and 89.4% of the area of the city of Warner Robins, 
Georgia which is about 200 miles away from Huntsville. In contrast, the 
administrative law judge stated Garrett's proposal would have included only 
73.4% of Huntsville's total population and 49% of its total area. However, 
Garrett's proposed changes would have provided service to more than 12,000 
people without AM service and would have attracted over 100,000 more people 
through the nighttime service. The FCC considered the competing applicant's 
transmitter site as providing optimum coverage of the city and a waiver of the 
coverage rules was granted. Neither the Review Board nor the FCC considered 
Garrett's proposal impressive enough to grant a waiver. 
The Court of Appeals called the judgment of the Review Board "grievously 
incorrect." Citing its motivations in the TV 9 decision, the Court held that in 
situations where minority ownership is inclined to increase or produce diversity, 
merit should be awarded in those situations. The Court insisted that reasonable 
expectation of the diversity is necessary as a basis for credit, however an 
advance demonstration of diversity was not needed. 
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Revamping Minority Preference in Comparative Hearings 
In 1992, the Commission wanted to fully reexamine the comparative 
hearing policy. 335 Although the Commission had previously tried to create new 
procedures that would speed up the comparative process, 336 attempts were 
deferred due to several petitions for reconsideration. 337 In order to revamp the 
1965 policy, the FCC sought comments on modifications to several criteria: 1) 
integration of ownership and management, 2) proposed program service, 3) past 
broadcast record, and 4) use of auxiliary power.338 The FCC also wanted 
additional comments on its proposal for a new, point-based system of evaluating 
competing applicants. 
After a deadline extension, 339 the FCC issued another Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making for consideration of an amendment to the comparative hearing 
policy. The Amendment suggested that successful applicants own their stations 
for a minimum of three years before transferring ownership. 340 As the comment 
period for the notice was extended, 341 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
335 In The Matter Of Reexamination Of The Policy Statement On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 
F.C.C.R, 2664. (1992). (Proposed April 10, 1992). 
336 Comparative Hearing Process for New Broadcast Applicants, 56 FR 787 (1991) (Commission wanted to 
encourage settlements, eliminate intermediate review, limit oral arguments, and implement other time saving 
mechanisms). 
337 Amendment Of Section 73.3525 Of The Commission's Rules Regarding Settlement Agreements Among 
Applicants For Construction And Proposals To Reform The Commission's Comparative Hearing Process To 
Expedite The Resolution Of Cases, 6 F.C.C.R. 5703 (1991). 
338 Id. 
339 Reexamination Of The Policy Statement On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 F.C.C.R. 3192 (1992) 
(placing NAACP comments into a new docket on "finder's preferences, thereby extending comment period 
~a week). 
Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 8 F.C.C.R. 5475 (1993) 
(further notice proposed August 12, 1993). (FNPRM sought to extend the holding period for successful 
comparative hearing applicants to three years). 
341 Reexamination Of The Policy Statement On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 8 F.C.C.R. 6676 (1993) 
(granting extension to Media Access Project to file comments on the three year holding period amendment). 
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District of Columbia reviewed the case of Bechtel v. FCC. 342 This case was to 
become a crucial moment in the ongoing FCC discussions about comparative 
hearings. 
Demise of Minority Preference and Comparative Hearings 
In deciding between or among mutually exclusive applicants who wanted 
to build and operate a new broadcasting station, the FCC generally favored 
applicants who promised to participate consistently in the station's management. 
In Bechtel v. FCC [Bechtel /],343 an application was denied due to the lack of 
integration of management. Because there was no proposal to integrate 
ownership and management of the new station, an administrative law judge 
rejected several competing applications, including Bechtel's. On an appeal by 
Bechtel, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled the Commission had to demonstrate 
why integration of ownership was in the public interest. The Court further 
instructed the FCC to respond to Bechtel's challenges and consider the 
application in light of those challenges. 
As the Court was deciding the Bechtel I case, the FCC ceased 
comparative hearings, halted the intake of new applications, and stopped 
judgment on any outstanding mutually exclusive proposals. 344 Upon remand in 
Bechtel I, the FCC failed to show why integration was still in the public interest. 
Soon afterwards, Bechtel again took the case to the D.C. Court of Appeals 
342 Bechtel V. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (1992). 
343 Id. 
344 FCC Freezes Comparative Proceedings, 9 F.C.C.R. 1055 (1994). 
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[Bechtel in.345 This time the court decided that integration of ownership was a 
subjective and unreliable criterion and was deemed unlawful. 346 The Court 
ordered the FCC to hold new proceedings to consider Bechtel's application 
without the integration preference. 
The FCC decided not to appeal the Bechtel II decision and subsequently 
lifted some of the restrictions placed during the comparative hearing freeze. 347 A 
second further notice of proposed rule making was issued. 348 This time, the FCC 
was looking for comments and suggestions that would help fine tune the policy in 
light of the final decision in Bechtel 11.349 But before any results could be seen 
from the FCC's proposed rule making on comparative hearings, an act of 
Congress would dramatically alter the future of comparative hearings altogether. 
Competitive Bidding Replaces Comparative Hearings 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted on February 8, 
1996. 350 Section 3090) of the Telecommunications Act reads as follows: 
U) Use of competitive bidding. 
(1) General authority. If, consistent with the obligations 
described in paragraph (6)(E}, mutually exclusive 
applications are accepted for any initial license or 
construction permit, then, except as provided in paragraph 
(2), the Commission shall grant the license or permit to a 
qualified applicant through a system of competitive bidding 
345 10 F.3d 875 (1993). 
346 Id. 
347 Modification Of FCC Comparative Proceedings Freeze Policy, 9 F.C.C.R. 6689 (1994). (Commission 
resumes processing applications for new broadcast media stations, applications for upgrades to previously 
owned stations, and the issuance of cut-off lists. They continued to suspend processing of applications that 
were mutually exclusive). 
348 Reexamination Of The Policy Statement On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 9 F.C.C.R 2821 (1994) 
~second FNPRM proposed June 22, 1994). 
49 FCC Waives Limitations On Payments To Dismissing Applicants In Universal Settlements Of Cases 
Subject To Comparative Proceedings Freeze Policy, 10 F.C.C.R. 12182 (1995). 
350 47 U.S.C. § 307. 
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that meets the requirements of this subsection. 
(5) Bidder and licensee qualification. No person shall be 
permitted to participate in a system of competitive bidding 
pursuant to this subsection unless such bidder submits 
such information and assurances as the Commission may 
require to demonstrate that such bidder's application is 
acceptable for filing. No license shall be granted to an 
applicant selected pursuant to this subsection unless the 
Commission determines that the applicant is qualified 
pursuant to subsection (a) and sections 308(b) and 310 
[47 uses§§ 308(b) and 310]. Consistent with the 
objectives described in paragraph (3), the Commission 
shall, by regulation, prescribe expedited procedures 
consistent with the procedures authorized by subsection 
(i)(2) for the resolution of any substantial and material 
issues of fact concerning qualifications. 
(11) Termination. The authority of the Commission to 
grant a license or permit under this subsection shall expire 
September 30, 2007. 
The 1997 Balanced Budget Act further expanded the Commission's 
authority under section 309G) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to resolve 
all mutually exclusive license applicants by competitive bidding procedures. 351 In 
November of that same year, the FCC proposed license auction procedures. 352 
Almost a year after the Balanced Budget Act allowed the FCC to resolve 
competing applications through competitive bidding, the Commission adopted 
general bidding procedures to select among mutually exclusive broadcast license 
applications. 353 
351 The FCC can stipulate methods by which a reasonable reserve price is required to obtain any license or 
permit being assigned pursuant to the competitive bidding. This freedom can have potential impacts on 
women, small businesses, and minorities who may not be unsuccessful in meeting that reserve price. 
352 Implementation Of Section 309(J) Of The Communications Act, Reexamination of the Policy Statement 
on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Proposals to Reform the Commission's Comparative Hearing Process 
to Expedite the Resolution of Cases, 12 F.C.C.R. 22363 (1997). 
353 Implementation Of Section 309(J) Of The Communications Act, Reexamination Of The Policy Statement 
On Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Proposals To Reform The Commission's Comparative Hearing 
Process To Expedite The Resolution Of Cases, 13 F.C.C.R. 15920 (1998). 
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Advancing Minority Ownership 
Although policies were created to enhance minority ownership, there 
continued to be a real problem incorporating minorities into broadcast ownership. 
To address the problem, the FCC formed the Advisory Committee on Alternative 
Financing for Minority Opportunities in Telecommunications. 354 The FCC 
discussed its continual efforts in the area of minority broadcast ownership and 
included recommendations from the Advisory Committee. 355 Based upon several 
of those recommendations, the FCC adopted new procedures which included: 1) 
authorized tax certificates and distress sales to limited partnerships when a 
minority general partner owned at least twenty percent of the property, 2) allowed 
tax certificates to divesting shareholders only when that divestiture further 
promoted minority ownership, and 3) delegated authority to conducted distress 
sale transactions to the Mass Media Bureau for quicker expedition. 356 
In addition to the policy statement, the Commission also issued a notice of 
proposed rule making to investigate the expansion of seller-creditor rights.357 The 
FCC acknowledged that some sellers and creditors might take a security interest 
in a station's assets or stock in the corporate license and that such transfers 
could be further promoted if sellers had greater protection. That protection, the 
FCC proposed, might come in the form of a reversionary interest, a future 
354 Commission Policy Regarding The Advancement Of Minority Ownership In Broadcasting, 92 F .C.C. 2d 
849 ( 1982) (proposed December 13, 1982). 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 849-851, 856. 
357 Id. at 859-860. 
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interest in a broadcast property when the property is not completely disposed of, 
yet assigned or granted to, another party. 
Supporters of expanding seller-creditor rights felt the physical assets of a 
station represent a small portion of the station's actual value and if sellers have 
to place a high reliance on those assets that places their capital at greater risk.358 
And although supporters of the expansion of seller-creditor rights indicated such 
expansion would stimulate minority acquisition, the FCC did not agree. 359 
The FCC, along with various comments from minority and community-
based groups, noted there have never been any property rights in a broadcast 
license. As such, licenses could not be subject to reversionary interest. The 
Commission also expressed concern expressed by commissioners that the 
proposed policy would hinder the progress of minority owners. Their 
independence as broadcasters would be threatened as control over their 
broadcast facility might be compromised. Noting the above arguments, the FCC 
terminated the proceeding into the expansion of seller-creditor rights. 360 
REEXAMINING OWNERSHIP POLICIES 
By the middle of the 1980s, the broadcasting industry had changed. The 
industry was beginning to undergo deregulation. The Supreme Court had begun 
to review many affirmative action cases with more scrutiny. 361 Its review of such 
cases had bearing on the FCC's race preferential programs. So the Commission 
358 Id. 
359 Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 99 F.C.C. 2d 
1249 (1985) (proceeding terminated). 
360 Id. 
361 See generally, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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issued a notice of inquiry to reexamine the comparative licensing process, the 
distress sale policy, and the minority tax certificate program. 362 
The inquiry was designed to examine the constitutionality of the programs 
against the "strict scrutiny" standard of review. Additionally, the inquiry solicited 
comments and evidence as to the connection between minority/gender 
ownership and programming. The FCC noted in its inquiry the provisions 
Congress had made in the Communications Act of 1982.363 Section 309 of the 
Communications Act of 1982 codified the lottery licensing provision, which 
authorized a minority preference plan. Notwithstanding Congress' attempts to 
promote and protect minority ownership, the FCC solicited comments on how to 
reconcile the government's attempts to promote minority ownership with the 
judiciary's strict review of such policies. 
Besides seeking comments on the legal arguments surrounding these 
policies, the FCC postponed consideration of all distress sales and comparative 
hearings where the diversification criterion was being claimed. However, 
President Reagan signed into law a joint resolution from the House of 
Representatives on December 22, 1987.364 This resolution, which authorized 
monies for the fiscal year 1988, attached an appropriation rider to the FCC's 
fiscal allocations. The rider prohibited the FCC from spending any of the monies 
to repeal, change, examine, or continue any examination of policies or 
362 Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax 
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F .C.C.R. 1315 (1986). 
363 Id. 
364 Pub. L. No. 100-202 (1987). 
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procedures that dealt with comparative licensing, distress sales, or tax 
certificates. That law effectively terminated the FCC's efforts to re-examine those 
policies and the FCC issued an order stating their discontinuation of their 
proceedings in January of 1988.365 To ensure the FCC did not attempt to change 
these policies in the future, the same rider was attached to every fiscal budget 
until 1994.366 Congress intended, through its actions, to keep minority ownership 
policies intact. 
Nearly eight years later, the FCC would finally get the opportunity to re-
examine the minority ownership policies. In a 1995 notice of proposed rule 
making, the Commission wanted to look at alternative legal remedies for 
providing entry for minority ownership. 367 The Commission wanted remarks on its 
exploratory proposals for an incubator program (to provide minority and female 
broadcast owners with small interest loans and other services from large 
broadcast groups), on FCC's revision to the broadcast ownership form to include 
information on race and gender, and on ways to expand the tax certificate 
program to encourage more sales to minorities. 368 
After an order for extending the comment period was granted, 369 the 
Commission issued a report and order in 1998. 370 One of the results from the 
365 Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies 
Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, F.C.C.R. 766 (1988). 
366 See, Pub. L. No. 100-459 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-162 (1989); Pub. L. No. 101-515 (1990); Pub. L. No. 
102- 140 (1991); Pub. L. No 102-395 (1992); Pub. L. No. 103-121 (1993); Pub. L. No. 103-317 (1994). 
367 Policies And Rules Regarding Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 
2788 (1995) (proposed January 12, 1995). 
368 Id. at 2790-2792. 
369 Review Of The Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite 
Stations, Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media, Facilities, Attribution Of Broadcast interests, 
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report was the modification of the annual ownership form to require information 
on race and gender of the license holder(s), excluding those ownership 
structures that are not required to file such forms (e.g. sole owners and 
partnerships). 371 Petitions were filed shortly after the adoption of the revisions to 
the annual ownership form. Petitioners, the National Association of Broadcasters 
[NAB], stated the new form would create more paperwork and would be an 
undue burden. In addition, the NAB stated that the NTIA already collected such 
information and the FCC's efforts would be redundant. 
The FCC, in addressing the comments, declined to remove the new 
revisions. 372 Although it acknowledged that the NTIA collected similar 
information, the Commission noted the NTIA's collection of such data was not 
altogether complete. Also, the NTIA reports did not distinguish owners on the 
basis of gender, as the FCC annual report form would. Last, the FCC's collection 
of data was premised on legal, statutory authority, since the Commission 
provides licenses to broadcasters. 
SUMMARY 
The legislative histories of minority ownership policies serve as a 
backdrop to legal discourse and analysis. While the histories may show some 
Investment In The Broadcast Industry, Cross-Interest Policy, 10 F.C.C.R. 12277 (1995). 
370 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -- Streamlining Of Mass Media Applications, Rules, And Processes, 
Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media Facilities, 13 F.C.C.R. 23056 
(1998). 
~11 Id. 
372 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Streamlining Of Mass Media Applications, Rules, And Processes, 
Policies And Rules Regarding Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media Facilities, 14 F.C.C.C.R. 
17525 (1999). 
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inconsistencies, they do show long-standing discussion, usage, and support of 
minority ownership policies by the FCC and Congress. The policy that had the 
steadiest support, with the least challenge, was the minority tax certificate. 
However that policy, along with broadcast distress sales, was eventually 
repealed. The only policy left standing was comparative hearings, which 
underwent a transformation with the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
The legislative histories of these policies are used during judicial decisions 
about minority ownership. While circuit judges and Supreme Court justices would 
eventually dispute the meaning and weight of legislative histories on case law, 
the histories do provide a good sense of the rationale behind the policies. 
92 
CHAPTER V: FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
As described in Chapter 111, Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases were 
used to gather court cases concerning minority ownership policy. A thorough 
search using the terms outlined in Chapter Ill yielded twenty-five cases. 
Seventeen cases were eliminated, as the questions posed in the cases did not 
turn on the specific issue of minority ownership or any of the minority ownership 
policies. 373 
Eight cases were classified as texts for analysis. Of those eight, only one 
was decided at the Supreme Court level. The other seven cases were decided in 
the D.C. Circuit Court. The cases span the period from 1973 through 1990. What 
follows next is an overview of each case, which includes posture, questions 
before the court, and the decision. Chapter VI provides a full analysis of court 
rationales in each case and discusses those rationales in light of social and 
political contexts. 
TV 9, INC. V. FCC (1973)374 
In 1965, Mid-Florida TV, TV 9 Inc., and other applicants 375 were 
competing for a permit to operate a TV station in Orlando, Florida. While the 
373 For example, one case dealt with minority preferences in personal communication services (PCS) 
auctions; another case dealt with FCC multiple ownership rules, with impacts on minority ownership as a 
secondary result. Other cases discussed changes in the board of director's, legal representation, denial of 
licenses, "sham" organizations, or other topics that were not a direct result from the question of minority 
ownership preferences or policies. 
374 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
375 The other applicants were Orange Nine, Central Nine Corp., Howard A. Weiss, Florida Heartland, Comint 
Corp., and Florida 9 Broadcasting Co. 
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FCC denied the applications of several applicants, it allowed Mid-Florida interim 
authority of the television channel. Comint (a minority- owned company) and 
Consolidated Nine376 applied for interim authority of the channel, but their 
applications were denied. Both parties appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. The 
court vacated the grant of interim authority to Mid-Florida and remanded the case 
back to the FCC. The Commission then granted interim authority to Consolidated 
Nine in 1969. 
A comparative hearing ensued among TV 9, Inc., Comint, Central Nine, 
Florida Heartland, and Mid-Florida. In 1972, the Commission awarded Mid-
Florida's application for a new TV station to operate in Orlando. The award went 
to Mid-Florida based on what the FCC called the "best practicable service" 
through its superior integration of ownership with management and their good 
past broadcast record. The case was then brought as another appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit Court. 
The question presented in this case was whether merit for black 
participation and black ownership should be awarded during the comparative 
hearing process? The court answered by stating only when minority ownership is 
likely to increase diversity of content, especially of opinion and viewpoint, should 
merit be awarded. The holding in this case was significant in that it stated when 
minorities proposed to be instrumental in local management and ownership of 
stations, merit should be awarded during the comparative hearing process. 
376 Consolidated Nine was composed of three of the initial applicants: Central Nine, TV 9, and Florida 
Heartland). Consolidation Nine was formed for the express purpose of trying to gain interim authority of the 
channel. 
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GARRETT V. FCC (1975)377 
Appellant (Garrett) was denied an application seeking to construct 
facilities that would change his station from daytime only to unlimited 
broadcasting. Garrett's station, WEUP, located in Huntsville, Alabama, was also 
in competition with the application of WRBN, Warner Robbins, Georgia, to 
upgrade facilities. The FCC consolidated the two applications and assigned them 
for comparative hearings. The FCC determined that WEUP's proposed change of 
service would not meet coverage rules and was therefore denied. WRBN's 
proposed changes, although falling short on the coverage requirements, were 
enough to justify the rule waiver. Garrett app·ealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit 
Court. 
This case presented several questions. First, did the Commission, in 
denying Garrett the application, give proper weight to the black ownership and 
operation of Garrett's station? In addition, were the rulings on station coverage in 
error? The Court of Appeals ruled the Commission erred when it denied Garrett's 
application and in its application of the waiver provision. The court cited prior 
federal cases where it held that administrative bodies cannot act in an arbitrary 
377 513 F.2d 1056 {D.C. Cir 1975). 
378 The D.C. Circuit Court noted that prior FCC cases should have been used as precedent for the coverage 
issue. In Great Southern Broadcasting Company, 7 F.C.C.2d 701 (1968), the Commission allowed an AM 
station to be built in a small, unincorporated community in Tennessee. As the community had merged with a 
larger city, the Commission stated the new municipality was large, covered rural and urban areas. As such, 
the FCC continued to acknowledge the former town and city before the merger took place. In KDEF, 30 
F.C.C. 635 (1961), a daytime only station in New Mexico was authorized to broadcast without limit even 
though the coverage did not conform to minimum filed intensity rules. The coverage extended to fewer than 
70% of the city limits within Albuquerque. Because a large part of the underserved areas were in fact under 
populated, the Commission decided that it would have been too harsh to require an applicant to require 
service to vacant areas near the city. 
95 
manner and cannot treat similar situations differently. 378 Although it was stated 
that the cases were different, there was no adequate explanation as to why the 
two applications were so different as to warrant different treatment. 
It was also noted that WEUP, as a solely black-owned and operated 
facility, was primarily black-staffed and was one of a few such stations 
nationwide at the time. Huntsville, the city of service, had a considerable black 
population that WEUP claimed to serve. The black ownership and operation of 
WEUP did not receive any qualitative credit during the proceedings. The court, 
as it referred to its supplemental opinion in the TV 9 case, wrote that in light of 
TV 9 the FCC erred in its decision not to grant merit to Garrett. 379 In that 
supplemental opinion, merit was defined as recognition by the FCC that a 
particular applicant has positive qualities that may (but do not always) result in a 
preference. The thrust of TV 9 was relevant to this case, which the FCC did not 
acknowledge. The Court remanded the case back to the FCC to re-examine the 
applicability of coverage rules and its waiver rules in light of past precedents and 
TV9. 
This case was significant in that the court not only affirmed its earlier 
holding in TV 9, but also extended merit for minority ownership and participation 
in comparative hearings to other situations. 
379 495 F .2d 929 at 941 . 
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STEREO BROADCASTERS 1 INC. V. FCC (1981)380 
Stereo Broadcasters, located in Garden City, New York, was selling its 
properties through a distress sale to Domino Broadcasting Company (a minority 
entity). Stereo Broadcasting opted to pursue the sale, despite the fact that its 
application for renewal had progressed to an unfavorable decision by an 
administrative law judge. 
As noted in the D.C. Circuit opinion, the original policy on station transfers 
was limited to license holders who had been designated for a revocation hearing 
or whose renewal application had been assigned to a hearing. 381 The distress 
sale policy was allowed in cases where the licensee had moved into the initial 
decision stage of application or renewal. 382 The minority distress sale policy had 
three major components: promotion of minority ownership, deterrence, and 
administrative economy. 383 The two concepts in question are the deterrence and 
administrative economy. Stereo claimed that substantial financial gains could still 
take place if the sale between Domino and Stereo was allowed to go through. 
Citing the costs of appealing a negative decision and subsequent costs of 
holding comparative hearings to fill the vacancy if Stereo was disqualified, it 
would provide better administrative economy to allow Stereo to consummate the 
380 Stereo Broadcasters Inc, v. Federal Communications Commission, 652 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
381 Id. at 1027. 
382 Id. at 1027- 1028. As stated in the opinion of the court, the FCC had initially limited the distress sale to 
cases in which hearings had not yet begun. This eliminate potential abuses by a rogue licensee who would 
go through a hearing, seeing what evidence could be presented against him, then decide to sell to a minority 
in order to gain some kind of monetary value out of a licensee that would well be denied. However, the 
Commission broadened the policy to cases that were in transition, meaning the case had gone to a hearing 
but no ruling had been issued. 
383 Id. at 1029. Minority ownership was not in question because it was clearly established that a black 
minority controlled Domino Broadcasting Company. 
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sale. As for deterrence, Stereo argued that it was unreasonable to discriminate 
among licensees in the hearing process until a final determination of the 
questions had been reached. 
Despite Stereo's arguments, the FCC did not allow the distress sale. 
Stereo Broadcasters claimed the FCC's application of the various factors of the 
distress sale policy (as it pertained to their case) was arbitrary and capricious 
and an abuse of the FCC's discretion. They appealed the decision to the D.C. 
Circuit Court. 
Was the FCC's application of the various factors of the minority distress 
sale policy arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the FCC's discretion? The court 
held that the FCC, in using its agency discretion, did not act in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner. The FCC did not take well to a license holder, already 
considered unfit to retain a license, seeking to gain profit from a station that 
he/she was no longer deemed to have a right to operate. This case showed that 
the structure of the distress sale policy and the administration of the policy were 
upheld by the court. 
WEST MICHIGAN BROADCASTING V. FCC (1984)384 
Waters Broadcasting (a minority entity) and West Michigan Broadcasting 
filed mutually exclusive applications for construction permits to build a new FM 
radio station in Hart, Michigan. An administrative law judge granted the license to 
Waters because of the credits received for being black owned, for local 
384 West Michigan Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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residence, and for civic activities.385 Upon appeal to the FCC's Review Board, the 
decision was reversed. Waters then appealed to the full Commission, which 
reversed and granted Waters the license. 
West Michigan appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. Its challenge was 
against the FCC's use of the minority enhancements in comparative hearings, as 
well as the enhancement given to Waters for local residency and community 
involvement. Because the community to be served had a sparse black 
population, West Michigan argued the FCC was wrong to grant any minority 
enhancements. 
In this case, the court had to decide if the FCC usage of minority 
enhancements in comparative hearings was a violation of equal protection and a 
violation of specific comparative hearing criteria. The court ruled that the FCC's 
use of the minority enhancement did not violate any administrative, statutory, or 
constitutional (equal protection) laws. The court referred to the holding in TV 9 
and stated that the ruling in TV 9 supported the FCC's granting of the license to 
Waters. The FCC sought to provide minority ownership regardless of the size of 
or existence of a minority population in the community of license. 
Prior Supreme Court cases Bakke 386 and Ful/ilove387 were cited as 
precedents that established FCC minority enhancements would not violate equal 
385 Id. at 602. 
386 438 U.S. 265. This was a highly charged case, as noted by the opinions of the court. Writing the court's 
opinion was Justice Powell in which Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in part and 
dissented in part. In addition, Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed separate opinions. Justice 
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justices Burger, Stewart, 
and Rehnquist joined in Steven's dissent. 
387 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a 
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protection. In order to understand the applicability of these cases to FCC minority 
preferences, the Supreme Court's decision in both of cases must be explained. 
In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down a university admission policy that set 
aside a fixed percentage for minority students in a state medical school's 
entering class. Justice Powell's opinion rejected the idea that race classifications 
could be used to assure a diverse student body.388 
The majority opinion also rejected race classifications as a remedy for 
past discrimination. The university had not made a final conclusion that 
discrimination did in fact exist or such discrimination warranted special 
classification and admission for minority groups. Yet, the opinion did recognize 
that the university had a compelling interest to promote a diverse educational 
experience. To that end, the court suggested that had the preference been a part 
of a multi-factor decision process, it might have passed judicial review. 389 
However, race alone could not be the basis for special classification. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated in Fullilove that while 
programs that used race classifications need to be closely examined, when 
"benign" race classifications were used--adopted by an administrative agency at 
the direction of congressional action--the courts were bound to defer to 
Congress. 390 As such, the majority did not apply strict scrutiny review to the 
government sponsored minority preference for a set aside provision authorizing funding in public works 
construction. 
388 438 U.S. 265 at 307. 
389 438 U.S. 265 at 317. 
390 448 U.S. 448 at 502- 507. Congress is charged by Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to look after and 
ensure the general welfare of society. The Court held that even if the measures were not necessarily 
remedial, they could be allowed under the Constitution so long as the preference served an important 
100 
questioned racial preference. In light of the decisions and rationales used in 
Bakke and Fullilove, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled the FCC policy of granting 
enhancements was constitutionally valid. 
In contrast to Bakke, the FCC did not set up quotas the number of 
licenses to be given to minorities. The enhancement was part of a multi-factor 
approach. Second, in agreement with Fullilove, congressional action had shown 
recognition of the underrepresentation of minorities in mass media ownership. 
That underrepresentation was attributed to past racial and ethnic discrimination. 
This case further solidified the use of FCC minority ownership preference policies 
as constitutionally valid and serving as a compelling government objective. 
NATIONAL BLACK MEDIA COALITION V. FCC (1987)391 
The FCC observed that daytime AM stations were providing good service 
to their communities despite their technical limitations. So the Commission 
issued an order allowing such stations to expand their operating hours as far as 
the.station could technically handle.392 However, in 1981 the NTIA petitioned for 
rulemaking proceedings that would give daytimers preference in comparative 
hearings for new FM facilities.393 While the FCC deferred decision on that issue, 
it pursued other avenues to increase the number of commercial FM stations. As it 
issued a notice of proposed rule making, the FCC sought comment on whether to 
grant special consideration for daytimers over other competing applicants for new 
iovernmental objective. 
1 822 F.2d 277 (1987). 
392 Id. at 278. 
393 Id. 
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FM stations in the same community. 394 As the rules stood, competing applicants 
for a FM station could "win" through the diversification of mass media property 
preference over daytime stations. 
The National Black Media Coalition submitted comments that opposed 
granting special consideration to daytime AM stations. Instead, the Coalition 
wanted the FCC to reduce the demerits it assigned to local broadcasters who 
sought additional licenses during the comparative process. In spite of this, most 
comments were in favor of the FCC's plan. 
In 1985, the FCC released its second report and order and concluded the 
relief for daytime AM stations was appropriate. 395 Several criteria were outlined 
for the enhancement preference. 396 Overall the enhancement consisted of 
upgrading the value of previous broadcast experience as an "integration 
enhancement". Prior broadcast experience would have the same weight that 
was given for the enhancement factors of minority ownership and local 
residence. 
Petitions were filed for reconsideration of the order. Most petitioners 
agreed that daytime stations should be given preferences, but the degree of 
preference should be greater. However, The National Black Media Coalition 
394 Id. at 279. 
395 101 F.C.C. 2d 638 (1985). 
396 822 F.2d 277 at 280. The enhancements were conditioned upon: 1) broadcast experience based on prior 
participation in management of daytime station, 2) daytime station must be in same city as proposed FM 
station, 3)daytime station must have been in operation for three continuous years, 4) owner proposed to 
become integrated in management of FM station, 5) owner must divest of the daytime station in three years. 
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petitioned for elimination or weakening the preference. The FCC rejected all 
petitions and allowed the order to stand. 
The Coalition petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit Court (D.C. Cir.) 
and asked for invalidation or remand of the rule for further proceedings, 
especially with respect to the concerns of the Coalition. The Coalition was 
extremely concerned as to whether the new enhancement given to daytime 
stations: 1) reduced the number of minority owned companies that could 
compete for new FM license, 2) represented a departure from FCC policy of 
encouraging minority ownership, and 3) eliminated other alternative proposals. 397 
The court agreed with the Commission and allowed the ruling to stand. It 
concluded that the FCC had adequately stated its rationale for the enhancement, 
noting that good service under the "technically different" daytimer status would 
lead to reasonable conclusion of good service on the FM band. While the 
Coalition stated the rule would reduce the opportunities for minorities to own 
broadcast stations, the Court wrote the FCC properly weighed and balanced the 
issues of daytimer stations and minority ownership. 398 Providing a criterion that 
called for divestiture of the daytimer station within three years was crucial to the 
Court, as it showed the Commission had struck a balance between minority 
ownership concerns and the goal of incorporating daytime station ownership. 399 
The divestiture was said by the FCC to create more daytimer stations, which 
would offset any negative impacts of the move to FM. 
397 822 F. 2d 277 at 280. 
398 /d. at 281. 
399 Id. at 282. 
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SHURBERG BROADCASTING OF HARTFORD V. FCC (1989)4°0 
Faith Center, a television station licensed in Hartford, Connecticut, 
attempted to sell its station through a minority distress sane. Faith Center tried 
twice unsuccessfully to complete such a sale. After its second attempt, Shurberg 
sought to file a permit to construct a station. That application was exclusive of 
Faith Center's renewal application. The FCC could have 1) granted Faith Center 
a third attempt to sell its property to Astroline (a minority entity) or 2) granted 
Shurberg's request for comparative consideration. The FCC decided to allow 
Faith Center another chance to sell its station. Shurberg appealed the decision. 
However, other events took place soon after that would halt the appeals 
process. First, the decision in Steele v. FCC401 had the FCC wondering if the 
distress sale policy was still constitutional. The ruling in that case stated the FCC 
acted beyond its statutory authority when it extended ownership preferences to 
female applicants during comparative hearings. While the judges in the case 
acknowledged the merit and clear congressional endorsement of minority 
preferences, there was no such documentation pertaining to female 
ownership. 402 As the FCC sought to undergo examination of minority and gender 
preferences in media ownership, congressional appropriation riders prohibited 
any inquires the FCC might have made. The Commission re-instated the distress 
400 876 F.2d 902 (1989). 
401 Supra note 10. Steele v. FCC dealt specifically with enhancements for women and gender discrimination. 
This case was excluded for analysis as based upon the criteria outlined in Chapter Ill. 
402 Donald Gillmor, et. al, Mass Communications Law: Cases and Comments 720-721 (5th ed., 1990). 
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sale policy, thereby allowing Faith Center to pursue the sale with Astroline. 
Consequently, Shurberg's appeal was re-instated. 
Did the FCC's minority distress sale policy violate the equal protection 
rights of Shurberg, as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment? The FCC had 
previously ruled the policy to be constitutionally sound because the Commission 
contended that underrepresentation of minorities in ownership and programming 
would be corrected if there was an increase in minority ownership." 403 The 
Commission also looked to congressional action when in 1982, the 
Communications Act was amended to include minority preferences in the 
broadcast license lottery policy.404 According to the per curiam opinion of the 
D.C. Circuit, the distress sale policy violated Shurberg's rights because the 
program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination or to promote 
programming diversity.405 The court relied on the opinions of Bakke, Fullilove, 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 406 and Croson v. City of Richmond 407 as 
the basis for their decision. 
In Croson, it was held that race seldom provided a basis for disparate 
treatment and that race classifications were potentially harmful to society. The 
city had developed a minority business utilization plan, which called for the major 
city contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of a contract's dollar amount 
to one or more minority businesses. The plan, according to the high court, used 
403 Id. at 906. 
404 Id. 
405 876 F .2d 902 at 918. 
406 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
407 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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racial quotas. State and local government had no mandate to enforce the 14th 
amendment. As such, race classifications ought to be clearly identified and 
unquestionably legitimate. The Supreme Court ruled that the city of Richmond 
had violated the equal protection clause. In Wygant, a school board policy 
provided minority teachers a preference over non-minority teachers with seniority 
during school layoffs. The Supreme Court ruled that policy unconstitutional. By 
providing a preference to minority teachers over non-minority teachers with 
seniority, the school board failed to establish the necessary evidence of past 
discrimination for remedial action. Due to the lack of evidence that tied past 
discrimination to the remedial action, the court stated the policy was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve its purpose. 
From those four cases, the opinion in Shurberg generalized that 
government imposed minority preferences are constitutional under certain 
circumstances. Yet such a preference could not be prefaced on the desire to 
achieve some level of diversity with an institution. 408 The circuit court noted that 
besides remedying past discrimination, the only other rationale supported by the 
Supreme Court was the promotion of a diverse student body.409 Quoting Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke, the D.C. court said the "goal of racial diversity might 
be compelling only when the greater diversity itself serves one of society's 
fundamental goals. 410 However, the court [Shurberg] asserted that neither 
Congress nor the FCC found evidence that linked the underrepresentation of 
408 Id. at 912. 
409 This position was stated in Bakke; however the minority preference in this case was invalidated. 
410 876 F.2d 902 at 913. 
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minorities to any discrimination by the FCC or the broadcast industry.411 
Underrepresentation alone was not appreciable proof of past discrimination. 412 
Outside of the representation issue, the preference given to minorities 
through distress sales was not tied to any disadvantage. The policy unfairly 
burdened third parties because their race eliminated them from potentially 
gaining a broadcast property. According to Judge Silberman, neither Congress 
nor the FCC linked underrepresentation to past discrimination by the FCC or the 
broadcasting industry.413 
Agreeing with Silberman's analysis, Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon 
wrote the FCC's program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. In 
fact, the program was labeled "untailored" because its open-endness allowed it to 
be applied to any license without regard to any past discrimination. 414 Since the 
offense of the licensee was in no way connected to past discrimination, the policy 
violated the holding in Croson. However Judge Wald viewed West Michigan as 
binding precedent. 415 The opinion in West Michigan pointed to several occasions 
where Congress had supported the FCC's attempts to diversify media control 
through minority ownership (e.g., Congress' institution of license lottery 
preferences for minorities, appropriations riders, etc.) Since Congress supported 
the policy, the outcome of Croson had little relevance to the current dispute. 
411 Id. at 914. 
412 Id. at 915. 
413 Id. at 914. 
414 Id. at 930. 
415 876 F.2d 902 at 935. 
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Judge Wald also argued that efforts to promote diversity were a basis to 
remedy past discrimination. 416 Therefore, the distress policy was not a set-aside 
as there was no pre-determined number of stations. The dismal figures that 
reflected underrepresentation of minorities emphasized why policies that 
encouraged general diversity had failed. The underrepresentation of minorities in 
the industry, coupled with the lack of diversity in programming was the direct 
result of past racial discrimination. 417 By implementing the distress sale policy on 
the basis of viewpoint diversity through minority ownership, the Commission 
designed the policy as a way to deal with the disproportion number of minorities 
in the broadcasting industry.418 Furthermore, Judge Wald asserted the 
"distress sale policy rest on an assumption that views and 
listeners of every race will benefit from access to a broader 
range of broadcast fare ... ,"419 
WINTER PARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. FCC (1989)420 
These were the consolidated cases of Metro Broadcasting and Winter 
Park. Appellants sought review of a FCC order to grant a broadcast license to 
Rainbow Broadcasting (a minority entity). Following a 1982 rule making 
proceeding, the FCC assigned a new TV station to the city of Orlando. 
Commission rules dictated a fifteen-mile rule, so channels were to be used in 
communities located within fifteen miles of Orlando. Metro Broadcasting, Winter 
416 Id. at 942. 
417 Id. at941. 
418 Id. at 936. 
419 Id. at 942. 
420 873 F.2D 347 (1989). 
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Park, and Rainbow filed mutually exclusive applications for the channel. Metro 
and Winter Park stated Orlando was their place of license, but Winter Park 
claimed a close city of Winter Park as the city of license. However all three stated 
they were serving the entire Orlando area. 
An administrative law judge issued the license to Metro, as Metro's 
qualitative factors suggested that it would be a better applicant than Winter Park. 
Rainbow was disqualified for lack of candor on its application. Winter and 
Rainbow appealed to the FCC's Review Board. The Review Board reversed the 
lack of candor decision against Rainbow and awarded Rainbow the station. The 
Review Board also decided that Winter Park was not entitled to extra credit under 
section 307 of the Communications Act.421 (The credit sought was under section 
307(b) of the Communications Act for providing first local TV service to the 
Winter Park area.) However, the Board reduced the integration credit of Metro 
and found Rainbow had a quantitative and qualitative advantage. Rainbow had 
ninety percent Hispanic ownership. Metro had one black partner, which 
constituted less than twenty percent of minority participation. Although the 
qualitative comparisons between Rainbow and Metro were close, Rainbow's 
substantial minority interest, and female ownership somewhat outweighed 
Metro's local ownership and civic participation. 
Winter and Metro appealed to the full Commission, which denied review of 
the decision. Winter and Metro appealed the FCC's decision to the D.C. Circuit 
421 Id. at 349. 
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Court. As the appeal went forward, the FCC asked for a remand in light of its re-
examination of the minority preference policies. The D.C. Circuit Court granted 
the FCC's request. Subsequently, the FCC found Rainbow had no clear 
quantitative advantage and that deletion of the minority preference would reverse 
the outcome of the case. Therefore, the FCC held the case pending further 
action in its re-examination on minority preference policies. 
Shortly thereafter, President Ronald Reagan signed into law an 
appropriations rider that prevented any type of re-examination or changing of the 
minority preferences. 422 Congress also ordered the FCC to lift suspensions of 
any proceedings and reinstate its prior policy.423 Consequently, the FCC 
reactivated the case and reaffirmed the Review Board's decision. Thus, the 
appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court was renewed. 
One of the major questions in this case was whether the minority 
enhancement violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. This 
question was similar to the question posed to the court in West Michigan. The 
D.C. Circuit Court noted the similarities and decided that the enhancements for 
minority status in this case were in accord with West Michigan. As such, the 
enhancements were constitutionally permissible. 
The minority preference, as supported in West Michigan, was reaffirmed in 
this case because 1) the Commission's award of the preference was not a grant 
of a specific number of stations nor was it a denial to non-minorities. The 
422 See Chapter IV, Comparative License Hearings for a detailed explanation of the appropriation riders and 
its accompanying public law. 
423 873 F.2d 347 at 351. 
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enhancement was only one factor in light of many factors; 2) the FCC's action in 
this case was also attributed to a congressional action that recognized 
underrepresentation of minorities in broadcast mass media. The policy was 
designed to increase minority participation. That increased participation would 
further the public interest goals of viewpoint diversity. 
The lone dissenting opinion believed the force of West Michigan was 
undermined by the case of Wygant and Croson. The FCC's justification of the 
preferences being non-remedial could not survive the Croson decision. 
Moreover, since the FCC never claimed that the policy was designed to remedy 
the effects of past historical underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting, 
the FCC should reexamine Congress' intent in light of Wygant and Croson. 
Also, congressional action (e.g., the appropriations riders) did not 
necessarily indicate a mandate of racial preference schemes for the FCC. The 
dissent argued that it "would seem anomalous for Congress to lock the FCC into 
a policy broader than it [Congress] had ever before applied ... ".424 It was also 
argued that the restriction placed on the FCC by the appropriations rider was 
limited; so the FCC would be free to reexamine the policy. (However, it was 
noted in Chapter IV that the appropriations riders were renewed every year up 
until 1994. Although the court could not anticipate Congressional extension of the 
riders when it decided Winter Park in 1989, such congressional action can be 
interpreted as strong show of support for the policies and the related rationales.) 
424 Id. at 364. 
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Outlining the FCC's decision to institute racial preferences (outgrowth of TV 9 
and Garrett), the dissent argued that underrepresentation was never linked to 
discrimination, only an extension of program diversity. Further, the Commission 
failed to consider non-racial solutions. 
METRO BROADCASTING V. FCC (1990)425 
This closely decided Supreme Court case (5-4) was a result of two cases 
previously heard in the D.C. Court of Appeals- Winter Park and Shurberg. 
Recalling the outcome in Winter Park, the Appeals Court upheld the FCC's 
decision to grant a broadcast license to a minority entity through qualitative 
enhancement credits in the comparative hearing process. However in Shurberg, 
the court invalidated the distress sale policy as it determined that Shurberg's 
equal protection rights had been violated. 
Upon hearing these two cases, the Supreme Court had to decide if the 
two minority preference policies were constitutional. In a decision marked by two 
separate dissents, the court held neither the minority enhancement policy nor the 
distress sale policy violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 426 The majority opinion stated the FCC's minority ownership 
programs were approved and authorized by Congress. In addition, race-
conscious measures that are validated by Congress are permissible only if the 
measures (a) serve important governmental objectives within the power of 
425 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
426 Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens wrote the majority 
opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia wrote the first dissent. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate dissent, which 
was joined by Justice Scalia. 
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Congress, and (b) are substantially related to achieve those objectives. The 
interest in enhancing broadcast diversity, according to the majority, was an 
important government objective. As such, the distress sale policy and minority 
enhancements in comparative hearings were substantially related to the 
achievement of that government interest. 
The case was significant because the majority's opinion upheld the FCC 
policies as constitutional because the policies were viewed as being related to a 
substantial government interest. Additionally, the policies were within the limits of 
Congressional and administrative action. Most importantly, the ruling affirmed 
that governmental decisions that rest on race classification could be permissible 
as a remedy for past wrong, provided those decisions served a compelling and 
substantial government interest. 
However the dissenting opinions, led by the lengthy argument of Justice 
O'Connor, 427 claimed that by upholding the FCC preferences, the Court departed 
from fundamental principles and from the high court's traditional requirement that 
racial classifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling interest. This departure, remarked Justice O'Connor, 
indicated a renewed toleration of racial classifications and a negation of the 
Constitution's equal protection guarantees, which should extend equally to all 
citizens. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bound the federal 
427 Supra note 446 at 602 (1990). Justice O'Connor's dissent was thirty-one pages long. 
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government as well as the states; hence no intermediate level of scrutiny applies 
to the federal government's use of racial classifications. 
Neither of the dissents by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy agreed with 
the majority's reliance on Fullilove or the application of intermediate scrutiny. 
According to O'Connor, Fullilove applied at most only to congressional measures 
that sought to remedy identified past discrimination. Justice Kennedy's opinion428 
went a step further in questioning the validity of viewing congressional mandates 
as seen in Fullilove. 
After the decision in Metro there was relatively little federal court activity 
concerning minority preferences until 1993. In Betchel II, the minority 
enhancement granted in comparative hearings was ruled invalid. When Viacom 
wanted to sell its cable properties to an African-American broadcaster by using 
the minority tax certificate, the tax gains that were deferrable amounted to over 
$400 million dollars. That large monetary amount caught the eye of Congress 
who swiftly moved to abolish the policy. After two hearings on the program (one 
in the House, the other in Senate), the policy was repealed in 1995. Soon 
afterwards, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed. This amendment 
to the 1934 Communications Act, among other things, raised local ownership 
limits, eliminated nationwide ownership caps, and replaced comparative hearings 
with a process of competitive bidding. 
428 Id. at 631. 
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These changes had significant impacts on minority ownership. No longer 
could minorities rely on enhancement credit when they sought to obtain a 
license. The end of the tax certificate program removed enticements for white 
owners to do business with minority groups. Without the policy, the bargaining 
power of minorities was reduced greatly. 
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CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
While Metro Broadcasting seemed to be the Supreme Court's last word on 
minority ownership preferences, a 1995 Supreme Court case countered that 
decision. In Adarand Constructors Inc., v. Pena,429 the Supreme Court held that 
all racial classifications, proscribed by any governmental agent, must be 
analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard of review. The decision in this case 
overruled Metro and the rationales for minority ownership preferences. However, 
the downfall of minority preferences did not start at Adarand. That case just 
culminated years of growing resistance to such policies. 
1970s: ACKNOWLEDGING THE ISSUE OF RACE 
In TV 9, the majority wrote that reliance on the Communications Act, as a 
colorblind document did not describe the breadth of the Act's public interest 
criterion. 430 The notion of public interest provided the FCC with the discretion to 
judge other factors believed to be relevant. Color blindness for the protection of 
individual rights should not foreclose consideration of minority group 
ownership. 431 The court wrote, "Inconsistency with the Constitution is not to be 
found in a view of our developing national life which accords merit to black 
participation .... "432 Black ownership was a broad concept to be given realistic 
content. 433 
429 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
430 495 F.2d 929 at 936. 
431 Id. at 936. 
432 Id. at 936. 
433 Id. at 937. 
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In the D.C. Circuit Court's supplemental opinion to TV 9, the FCC said it 
was forced by the court to adopt a new comparative policy of awarding a 
preference for black ownership. The Court disagreed. In fact, the court did not 
rely solely on the race of the owner and its did not dictate a preference at all. 
Distinguishing merit from preference, the court stated that a preference was a 
FCC decision on the qualities of an applicant, whereas merit was designated as 
favorable consideration that may or may not result in an actual preference. Under 
the already established criterion of public interest in broad community 
representation and best practicable service, Comint was entitled to an award of 
merit. According to the court, a preference did not necessarily follow from their 
decision. Other applicants were not foreclosed from seeking similar merit. 
In the case of Garrett v. FCC, the Circuit court recognized that WEUP was 
only one of a few black operated stations in the United States.434 At that time 
(1973), 33 out of approximately 7,000 radio stations were minority owned. As for 
television, none of the one thousand television stations were minority owned. As 
such, it was important to take into account the service that WEUP would provide 
to the minority population of Huntsville. Since TV 9 served as the precedent 
case, the rationales used in that case were applied in Garrett. 
The Court's argument in both of these cases is clear. While the court 
dictated no specific policy, the FCC was instructed to view minority ownership 
with a social and historical approach, taking into account industry trends and the 
434 513 F.2d at 1061. 
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realities of society. Interestingly, these cases were decided in the middle 1970s-
during a time when the country was looking to fill the promises of the civil rights 
movement. The Kerner Commission, in 1968, maintained the media had done a 
poor job in communicating the needs and concerns of minority groups to 
American society. 435 The visibility of blacks (and other racial groups) in the media 
was low and often stereotypical. More importantly, the Kerner Commission 
speculated about what affect these images would have on white society and the 
interaction between the races. 
The Kerner report led to the FCC's adoption of equal employment 
opportunity provisions. 436 In acknowledging the lack of progress made with 
earlier efforts to increase minority participation in the media, the FCC determined 
that minority ownership was needed to create diversity in the types of messages 
and programming presented to the public.437 
The Kerner report was followed by a report from the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights. 438 Noting how the civil rights movement had captured the American 
public with vivid TV images, the report observed that television gave particular 
groups and individual's status. It followed that those chosen individuals and 
groups for media coverage were receiving attention to the detriment of those 
groups and individuals who were not. 
435 Otto Kerner, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (1968). 
436 Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, supra note 115. 
437 Id. 
438 Window Dressing on the Set: Minorities in Television, a report of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, (August 1977). 
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At the time of the TV 9 and Garrett ruling, the FCC was trying to become 
part of the solution. By recognizing that its race-neutral polices had not helped to 
bring minorities into the broadcast industry or diversify viewpoints, the FCC 
adopted polices that provided opportunities for employment and ownership. The 
above reports, coupled with civil and social unrest, prompted many to believe 
that white majority control over the media affected how minorities were portrayed. 
Such control over the media by the white majority would also influence messages 
communicated to the general public.439 In agreement, the Kerner Commission 
asserted that white dominated media would not communicate with nor provide 
message and programming appealing to minority audiences. 440 
More importantly, race was understood to be a symbol of cultural identity 
and a product of society. Consequently, race discrimination was treated as a 
societal issue. Affirmative action programs, set-asides, and various programs to 
promote racial equality began to emerge. Anti-discrimination policies were 
designed to remove the conditions that continued to subordinate blacks. 
Affirmative action, to some extent, equalized and redistributed power, resources, 
and wealth. 441 Such policies called upon judicial support to advance the removal 
of racial oppression. 442 
43s Id. 
440 Id. 
441 Harris, supra note 272. 
442 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
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The 1960s were marked by heightened social and political activism.443 
The Johnson administration tried to increase participation by disadvantaged and 
marginalized groups. 444 Grassroots organizations, community groups, and 
minority organizations began to transform their concerns and political agendas 
into concrete actions, especially within the communications industry.445 Their 
impacts, though successful, were short lived. Inflation and productivity decline in 
the late 1970s were crucial forces behind the subsequent changes in various 
industries, such as communications. 446 
During this period, racial discrimination was primarily viewed from 
Freeman's "victim" perspective. Racial discrimination consisted of "conditions of 
actual social existence as a member of a perpetual underclass." 447 Events such 
as unemployment and homelessness, combined with the human feelings 
associated with those events (despair, anger, etc.) created a certain social 
condition. 448 By removing the feelings and the related conditions, racial 
discrimination could be remedied. 
This is important to note, because in the 1980s group rights and remedies 
were no longer viewed in that manner. Critical race theorist Kimberle Crenshaw 
asserted that affirmative action, during this period, was viewed as a mechanism 
that undermined the inherent property interest in being white and the related 
443 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 199. 
444 Id. at 198. 
445 Id. 
446 Id. 
447 Freeman, supra note 269 at 29. 
44B Id. 
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social status of being white.449 Agreeing with that idea, critical race theorist 
Cheryl Harris wrote that affirmative action and race preference polices 
threatened to "dismantle the actual and expected privilege that has attended 
white skin since the founding of the country.',450 
1980s: QUESTIONING THE RACE FACTOR 
By the late 1970s, those who were privileged (i.e., white majority) began to 
see a tightening job market.451 As employment opportunities began to dwindle, 
resentment grew toward polices that provided an "unfair advantage" to others.452 
Affirmative-action policies were attacked as a form of "reverse discrimination". 453 
As the 1980s approached, racial discrimination began to take on what 
Freeman labeled the "perpetrator" viewpoint. 454 In this viewpoint, racial 
discrimination was viewed as an action or series of actions inflicted upon a victim 
by a specific perpetrator. Removed from social or historical contexts, the 
perpetrator becomes the focus of the remedy. Freeman linked this idea to 
misconstrued notions of fault and causation. 455 The fault in anti-discrimination law 
goes to specific individuals, which separates that person from society as a whole. 
Causation detaches the singular instance of discrimination from the total range of 
experiences that could be associated with the discrimination. 
449 Race and refonn, supra note 13. 
450 Harris, supra note 272 at 288. 
451 Race and refonn, supra note 13. 
452 Id. at 114-117. 
453 Id. 
454 Freeman, supra note 269. 
455 Id. at 30. 
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The focus of racial discrimination began to shift towards the specific action 
and specific individuals, rather than the overall existence of systemic racial 
inequities. 456 By labeling discriminatory actions as unintentional, responsibility 
for the effects of such conduct can be evaded.457 Freeman cautioned that 
faultfinding with specific individuals would create "a class of innocents who need 
not feel any responsibility for conditions associated with discrimination and would 
feel great resentment when called upon to bear any burden in connection with 
remedying violations." 458 Indeed, cases like Shurberg serve as an example of 
what Freeman had described. While the parties in Shurberg were exercising 
their right under an established FCC provision, the challenger (Shurberg) felt he 
was unduly burdened by the policy. The court acknowledged that the FCC's 
purpose in establishing the distress sale policy was to promote diverse 
programming. 459 And while accepting the FCC's rationale, the court stated 
" ... the distress sale policy requires innocent third parties to shoulder excessive 
burden." 460 
The case of West Michigan noted that underrepresentation of minorities in 
the media and ownership had the support and weight of congressional action.461 
In fact, Congress expressed in a 1982 conference report that the 
underrepresentation of minorities in the mass media was a direct result of past 
456 Id. 
457 Id. 
458 Id. at 30. 
459 876 F.2d 902 at 913. 
460 Id. at 917. 
461 735 F.2d 601 at 613- 615. 
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racial discrimination. 462 The court deferred to that congressional action and 
dismissed any constitutional violations. While the appellant tried to assert that 
minority enhancements worked where there was a sizable minority population, 
the court and the FCC rejected that argument. Minority enhancements were 
never premised on matching broadcasters to specific communities of a specific 
size. Rather they [enhancements] were linked to general diversity of viewpoints 
in the media, regardless of community size and/or location. This case reinforced 
the concept of group rights in remedying discrimination. Minority ownership was 
viewed as a way to address the lack of minority group participation in radio and 
television. 
Crenshaw remarked that the Reagan administration symbolized the 
emergence of hostility towards government. 463 Reagan's attempts to fire 
members of the Civil Rights Commission, his veto of the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act are cited as overt actions taken during the administration that showed some 
hostility to the furtherance of minority rights and causes.464 Horowitz remarked 
that during the Reagan administration there was a great push to reduce the role 
of government in social regulation. The Paperwork Reduction Act (which was 
started under the Carter administration) and other policies aimed at removing 
government from the economy of many business and industries were cited as 
examples. 465 By appointing administrators hostile to regulation of any kind, 
462 HR Cont. Report no 97-765, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, pages 40-41. 
463 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
464 Id. 
465 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 210. 
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instituting agency cutbacks, and through non-enforcement the Reagan 
administration tried to remove all forms of social regulation. 466 
That hostility was transformed into a formalized, colorblind view, which 
called for the removal of affirmative action and other preference based policies. 
During this time, many commentators remarked that the goals of the civil rights 
movement had been reached.467 As Nan observed, social attitude surveys 
showed growing resentment towards affirmative action as a majority of American 
society believed that the previously labeled "disadvantaged" had become the 
privileged. 468 
Some suggest that the colorblind view of the Constitution was developed 
in conservative think tanks as a way to combat civil rights policies.469 Seeing 
such policies as a "threat to the democratic political system,"470 affirmative action 
and race-based policies were signaled out for attack. In addition to attacking the 
premise of affirmative action and race-based policies, remedies for discrimination 
became limited to those who could "actually" prove some harm.471 This 
colorblind approach to anti-discrimination law purports a "common ownership" 
where everyone is equally protected under the Constitution. 
The colorblind rhetoric was transformed in the broadcasting industry 
through broadcast deregulation. Broadcast policies such as ascertainment 
466 Id. at 209. 
467 Id. 
468 Nan, supra note 22. 
469 Race and reform. supra note 13. 
470 Id. at 103. 
471 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
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(required broadcasters to survey local community to determine what the needs 
were), anti-trafficking (required stations to be held for no less than three years), 
and license challenges (ability to challenge a license holder for poor or 
inconsistent service) allowed the voice of marginalized persons to be heard. 
Their removal prompted serious concerns for minority groups. For example, Ray 
noted, once the anti-trafficking rule was eliminated, "the number of TV stations 
sold annually after being held less than two years had increased by eightfold."472 
Such activity was the early precursor to mergers, acquisitions, and eventually 
industry consolidation. 
Regulation was considered a contributor to the falling economic 
productivity. Businesses no longer supported regulation as they began to worry 
about how the social and economic impacts of the 1970s would affect the future 
of profits. 473 While the industries and business were moving away from 
regulation, the courts had begun to view regulatory agencies as experts on the 
interest of consumers and the public.474 To that end, the courts deferred to the 
agencies and to congressional legislation proscribed to the agencies. 475 A 
tension developed between businesses that wanted less control from the 
government and government agencies that saw fit to regulate businesses and 
their activities in the interest of the public. 
472 Ray, supra note 137 at 165. 
473 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 199- 299 
474 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 211. 
41s Id. 
125 
During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the broadcast industry was 
striving for deregulation. The FCC was taking cognizance of new technologies 
such as direct broadcast satellite, multipoint distribution services, cable services, 
and low power television. 476 As the Commission sought to integrate newer 
services with traditional broadcast, it removed regulations that were deemed to 
be prohibitive of new growth. Programming logs, restrictions on group ownership 
and certain content-based regulations were removed in order to encourage 
growth and competition. 477 
One of the industry's changes in the late 1970s was the rise of FM radio. 
As Howard and Zeigler wrote, listenership for FM radio was expanding during 
this time. 478 In 1975, FM radio was considered an auxiliary service to the 
dominant AM radio.479 Responding to industry demands, economic, and 
technological developments, the FCC wanted to promote FM services.480 In a 
1983 order, the FCC adopted new rules that increased the number of FM 
stations and provided spectrum space for approximately 700 new FM stations.481 
Even though the Commission had expanded the ability of daytime stations 
to broadcast, 482 the NTIA believed that daytime stations would be in a poor 
476 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 245. 
477 Massive removal of these policies, along with others, was upheld in Office of Communications of the 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (1983). For a more in-depth discussion of radio deregulation 
and its impact on public interest, see Cindy Rainbow, Radio Deregulation and Public Interest, 4 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 169 (1985). 
478 Sherilyn K. Zeigler & Herbert H. Howard, Broadcast Advertising: A Comprehensive Working Textbook 9 
prd ed. 1991). 
79 Krasnow, et. al, supra note 71 at 24. 
480 Andrew R. Reeves Ill, FM Radio Spectrum Allocation: The History and Chronology of Changes in the 
FCC Policy, Procedures and Rulemakings (1993) (Thesis, University ofTennessee, Knoxville). 
481 49 Fed. Reg. 11214 
482 822 F.2d 277 at 278. 
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competitive position with the FM stations.483 Although the FCC wanted to expand 
the possibilities of FM usage, it also wanted to provide comparative hearing 
enhancements for daytime AM operators competing for FM license. This 
enhancement would be similar to minority enhancements in similar situations. In 
National Black Media Coalition, appellants argued that the enhancement would 
threaten the ability of minorities to compete for FM stations. 
The FCC provided a divestiture provision with the daytime enhancement. 
The owner had to divest him/herself of the existing AM station in order to receive 
the enhancement in a comparative hearing for a new FM station. 484 This 
provision seemed fair on first glance. The policy, however, was limiting. 
The Coalition noted that for communities with populations over 25,000 
people, only 93 stations would be available.485 And an estimated number of 
sixteen stations would be available only to daytime AM stations. 486 That 
translated into fewer opportunities for minority groups. The trading of stations had 
begun to increase as the industry deregulated. As a result, the value of newly 
purchased FM stations increased. 487 As Reeves noted, FM stations were viewed 
as profitable and were "being sold at multiples of up to 15 times projected cash 
flow."488 The FM stations' value was being based upon future earning potential, 
not on what was being generated from already existing FM stations. 
483 Id. 
484 822 F.2d 277 at 282. 
485 Id. at 281. 
486 Id. 
487 Reeves, supra note 480 at 43. 
488 Id. 
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Conversely, most AM stations had been purchased years ago when the 
frequencies had first become available. The AM stations that existed were 
presumably good frequencies, which was important to attracting customers and 
advertising. A higher price for a well established, profitable AM station was more 
likely to occur than for an FM station whose values had yet to be proven. Even 
though the FM frequency would become more dominant, initially AM stations 
were still desired as profitable radio properties. 
While preserving and maintaining minority ownership had been a major 
priority until this point, the National Black Media Coalition case showed where the 
needs of the industry and majority interests over .. rode the interests of minority 
groups. This may have translated to a blockage of early minority participation in 
the allocation of new FM services. More importantly, the Commission rejected 
petitions that suggested a preference for minorities applying for new FM 
stations. 489The ability to perceive potential impacts on minority ownership was 
outweighed by the promotion of FM radio. 
The ruling in National Black Media Coalition suggested that minorities did 
not need additional help in accessing new FM services. However by its own 
admission in its 1978 report, the FCC discovered that bias and discrimination in 
advertising, the inability to discover of available properties and lack of financing 
were all impediments to minority involvement. 490 
489 Carter, supra note 311 at 50. 
490 See generally 1978 Report, supra note 99. 
128 
Concerning the argument for using race-neutral policies, most of the FCC 
ownership policies were already race-neutral. However, relying on race neutral 
policies creates, "an illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor 
responsible for the position of the black underclass."491 Relying solely on race-
neutral policies leaves the impression that race is unimportant and bares no 
impact or influence on systemic processes. Even when the Commission 
instituted rules that were not directly related to ownership, were race-neutral, and 
would help gather input from minorities,492 it acknowledged, "views of racial 
minorities continued to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media."493 
(The majority in Metro would note that the ascertainment policy, a decidedly race 
neutral measure, had failed to determine the programming needs of a 
community.) 494 
The distress sale policy did not mandate the owner to sell the property. In 
fact, the owner had an option to proceed with a hearing and take his/her 
chances. Nothing precluded the owner from trying to sell the property through 
some other mechanism. Moreover, before the 1975 addition of the minority 
component to the distress sale policy, owners were able to use the policy in 
circumstances such as bankruptcy or extreme health conditions. 
In TV 9, the D.C. Circuit Court wrote that regardless of whether one called 
the Communications Act (or even the Constitution) a colorblind document, 
491 Race and reform, supra note 13. 
492 Such as ascertainment rules and equal employment opportunities. 
493 Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, supra note 115 at 980. 
494 497 U.S. 547 at 590, note 42. 
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attempts to live up to public interest objectives should not be ignored.495 Since 
providing society with divergent viewpoints was judged a necessary component 
of the Communications Act, inclusion of marginalized and disadvantaged people 
worked to serve the overall public interest goals. Yet, in Shurberg those very 
ideals were viewed as weak arguments for minority ownership policies.496 
Shurberg focused on "race" as a preference, rather than seeing the 
"policy" as a preference. The line was drawn when a white applicant believed his 
own race hindered him from competing for a broadcast license. The majority 
opinion in Shurberg found it impossible to say someone's race had a profound 
effect on his or her profession. In fact, the court said such assumptions could be 
called "stereotyping." 497 
Nevertheless, the court did not take into consideration studies that were 
conducted that showed differences in the race of owners and programming. 
Studies had confirmed racial differences affected the type of music played on 
stations, 498 employment opportunities,499 and the type of news covered. 500 While 
other factors would inevitably affect a broadcaster's ability to serve the public, 
race should not be discounted as a realistic factor in how that service is provided. 
In spite of the evidence that affirmed the importance of race, the distress sale 
policy was ruled unconstitutional. 
495 495 F. 929 at 936. 
496 876 F.2d 902 at 914. 
497 876 F.2d 902 at 922. 
498 Jeeter, supra note 195. 
499 See NTIA, supra note 102; Gold, supra note 198. 
500 Gold, supra note 198. 
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No longer concerned with maintaining that diversity in ownership would 
lead to diversity in programming, the court adopted the position that 
underrepresentation was not a cause for minority ownership preferences. The 
policy was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination. 501 The link that . 
seemingly existed between minority ownership and diversity of viewpoint in prior 
cases had disappeared. 
Critical legal scholars, such as Gotanda, provide explanations as to why 
the link disappeared. According to Gotanda, the courts equated discrimination, 
not with social conditions or effects, but to intentional action(s). 502 Limiting 
discrimination to intentional acts hindered the ability to address racial 
discrimination in its totality because each social problem was disconnected from 
the main component of racism.503 
Such an approach disparages the importance of social and historical 
factors that contributes to racial inequality--factors that cannot be easily 
identified, but are embedded in our society. For example, Ofori's study 
documents, through interviews and analysis of advertising revenue figures, the 
subtle discrimination that takes place within the broadcasting industry. 504 While 
those in the industry may speak of the discriminatory practice such as non-urban 
dictates and minority discounts, to ask a minority to clearly identify an 
"intentional" harm that has resulted from these practices poses quite a challenge. 
501 876 F.2d 902 at 915. 
502 Colorblind, supra note 44. 
503 Id. 
504 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83. 
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And when viewed in the larger context of broadcast ownership, advertising is the 
life that supports the health and growth of broadcast stations. Profits, from the 
sale of advertising, are the key to success. To disassociate the problems of 
advertising discrimination from the overall challenges of broadcast ownership 
would make it hard for a minority to explain and prove actual harm. And as 
Lawrence wrote, 
"requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a 
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is 
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand 
about how the human mind works." 505 
The dissenting opinion in Shurberg had recognized that only thirty-three 
stations had been sold to minorities since 1978.506 In the eleven preceding years, 
only a small number of stations had been exchanged using this policy. It was 
hardly an overused policy that burdened a potential license holder; the burden 
was minimal and focused on eradicating obstacles brought on by discrimination. 
Winter Park, decided only a few months after Shurberg, was very different 
in rationale and contrast. As the court relied on West Michigan as the controlling 
case, congressional action was important to understanding the need for minority 
preferences. While Shurberg downplayed congressional support and involvement 
with minority ownership, the majority in Winter Park saw congressional support 
as validation of public interest goals and as a way to overcome discrimination 
505 Charles R. Lawrence, Ill, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism in 
Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that Formed The Movement 235-275 (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil 
Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
506 876 F .2d 902 at 938. 
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against minorities. In stating the FCC's goal in the creation of the policy, the court 
wrote it was 
"Designed to increase the participation of minority groups 
in the broadcast industry in furtherance of the public 
interest goal of diversity-to enhance the public's exposure 
through programming on broadcast stations of the 
significant diverse groups that make up the nation."507 
The congressional influence considered important in the majority was 
seen as weak in the dissent. Although the dissent noted congressional action 
was a constitutionally necessary function in responding to societal problems, no 
empirical evidence had been presented that showed discrimination existed in the 
industry or any government agent. 
Both Shurberg and Winter Park were decided at a time when affirmative 
action programs were constantly being challenged. 508 Regulations of any kind 
were viewed as a constraint. As Horowitz suggested, socially derived regulation 
(which minority preferences would be considered) had affected a broadcaster's 
degree of calculated risk.509 There were costs associated with the compliance of 
government regulations. As such, regulations deprived business of its ability to 
exercise private privilege and autonomy. 510 
When deregulation began in the broadcast industry, it was proposed as a 
way to reduce paperwork and get broadcasters back into the business of 
broadcasting. The removals of government-sponsored regulations were equated 
507 873 F.2d 347 at 333, note 6. 
508 Nan, supra note 22. 
509 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 205. 
s10 Id. 
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with marketplace freedom, which was supposed to lead to consumer choice. As 
Horowitz aptly stated, regulation was a "class" issue, with regulation and 
government action seen as being dictatorial over the industry. Furthermore, the 
judiciary began to shift away from seeing regulatory agencies as guardians of 
public interest, as they asserted the marketplace might be the best place to 
decide the issue of public interest.511 This was solidified in the early 1980s when 
the courts, in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,512 
approved legislation that eliminated socially favorable policies at the FCC.513 
While those changes may have provided robust opportunities for new 
technologies and allowed broadcasters to operate at better efficiency, the 
removal of social regulation removed the discussion of race and minority groups. 
Diversity and the marketplace of ideas were to be delivered by an unrestricted 
market. 514 Hence, the application of viewpoint diversity became problematic in 
the deregulated broadcast market.515 Horowitz suggested that as technologies 
changed and the market evolved, the broad notions of public interest got lost.516 
Corporate and business interests are perceived as more important, where the 
needs of disadvantaged and underrepresented groups are seen as secondary. 
Standing on the side of businesses was part of President Reagan's goal when he 
initialized his plan of supply-side economics (also known as trickle down 
511 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 220. 
512 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
513 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 260. Some of the policies eliminated were equal time provision, the Fairness 
doctrine, and comparative license renewals. 
514 Id. at 21. 
515 Id. at 16. 
51e Id. 
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economics). The assumption was that by providing tax cuts to big business, 
entrepreneurs would be encouraged to use their profits as an incentive to be 
more productive, increase employment and to re-invest. However, instead of 
looking to re-invest profits, many industries (especially broadcasting) sought to 
remove government restrictions on how they conducted business. This equated 
to a reduced emphasis on public interest. Both free market rhetoric and 
deregulation in the telecommunications industry intensified during the 1990s, 
which, according to Horowitz, damaged any hopes of continuing with social 
regulation within the industry.517 
1990s: RECONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING RACE 
The decision in Metro Broadcasting, although closely decided, was a 
warm reassurance that the courts still considered race and the historical 
discrimination against minorities as important. Race and ethnic identity provided 
a relevant basis for preference policies, if they were narrowly tailored to meet a 
specific, compelling interest. The majority correctly noted that minorities were late 
entrants into media ownership and were often handicapped, as they usually 
owned less valuable properties that served smaller audiences in geographically 
limited areas.518 The fact that the Supreme Court recognized the considerable 
obstacles that minorities had to overcome presented a clear understanding of 
how race and discrimination combined to effectively keep minorities out of 
broadcast ownership. 
517 Id. at 67. 
518 497 U.S. 547 at 554. 
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The Supreme Court majority based their support of minority 
enhancements in comparative hearings and the distress sale policy on several 
issues. First, these polices promoted program diversity, which was asserted to be 
a compelling government interest. The policies had an overall benefit for society, 
not just minority groups. Second, the policy remedied past discrimination against 
minorities in ownership by providing entrance into the industry. The majority 
accurately reasoned that minority ownership policies and the quest for 
programming diversity did not mean programs that appealed to minorities would 
not appeal to non-minorities. 519 Nor did it mean that in every case minority 
ownership would lead to minmity programming or a minority viewpoint. 
The Supreme Court wrote that the Commission never completely relied on 
market forces to ensure audience needs were met. 520 Economics and economic 
theory cannot be the only determining factors regarding broadcast and 
telecommunications reform. There is a strong need to consider other factors, 
such as societal and consumer concerns as well as industry competition. 521 That 
was in 1990. As discussed in chapters I and 11, since the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, the marketplace was the sole dictator of how audience needs were 
519 I would argue that in fact minority programming differs greatly from majority programming. A few years 
ago, Fox Network considered "Living Single" for cancellation. Minority groups waged a phone and letter 
writing campaign to save the show. When compared with viewing among the white population, Living Single 
ranked in the bottom 100 shows in the Nielsen ratings. However, in black viewing households the show was 
consistently in the top 20's. Although this is not empirical proof that minority oriented programming would not 
appeal to non-minorities, it serves as a real-life example of how tastes in programming and content differ by 
race. 
520497 U.S. 547 at 571 (1990). 
521 John Fortunato and Shannon E. Martin, The Courts and the FCC: Diversity and the Broadcast Provisions 
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 21 COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW (1999). 
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met. Minority interests continue to go unfulfilled, as demonstrated in the recent 
boycotts of network programming 522 and the loss of minority owned stations. 523 
The dissent disputed the need for racial preferences, stating that race-
neutral polices should be used. However, the "Blue Book," the industry's first 
attempt at outlining public interest in broadcasting was a race-neutral document 
aimed at encouraging diversity of content. By the late 1960s and throughout 
1970s it became evident that relying on race neutral polices to provide 
programming diversity was not working, at least in terms of minority 
programming. 524 
The dissent vigorously argued for race neutral policies that would help the 
nation become a "society untouched by a history of exclusion." 525 Such 
aspirations, wrote Justice O'Connor, were the thrust of the Constitution. But 
according to Bell, it is the inability of whites to recognize and accept the fact that 
discrimination still exists that hinders the overall efforts to achieve racial 
balance. 526 And although O'Connor stated the use of race classifications may 
stigmatize racial or ethnic groups, 527 that perspective overlooks the long-standing 
history of racial discrimination against minority groups. 528 
Some argue that whites are not willing to accept accountability for the 
problems that currently exist nor do they deem any level of personal sacrifice 
522 Breyer, supra note 260. 
523 NTIA, supra note 102. 
524 See Kerner Commission, supra note 437; Window Dressing, supra note 440. 
525 497 U.S. 547 at 611 (1990). 
526 /d. 
527 Id. at 604 
528 Harris, supra note 272. 
137 
necessary to right systematic or societal wrongs. 529 The evidence that whites are 
still unable to accept the deep-rooted effects of racism can be inferred from the 
continued debate over affirmative action and preferential programs. 530 O'Connor 
suggests that race could never be used in ways that would not burden individuals 
who were not members of the preferred racial group. 531 But when systemic 
racism and discrimination marginalizes segments of society, how should the 
government go about protecting their concerns? Aren't those groups still unduly 
burdened in ways beyond their control? 
1990S AND BEYOND: WHAT LIES AHEAD 
Out of all the ownership policies, tax certificates were the only policy 
strongly supported by the NAB. 532 Because the policy presented a situation 
where minorities and white media owners would both profit, the industry 
embraced it. The distress sale was strongly opposed because, as Barlow 
reflected on the concerns of minority media owners, there was a concern that 
"unscrupulous minority groups would use the policy to blackmail white station 
owners. "533 It seemed senseless to assume that minorities would mount a 
campaign to blackmail major white-owned station owners to turn over their 
properties. Even Justice Scalia quashed the thought of a great minority backlash 
through preference polices as he stated in Fullilove that "the federal government 
529 Bell, supra note 28. 
530 Id. 
531 497 U.S. 547 at 630 (1990). 
532 Barlow, supra note 84 at 251. 
533 Id. at 252. 
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is unlikely to be captured by minority racial or ethnic groups and used as an 
instrument of discrimination." 534 
The FCC considered setting aside spectrum frequency for minorities, 
however that idea was rejected because the predominance of white broadcasters 
would not be able to benefit."535 As recently as the early 1990s, major 
broadcasting groups were willing to provide investment finds for minorities 
seeking station ownership. However, the caveat was that white owners would be 
allowed to increase their ownership caps and nationwide concentration. 536 Such 
stipulations provide real-life testimony to Bell's interest-convergence theory. It 
would seem that through the acceptance of some polices and through the 
rejection of others, the fate of minority broadcast owners is inextricably tied to the 
overall profit and concentration potential for major media conglomerations. 
534 497 U.S. 547 at 566. 
535 Barlow, supra note 84 at 252. 
536 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 67. Rupert Murdoch, and his Fox group, sought an 
increase the nationwide coverage of its TV stations from 35% to 45%. In exchange, Murdoch proposed to 
donate up to $150 million dollars to an investment fund for minority broadcasters. 
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CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to explore the concept of race in minority 
ownership policies through the analysis of court decisions. While none of the 
cases analyzed specifically addressed the issue of tax certificates, the issues of 
comparative hearings and distress sales were thoroughly examined. 
Question 1: In what ways have the courts viewed the issue of race and 
diversity in broadcast ownership? 
The courts initially viewed race within the broadcast media as a social 
concept and a way to diversify media ownership and media content. When 
deregulation began to occur, race was viewed as a discriminatory agent in the 
open broadcasting marketplace. 
Legally and socially, the concept of race was initially defined in terms of 
group rights, as seen in TV 9 and Garrett. Looking back to the civil rights 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, race was a condition that placed certain 
segments of society at a disadvantage. With the remnants of segregation 
embedded in society, race was seen as a label. In order to correct the injustices 
done to races, policies needed to be sensitive and inclusive of all social groups. 
Up until 1995, the Supreme Court (and the lower courts) had deferred to federal 
agencies and the creation of affirmative action programs. In fact, the standard of 
review was intermediate scrutiny, which viewed racial classifications under a less 
suspect lens. 
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Racial preferences in broadcasting were based upon social benefits and 
the public interest- the more diverse people involved in broadcasting, the better 
the chances of wide-ranging programming. Diversity of programming (and 
ownership) was elucidated through the concepts of the "marketplace of ideas" 
and varied viewpoints. These principles considered part of the First Amendment, 
as such the FCC (through its creation and subsequent authorities and powers 
granted to the agency) was charged with upholding the First Amendment. As 
seen in TV 9, Garrett, and West Michigan, the courts acknowledged that 
minorities could contribute to the overall goal of viewpoint diversity. As such, 
when minorities were seeking to be included in broadcast programming and 
ownership, policies that provided them an opportunity to do so would be upheld. 
However, as economic and social changes took place, there was a 
backlash against such policies. Such policies were perceived as forms of 
"reverse discrimination" against the white majority. During the 1980s, preference 
policies began to be invalidated, as the court no longer saw their purposes as 
legitimate. Race neutral laws replaced racial consciousness in the law. Supreme 
Court cases such as Bakke, Croson, and Adarand started the move away from 
race-consciousness towards race-neutrality. As critical race theorists lament, this 
colorblind view of anti-discrimination law has separated injustices against 
minorities from their social and historical roots. In fact, removing racial 
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distinctions does very little to actually prevent discrimination and it makes 
attempts to identify and correct discrimination very difficult. 537 
Group rights and historical perspectives of racial discrimination gave way 
to individual harms. Group rights that were supported in cases like TV9 and 
Garrett were disregarded as illegitimate. Discrimination against groups began to 
be attributed to individual actions in isolated, specific contexts. As such, minority 
preferences were challenged because they did not conform to the new legal 
standard of race-neutrality as seen in the cases of National Black Media Coalition 
and Shurberg. But focusing on individual harms perpetrated on minority groups 
does not address the social conditions that cause discrimination to exist in the 
first place.538 
As in Adarand, when a federal highway contracting provision was 
invalidated, the effects rippled to other areas such as broadcasting and were 
seen in the Metro Broadcasting case. Shurberg and Justice O'Connor's 
dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting spoke of the need to exclude the past 
from the present, in hopes for a better future. For society (and the broadcasting 
industry) to be more diverse, race needed to be removed from the law. 
Preference polices were often labeled as "stereotyping" all minorities to think, 
feel, and act the same way. However, that analysis is somewhat faulty in that 
there is a shared cultural experience within every racial group. Furthermore, 
537 Christine Enemark, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Forcing the FCC into a New Constitutional 
Regime, 33 COLUM. L.J. & Soc. PROBS. 215 {1997). 
538 Robert St. Martin Westley, Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence: Race and the Rights of Groups (1993) 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University). 
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when a case is decided it sets a precedent for other cases that turn on similar 
issues, regardless of the circumstances of the case. So where a case involving a 
federal affirmative action set-aside for the highway construction industry 
ultimately influenced how the FCC could construct and administer policies that 
dealt with minority ownership in the media. To assume that the notion of truly 
"individualized" remedies exists may not be completely accurate. 539 
Bell argued that race neutrality erects barriers to achieving racial relief. 540 
As minorities look to challenge bias and discrimination, they must present proof 
of actual behavior .that produced a discriminatory effect and caused harm. Even 
armed with that proof, Bell asserts that the relief due would be limited to a very 
specific context. 541 While it may be easy to identify a placard that reads "No 
Blacks Allowed" in a public facility as proof of discrimination, it becomes much 
harder to document discrimination in the privately held broadcast industry. As so 
many factors can figure into the purchase and success of a broadcast station, 
identifying every instance of discrimination trivializes the true inequities that exist. 
While the FCC rationales for minority ownership policies were still in 
effect, the factual basis that had long supported the policies had been 
questioned. Minority ownership policies were not tailored expressly to meet the 
goals of viewpoint diversity. The dissents written in Metro Broadcasting 
questioned whether the rationales of viewpoint diversity were compelling enough 
for race-conscious measures. This reflection in court decisions since Metro 
539 Id. 
540 Bell, supra note 28. 
541 Id. 
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Broadcasting has hampered the FCC's ability to support its minority ownership 
policies or to create new ones. Note that the courts speak generally of the 
Constitution's extension of rights to individual citizens. Yet that concept contrasts 
with the way the First Amendment is often viewed. Closely tied to the 
marketplace of ideas, the First Amendment justifies free expression because of 
the benefits to society. This creates a conflict of interest, as the rights of 
individuals are advocated above all and then society and groups are seen as the 
basis for certain portions of the Constitution. 
Question 2: Is there a difference in the rationales used among the various 
courts (e.g., Supreme Court versus Courts of Appeal) in deciding minority 
ownership cases? 
Yes, there was change in the rationales used by the courts in deciding 
minority ownership cases. Even within the courts of appeals, there was some 
division as to what basis such cases would be decided. 
The courts shifted in their interpretation of FCC rationales for minority 
ownership policies. Initially, the policies were supported as a way to diversify 
viewpoints and as a way to overcome discrimination. Overall, the rationales used 
by the D.C. Circuit Court and the Supreme Court was similar in many respects. 
Both courts deferred to administrative agencies (FCC) and congressional action, 
as they [courts] recognized Congress' power to promote the interest of society. 
However, it is evident that the D.C. Circuit Court began to change its 
approach to minority ownership polices. In National Black Media Coalition, the 
courts allowed the industry's focus on technological advancements to prevail 
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over citizen concerns. With the coming of new technologies such as personal 
communication services (PCS), high-definition television (HDTV), and digital 
broadcast satellite (DBS), the FCC was looking to advance pro-industry, 
deregulatory policies. Congress soon followed the FCC's stance as comparative 
hearings were replaced with competitive bidding. The courts, without questioning 
what impact these changes may have had on minorities, upheld the deregulation 
of the industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Although minority ownership figures have improved slightly, the number of 
minority owned broadcast facilities is still relatively low. Financing still creates a 
huge barrier for many minorities, as financiers consider investing in such 
ventures as a "high-risk".542 Of the $90 billion dollars of institutional equity capital 
invested in United States businesses, less than $2 million is targeted for minority 
start-ups. 543 Whites, who tend not to invest in minority ventures, control the 
majority of the financing. Minority-owned firms control only one percent of funds 
in the venture capital community. 544 Without financing, minority owners are often 
unable to buy properties. However, new venture capitalists, such as 
Queztal/Chase Capital Partners, are willing to invest monies for women and 
542 Many of the owners did not have a great deal of broadcasting experience. Moreover, for those who did, 
financiers considered investing in broadcast properties to be risky, as such properties were licensed and 
controlled by government authorities. 
543 Christopher Williams, In The Minority: Venture Capitalists Focused on Non-mainstream Deals are Making 
Headway, Slowly, BARRONS, June 5, 2000 at 34. 
544 Id. 
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minority communications companies.545 So things may be on the up swing, but 
only time will tell. 
For those minority owners who own broadcast stations, competing for 
advertising dollars has always been difficult, even more so since deregulation. 
Stations that are programmed specifically for minority audiences are still unable 
to earn as much revenue (per listener) as more "general programming" 
stations. 546 Even though minority owned stations that carry minority programming 
average sixty-five percent greater revenues than small, majority competitors, 
general market non-minority broadcasters average revenues that are fourteen 
percent greater than minority owners in the same format. 547 As Ofori observed, 
minority owned stations are under performing in terms of power ratios as 
compared to majority broadcasters across similar formats. 548 Even more 
compelling is evidence that majority broadcasters that air minority programming 
still garner more revenues than minority owners who provide similar 
programming-twenty percent more on the average.549 
Even when market size is held constant, black stations were lower priced 
than white stations. 550 While the lower price was attributed to format and 
audience characteristics, 551 recent studies affirm this to be true and note that 
545 Id. 
546 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83. 
547 Id. at 146. 
548 Id. 
549 Id. 
550 Lawrence Soley and George Hough 111, Black Ownership of Commercial Radio Stations: An Economic 
Evaluation, 22 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 455 (1978). 
551 Id. 
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black audiences are extremely undervalued. 552 It is this underestimation of black 
audiences, by advertisers, that results in lower advertising revenues. 553 Lack of 
substantial advertising revenue, in addition to competition from group owned 
stations, may cause a minority broadcaster to sell its stations. 
In spite of continued advertising discrimination, deregulatory effects, and 
poor financing, there are a few minority broadcasters that are succeeding. Radio 
One, founded in 1981 by African-American broadcaster Cathy Hughes, has 
managed to amass over twenty radio stations. 554 Many of those stations are 
located in the top twenty African-American media markets. As recently as March 
2000, the company managed to purchase twelve radio stations in seven different 
markets. 555 In addition, the majority of the stations are programmed with an 
urban-contemporary format. 556 And according to an Arbitron report, urban 
formats are the most popular and well-listened formats for black Americans. 557 
Nevertheless, deregulation has had a profound impact on minority 
participation in the broadcast industry. Socioeconomic factors preclude the 
existence of minority advocacy that has existed in the 1960s and 1970s. As a 
result, the market has been unwilling to sustain a real effort to address minority 
issues and provide diverse programming. Minority interests are not being met, as 
552 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83. 
553 Id.; See also Soley, supra note 550. 
554 Njuguna Kabugi, Radio One, Inc: Announces It's Third Acquisition in Richmond, Virginia, THE 
WASHINGTON I FORMER, March 3, 1999 at 6. 
555 Katy Bachman, Radio One Leads Second CC Wave, MEDIAWEEK, March 20, 2000 at 17. 
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demonstrated in the recent boycotts of network programming 558 and the loss of 
minority owned stations. 559 
FCC public interest arguments have valued diversity in programming and 
ownership. Observing the small number of minority owners, policies were created 
to increase broadcast ownership participation in hopes of diversifying viewpoints 
and programming. And for a time, judicial and government involvement 
supported those policies. 
However, the link that once existed between minority ownership and the 
diversity of viewpoint argument has disappeared. Individual harm, combined with 
race-neutral thinking foreclosed consideration of minority group ownership. All 
minorities do not think the same way. However, relying on that simple 
assumption to address the need (or lack of a need) for minority ownership is 
inaccurate. 
As the majority accurately reasoned in Metro Broadcasting, minority 
ownership policies and the quest for programming diversity did not mean 
programs that appealed to minorities would not appeal to non-minorities. 560 Nor 
did it mean that in every case minority ownership would lead to minority 
programming or a minority viewpoint. Minority ownership policies ought to 
produce a more reflective media, accommodating other interpretations, images, 
558 See generally, John P. McCarthy, Adjusting the Color, AMERICA, November 13, 1999 at 17; Stacy A. 
Teicher, Advocacy groups work to sway Hollywood, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 20, 1999 at 2; 
Greg Braxton and Nicholas Riccardi, Rev. Jesse Jackson Blasts TV on Lack of Diversity Media, Los 
ANGELES TIMES, September 24, 1999 at A-35. 
559 NTIA, supra note 102. 
560 497 U.S. 568, 579-580. 
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and views. Judge Wald, writing the dissent in Shurberg, said the distress sale 
policy rested on "the assumption that viewers and listeners of every race will 
benefit from access to a broader range of programming .... "561 
I certainly agree with the Metro Broadcasting majority in that minority 
programming produces a more reflective media and a recent study supports that 
supposition as well. A 2001 study of minority and non-minority broadcast owned 
radio and television stations revealed that news directors at minority owned 
stations were significantly more likely to report stories geared towards specific 
audiences, specifically minority audiences. 562 Minority owned radio stations were 
more often to report public affair programming that was appealing to minorities 
and were more likely to employ a greater percentage of on-air personnel who 
were racial and ethnic minorities.563 Overall, the study showed that minority radio 
stations owners were more integrated into the station and played active roles in 
news and public affairs decisions, as the race of owners played a role in the 
focus of programming aimed at minority audiences. 564 
While these results do not necessarily hold true for television station 
(minority or non-minority owned), I would argue that in fact minority programming 
differs greatly from majority programming. A few years back when the Fox 
Network comedy show "Living Single" was considered for cancellation, minority 
561 876 F .2d 902 at 942. 
562 Laurie Mason, Christine Bachen, Stephanie Craft, Support For FCC Minority Ownership Policies: How 
Broadcast Station Owner Race and Ethnicity Affect News and Public Affairs Programming Diversity, 6 
COMM. L. & POL'Y 37-73 AT 56 (2001). 
563 Id. at 58- 60. 
564 Id. at 66. 
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groups waged a massive phone and e-mail campaign to save the show. 565 When 
looking at viewing patterns among the white population, "Living Single" ranked in 
the bottom 100 shows in the Nielsen ratings. However, in black viewing 
households the show was consistently in the top 20s. As Newton Minow 
observed, present overall programming is not aimed at the public taste: 
"Ratings tell us only that some people have their television 
sets turned on ... a rating at best is and indication of how 
many people saw what you gave them."566 
Similarly, blacks and whites tend to enjoy different types of 
programming. 567 For example, the top 5 shows in black viewing households 
during the 1996-1997 season were: 1) Living Single, 2) NY Undercover, 3) 
Martin, 4) Family Matters, and 5) Moesha. In contrast, the top five shows for 
white viewers were: 1) Seinfield, 2) Friends, 3) Suddenly Susan, 4) ER, and 5) 
Monday Night Football. 568 Many of the "black-oriented" programs have little 
crossover value to white audiences, especially during prime time.569 As a result, 
reaching minorities through prime time programming is difficult. 570 
Two former African-American network television producers, Claudia Pryor 
and Gregory Branch, know first hand how difficult it can be to convince network 
executives to include minorities in programming. They both note that many 
network executives view stories about blacks or stories with black characters as 
565 Popular Demand Brings "Living Single" Back for Fifth Season, Jet, September 15, 1997 at 58. 
566 Supra note 3 at 25. 
567 Id. The article referred to a 1996-1997 study done by ad agency BBDO Worldwide, which examined 
viewing patterns of black and white viewers during the prime-time season. 
568 Id. 
569 Mark Dawidziak and Tom Feran, Is TV's Racism Black and White or Just Green?, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, August 15, 1999 at 1A. 
510 Id. 
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"not marketable." 571 Bri/1's Content magazine conducted a survey of television 
news magazines, such as 20/20 and 48 Hours, shows over a two-month period. 
What they found was that the three major networks did very little to show minority 
stories to the general public: NBC (0%), ABC (7%), and CBS (25%).572 The 
comments of Pryor and Branch echo what many network executives already 
knew as over twenty of the executives and reporters interviewed stated race was 
a "simmering" yet rarely discussed issue.573 Often, stories with a minority focus 
are ignored due to lack of approval when the story is initially pitched to 
executives or if the story does pass the initial pitch, the failure to pass the 
rigorous screening process because black characters undergo tougher 
scrutiny. 574 To further complicate matters, most of the executive producers for 
network television news magazine shows are white males. 
The ability to think of America as a culturally singular nation, as suggested 
by Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting, might be compromised. As 
McChesney observed, we (America) "increasingly have little exposure to cultural 
experiences of broad sectors of society."575 This lack of crossover value might be 
explained by lngber's contention that the marketplace functions with a bias 
towards the status quo. 576 Established groups [media companies] accept ideas 
[programming] and alternatives [competition] from within the dominant culture, 
571 Robert Schmidt, Airing Race, BRILL'S CONTENT, October 2000 at 112- 115; 145-146. 
572 Id. at 115. 
573 Id. at 115. 
574 Id. at 146. 
575 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 145. 
576 Mark Ingber, The Marl<etplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1 DUKE L. J. 71 (1984). 
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which Ingber says only encourages a limited range of ideas from a limited group 
of marketplace participants. Thus the marketplace of ideas has very little impact 
on diversity of viewpoints. 577 This can be supported, practically, by industry 
behavior. Schmidt observed that many executives feel viewers do not want to 
see news stories that feature characters "unlike" themselves. 578 The stories are 
designed to be appealing to a mass audience, which tend to be middle class 
whites. It is exactly these types of approaches to programming at the network 
level that leave little in the way of diverse opportunities in news and 
entertainment. 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
As recently as the early 1990s, major broadcasting groups were willing to 
provide investment funds for minorities seeking station ownership. However, 
such ideas are still tied to the advancement of white broadcasters. There are 
other ways that the industry, the regulators, and the judiciary can help promote 
effective minority ownership policies. 
FCC Solutions 
The FCC, along with Congress and the Internal Revenue Service, should 
re-institute the minority tax certificate. This policy was successfully supported by 
the broadcast industry. Although it provided white owners an opportunity to 
capitalize on minority progress, the policy was still a truly effective mechanism for 
incorporating minorities into broadcast ownership. The policy provided minorities 
577 Id. 
578 Schmidt, supra note 571, at 145. 
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with bargaining power they would not have had otherwise. With some new 
provision, such as caps on the amount of tax gains deferred and limits on the 
number of times a certificate could be used, the policy can help bring new 
owners into a rapidly consolidating industry while limiting the financial benefit to 
existing majority owners. 
In addition to the tax certificate, the FCC should institute a policy that 
would reduce discrimination in advertising. As Ofori's study showed, bias and 
racism towards black owned, black formatted stations still exists.579 In 1986, 
Congressional Representative Cardiss Hollins introduced a bill into the House of 
Representatives that called for the denial of advertising expense deductions for 
businesses that discriminated against minority owned or formatted stations in the 
purchase or placement of advertising.580 The regulation would have allowed an 
aggrieved party the opportunity to bring civil actions to recover lost profits. Such 
a policy would target the problem of discrimination by financially handicapping 
businesses that discriminated. In addition, broadcasters would be able to recoup 
monies lost based on advertising rates, market competition, and other related 
factors. 
There is a concern with such a policy about the ability (or inability) to 
prove systemic advertising discrimination against a minority broadcaster. And 
while one could argue about restraint of speech due to punitive nature of such a 
policy, discrimination in any form is unlawful. If a minority broadcaster were able 
579 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83. 
580 H.R. 5373 (October 2, 1986). 
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to document and prove a system of discrimination against his/her business, then 
there would be cause to claim an injury or threat to the livelihood of their 
business. And as noted in The Federal Trade Commission Act, "unfair methods 
of competition in ... commerce ... and unfair practices in or affecting commerce ... 
are herby declared unlawful."581 If one was to ever dispute the notion that 
discrimination in advertising exists or if the impacts of such discrimination are 
real, then consider the following quote from radio salesperson Luis Alvarez taken 
from Ofori's study: 
"I recall being in front of a buyer and we were discussing 
Ivory Soap and the buyer was telling me they were not 
going to buy ... they said "well, we have studies that show 
Hispanics do not bathe as frequently as non-Hispanics. "582 
More importantly, such discrimination seems to be encouraged by the industry. A 
national radio rep firm, Katz Media, sought to discourage media buys on minority 
owned and/or minority formatted stations when it issued a company-wide memo 
that stated, 
"When it comes to delivering prospects not suspects the 
urban [-formatted stations] deliver the largest amount of 
listeners who turn out to be the least likely to purchase. 
Median age is 23. Very young and very, very, poor 
qualitative profile. 583 
These examples alone may or may not be considered direct evidence of 
systematic discrimination. However, Ofori's study demonstrates there is good 
581 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1). 
582 Civil Rights Forum, supra note 83 at 37. 
583 Id. at 43. 
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reason to believe minority owners would be able to gather substantial 
evidence. 584 
Lastly, the FCC can seek to dedicate frequency space in addition to what 
already exists for minority broadcasters. Somewhere in between educational and 
commercial radio, this frequency would provide women, minorities and other 
marginalized groups an opportunity to present diverse programming to the public. 
Though it is highly unlikely that any FCC proposal such as this would "pass 
industry muster," perhaps the FCC's creation of low-power radio will serve a 
similar purpose. The overall system of creating additional space on the 
frequencies would serve several purposes. Minority owners would be removed 
from competition with larger, group owned stations and could present 
programming without the stress of competing against larger media 
conglomerates. Additionally, creative and distinct programming that might be not 
supported by the majority of the public would have an opportunity to be aired. 
Industry Solutions 
The industry can also help remedy the low participation of minorities 
involved in broadcast ownership. As noted earlier, some major media companies 
were eager to establish minority financing funds but only if the FCC further 
relaxed restrictions on media/ market concentration. This is counter-productive to 
what minority ownership seeks to do, which is to diversify the viewpoints in the 
media. If their [minorities'] progress depends on the advancements of majority 
584 Id. 
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interest, the true rationale behind diversity of views is lost. By increasing 
concentration of major media firms, they [majority media] would possibly have 
greater access and concentration in markets where minority owners would want 
to penetrate. 
The broadcasting industry must make some commitments to diversifying 
its products. One way that can be accomplished is by establishing an industry 
wide fund from a portion of the gains deferred on tax certificates or other tax-free 
sales. The portion can be a very small amount, such as one percent. The fund 
would be open to minority groups for a one-time use in securing radio stations. 
Another less precise solution would be to start an industry supported fund, 
managed by the FCC, by taking a certain percentage of broadcasters profits. All 
broadcasters would be required to give a portion of their profit, perhaps on a tax-
deductible provision. The fund would be available to small businesses, women 
and minorities to use as start-up monies in the communications industry. 
In addition, broadcasters should seek to increase employment and 
management opportunities for minorities. The usage of training and 
developmental programs could be useful in recruiting minority talent into the 
industry. 
Judicial Solutions 
The judiciary can also have a positive impact on the way minorities are 
included in media ownership. First, the judiciary should reassess its position on 
discrimination and affirmative action by returning to an intermediate level of 
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scrutiny. By reviewing race-based preferences with a lower level of scrutiny, the 
courts can still maintain the intent of the Constitution. The government interest 
would still have to be important and a substantial relationship would have to exist 
between the government's classification and the purpose of the policy. 
By returning to an intermediate level of review, race preferences can be 
viewed in a historical context. As strict scrutiny makes any race preference highly 
suspect, it also makes it hard for government agencies to address the needs of 
its constituents. An intermediate level of judicial review would not undermine 
agency authority and would provide then with opportunities to create policies and 
legislation necessary to remedy discrimination in broadcasting, as well as other 
segments of society. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are many directions for further research as this topic crosses the 
disciplines of communications, race studies, and law. Further research should 
endeavor to use a multi-disciplinary approach, as the issues surrounding minority 
ownership are not necessarily confined only to communications studies. 
An analysis of FCC agency decisions on the various race based 
preference policies would be most useful in future research. In addition, a 
comparative analysis of congressional hearings and reports about minority 
ownership would augment FCC decisions and provide the true intent and level of 
evidence the judiciary now demands. In addition, continued use of critical race 
theory to examine the role in communications and communications policy can 
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